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U.S. corporate law scholars have recently recognized that, even in
developed Western countries, there have been different solutions to
the classic agency problem,1 arguably the primary focus of corporate
law that governs the relationship between owners and managers in the
large public corporations which are so important in the world econ-
omy.2 Scholars have also acknowledged that these solutions, which
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1 The problem arises from the separation of ownership and control in large public corpora-
tions. Corporations need large amounts of capital, which numerous, dispersed investors help to
supply, to compete in expanded national and international markets. Because investors generally
have few funds committed to any one enterprise, they do not find it cost efficient to monitor
management. Since management's interests are different from those of shareholders, manage-
ment may use its control of an enterprise to pursue its own goals at the expense of shareholder
owners. The problem for shareholders is how to minimize management's self-interested behav-
ior. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDmER C. MEANS, THm MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 78-82 (Transaction Publishers, Murray L. Weidenbaum & Mark Jensen, int., reprinted
1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-ime Report, 15 CAR-
Dozo L. REv. 837, 838 (1994). See also infra subpart IIB1.
2 See, eg., Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 15 CAR-
DOZO L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1994) (citing OLrvER E. WILLIAMSON, Tim ECONOMIC INsTrruTIONs
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fall under the general heading of corporate governance,3 do not arise
solely from the evolution of some fundamental economic order or
logic, but are shaped by social, political and, more generally, cultural
forces, often unique to a particular country.4 In their studies they
OF CAPrTALISM 298-325 (1985)) (arguing that the goal of corporate law is to establish rules that
align the interests of managers with those of shareholders in the most cost-efficient manner).
3 According to Professor Mark J. Roe, U.S. corporate governance is simply "the relation-
ship among a firm's shareholders, its board of directors, and its senior managers." See MARK J.
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OwNERs: TnE POLITICAL ROOTs OF AMERICAN CORI'ORAE
FINANCE vii (1994). In other countries, additional constituencies may be involved in corporate
governance. See, e.g., infra subpart IVA.
4 The foremost U.S. advocate of this position is Professor Roe, who explains the develop-
ment of U.S. corporate governance from a political perspective. See ROE, supra note 3, at ix
("American corporate structures are in considerable part the result of political decisions, many
long forgotten, about the organization of financial intermediaries."). See also Mark J. Roe, A
Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. Rv. 10 (1991). According to
Professor Roe, economic developments led to the rise of the large public corporation, with dis-
persed shareholders and professional managers. How a particular country responds to this phe-
nomenon to produce a corporate governance "equilibrium" or solution characteristic of that
country depends upon numerous ideological, political and historical - in sum, "cultural" - fac-
tors, in addition to economic forces. See ROE, supra note 3, at 24-25.
Many studies of comparative and foreign corporate governance highlight the historical and
cultural nature of solutions to the corporate agency problem. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John
C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1997 (1994); Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers:
A Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing corporate governance in
Germany); James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance and United
States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) (discussing French corporate govern-
ance); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders:
The Place of MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1993) (discussing
Swedish institutional investor monitoring); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the
Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102
YALE L.J. 871 (1993) (discussing structure of Japanese corporate governance); Mark J. Roe,
Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE LJ.
1927 (1993) (comparing corporate governance in listed countries). Butsee Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examina-
tion of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1996) (arguing that U.S.
corporate governance studies "romanticize" foreign corporate governance and overlook the
weakness of foreign systems); J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches Bid for Japanese
Firms, 102 YALE LJ. 2005 (1993) (questioning the value of studies in comparative corporate
governance, given the relative unimportance of governance as opposed to capital and product
market competition in a firm's success); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Les-
sons From Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE LJ. 2021 (1993) (similar skepticism about the
importance of corporate governance for increasing shareholder value).
Non-U.S. academics and writers have also examined their own, and other, corporate gov-
ernance systems. See, e.g., JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY. A STUDY OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FrvE CouNTRms 248-343 (1994) (discussing U.K. corporate gov-
ernance and, among other things, reforms proposed by Cadbury Committee); CONFERENCE ON
INsTITUTIONAL INVEsTORS (Theodor Baums ed., 1992) (collecting essays on the role of institu-
tional investors in different jurisdictions); CONTEMPORARY IssUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(D.D. Prentice & P.RJ. Holland eds., 1993) (collecting essays on corporate governance topics);
EUROPEAN Busnmss LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONI-
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have thus emphasized cultural differences and historical influences in
the emergence of corporate governance systems. 5 Culture means here
the conceptual framework whereby individuals, generally citizens of
the same country, make sense of and justify the world, including their
actions and those of others.6
This development in corporate law scholarship makes sense be-
cause of the important phenomenon of globalization or international-
ization of securities markets, investments and of corporate finance.7
zATIoN (Richard M. Buxbaum et aL eds., 1991) (reviewing worldwide harmonization and capital
market developments); EuRoP? TAKEOVERS - LAW AND PRAcTcIE (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch eds., 1992) (looking at different European corporate governance systems with a fo-
cus upon takeovers); 4 RicHARD M. BUXBAUM AND KLAUS J. Hopr, LEGAL HARMoNIZATION
AND TmE BusINEsS ENTERPiSE, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw (1988) (Reviewing harmoni-
zation of business law). Many non-U.S. academics and writers have emphasized the cultural
complexity of corporate governance. See, &g., Olivier Pastrd, Le gouvernment d'entreprise" ques-
tions de mdthodes et enjeux thiforiques, 31 REv. ECON. FIN. 15, 18-19 (1994); Jean-Marie
Thiveaud, De la gouvernance des grandes societis: un incessant difflrend dans l'espace et le
temps, 31 Rnv. tCON. FiN. 243, 256 (1994).
5 The dominant U.S. paradigm for corporate law scholarship is based upon law and eco-
nomics. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 916 (1992) ("By all accounts, the integration of
economics and finance theory into corporate law during the late 1970s and early 1980s brought it
to the forefront of quality legal scholarship generally."). Some economists have recently ex-
plored the historicity, and even economic irrationality, of certain economic outcomes. See, ag.,
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through ime, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 359, 362 (1994)
("History demonstrates that ideas, ideologies, myths, dogmas, and prejudices matter, and an
understanding of the way they evolve is necessary for further progress in developing a frame-
work to understand societal change."); Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary Theorizing
About Economic Change, paper presented at the Columbia University School of Law Center for
Law and Economic Studies Workshops, Fall 1994-1995, on "Path Dependency and the Evolution
of Economic Practice and Institutions" (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(describing evolutionary theorizing in economics). See generally Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolu-
tion in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REv. 641 (1996).
6 The anthropologist Clifford Geertz has explained culture as follows:
No matter how much one trains one's attention on the supposedly hard facts of social exist-
ence, who owns the means of production, who has the guns, the dossiers, or the newspapers,
the supposedly soft facts of that existence, what do people imagine human life to be all
about, how do they think one ought to live, what grounds belief, legitimizes punishment,
sustains hope, or accounts for loss, crowd in to disturb simple pictures of might, desire,
calculation, and interest.
CLiFFoRD GEERTZ, AFTER TrE FACT: Two CouNTREs, FOUR DECADES, ONE AN'rimOPOLO-
GIsT 43 (1995). See also CuiFxoRD GEERTZ, Tim INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED
EssAYs 89 (1973) ("it denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in sym-
bols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.").
7 See, e.g., Richard C. Breeden, The Globalization of Law and Business in the 1990's, 28
WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 509,513 (1993) ("Capital will be king in the global economy. Those who
have the capital to invest will seek to maximize their returns without regard for national bounda-
ries or loyalties."); Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets:
Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 349, 350 (1990) ("[T]he
evidence shows that international investment activity has grown tremendously over the past dec-
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U.S. investors, both institutional and retail, are investing in securities
of foreign companies, whether in the U.S. markets or abroad.8 Both
U.S. and foreign world-class public companies, competing vigorously
with one another in world product markets,9 similarly compete for
capital and financing flexibility in world financial markets. 10 United
States legal academics who follow developments in business, as well as
in corporate and financial law, thus encounter, among other non-U.S.
phenomena, foreign companies and their governance. 1
Because of the internationalization of markets, all corporate gov-
ernance systems may not survive. Either one system may "make
sense" and thus prevail in the developing global capital market, or,
since cultural differences are slow to disappear, numerous systems
may continue to co-exist and to interact in the foreseeable future.'
2
ade, and there is reason to believe that international trading will continue to expand vigorously
in the future."); Joel Seligman, Another Unspecial Study: The SEC's Market 2000 Report and
Competitive Developments in the United States Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 485, 492 (1995)
("A second principal market dynamic in market regulation is internationalization."). For early,
but significant, work on this subject, see Carl T. Bodolus, The Internationalization of the Securi-
ties Markets, 29 Bus. LAW. 107 (March 1974); Manuel F. Cohen, Toward An International Securi-
ties Marke4 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 357 (1973).
8 U.S. institutional investors, which category includes pension funds, whether private or
public, insurance companies, mutual funds and bank collective trust funds, are clearly making
significant offshore investments, See eg., Fanto, supra note 4, at 10-15 & accompanying notes, as
are retail investors, either through these institutional investors or individually. See Seligman,
supra note 7, at 491-95 (describing the increase in the number of retail investors and speculating
whether, given improvements in technology, retail investors can easily invest directly offshore).
United States investors, whether retail or institutional, may purchase and hold foreign shares
directly in the foreign market or indirectly in the United States through shares, evidenced by
American or Global Depositary Receipts ("ADRs" or "GDRs") that represent an interest in the
underlying foreign securities. See generally Joseph Velli, American Depositary Receipts: An
Overview, 17 FORDaAM INr'L L.J. S38 (1994). A sign of the importance of foreign shares to all
U.S. investors is that Morningstar, a private company providing information on mutual funds
and shares, covers investments in ADRs. See MORNiNGSTAR, DFcisioN-MmANr, TooLs FOR
BErER INVESTING 30-31 (1995).
9 See, e.g., Klaus Schwab & Claude Smadja, Power and Policy: The New Economic World
Order, 72 Hasv. Bus. REv. 40, 41 (Nov.-Dec. 1994) ("Corporations and countries must now
compete not only against rivals in their own league but also against a continual stream of new-
comers, while at the same time playing catch-up with competitors claiming to have made the
latest break-throughs.").
10 See, eg., Ramseyer, supra note 4, at 2006 (arguing that, unless a company has the flexibil-
ity to offer securities in different markets, it will be disadvantaged in global product
competition).
11 Since casebooks generally tend to reflect "settled" concepts in a field, that globalization
has found its way into casebooks underscores its importance. See eg., HAL S. Scotr & PmLn,
A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACinoNS, Poucy, AND REGULATION (2d ed.,
1995) (including chapters on internationalization of U.S. securities markets and securities mar-
kets in the European Union and Japan).
12 Another way of putting the issue is to ask whether, in the developing global market, cor-
porate governance systems are "converging". See, eg., Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 21-22. See
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Under any view on the evolution of worldwide corporate governance,
however, scholars must understand existing corporate governance sys-
tems as cultural products. If these systems are viewed as evolving to-
wards a single model, it is useful to comprehend the cultural factors
that either hinder or help a particular country's system move towards
that model. If different corporate governance systems survive, their
cultural origins should be examined and understood all the more.
There is also an increased practical need to comprehend these systems
since many U.S. investors are under legal obligations to take seriously
foreign corporate governance.13
U.S. investment and financial communities, and legal academics,
must therefore understand foreign corporate governance as a complex
cultural product. 4 They should also realize that an outsider may find
also Fanto, supra note 4, at 71-74 (discussing possible directions in the transformation of French
corporate governance); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Capital Markets and Corporate Controk A
Study of France, Germany and the UK, in 10 EcoN. POL'Y 189,215 n.8 (Apr. 1990) (arguing that
there is no clear merit to one country's solution to the agency problem over another); Macey &
Miller, supra note 4, at 107-108 (describing obstacles to convergence in Germany, Japan and the
United States); RoE, supra note 3, at 222-25 (questioning whether German, Japanese and U.S.
corporate governance are in fact evolving towards a single model); ROBERTA ROmANO, THE
GENrus OF AimluCAN CORPORATE LAW 136-37 (1993) (pointing out that market conditions
supporting corporate governance solutions in certain jurisdictions may be disappearing). Cf.
Paul David, Heroes, Herds and Hysteresis in Technological History: Thomas Edison and 'The
Battle of the Systems' Reconsidered, 1 INDus. & CoRP. CHANGE 129,139 (1992) (describing how
the triumph and the endurance of a particular technology may be due not so much to its effi-
ciency, as to the institutional advantage of being the first technology to be established).
13 See, e.g., Department of Labor Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration Interpretive
Bulletin, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 38,861 (1994) (stating that plan officials have the same fiduciary
responsibility to vote proxies in foreign companies as they do with respect to U.S. corporations:
"[I]t is the Department's view that the same principles apply. Namely, plan fiduciaries have a
responsibility to vote proxies on issues that may affect the value of the [foreign] shares in the
plan's portfolio.").
14 This statement in fact includes an assumption: that corporate governance affects the prof-
itability of companies and thus the economic life of the country in which companies are located.
See, ag., ROE, supra note 3, at ix ("But although poor governance did not spark failure, better
governance might have snuffed out the fire when it was a spark and not a conflagration. Eco-
nomic and technological change set up the problem, but corporate governance - how and
whether those at the top of the firm reacted - influenced whether the firms succeeded despite
the challenge."); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumula-
tive Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124 n.1 (1994) ("Corporate governance matters, however, be-
cause management matters."); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and
the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FrN. 831, 847 (1993) ("In industry after industry with
excess capacity, managers fail to recognize that they themselves must downsize; instead they
leave the exit to others while they continue to invest. When all managers behave this way, exit is
significantly delayed at substantial cost of real resources to society."); W. Carl Kester & Timothy
A. Luehrman, Rehabilitating the Leveraged Buyout, 73 HARV. Bus. Rnv. 119, 128 (May-June
1995) ("The first lesson may be obvious, but it bears repeating: How a company is governed
matters."); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Center for
Research in Security Prices, The University of Chicago Graduate School of Business 13 (Sept.
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cultural differences, characteristics and pressures often difficult to un-
derstand and sometimes even to recognize as differences. Foreign cor-
porate governance is complexly determined by the pressures of a
given historical context, and thus requires a special effort for an out-
sider to comprehend.'5 A foreign system is not unknowable, but
knowledge of it requires a different effort than an uncritical applica-
tion of one's own conceptual and cultural perspective, which will high-
light only issues of concern to that perspective, but of little importance
to the foreign system. Understanding a foreign corporate governance
system involves an effort to embrace the perspective of and to enter
into a dialogue with those living in the other system.' 6
This Article examines how well the mandatory disclosure system
established under U.S. securities laws and regulations leads foreign
companies to provide U.S. investors with a useful cultural account of
foreign corporate governance. The federal securities laws, and rules
and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
make corporate governance a required subject of disclosure for cer-
tain foreign companies, generally those publicly selling their securities
to U.S. investors or listing their securities on U.S. securities exchanges
or exchange equivalents. 17 This disclosure, moreover, is the only le-
gally, as opposed to market, mandated public discussion of the topic in
the United States, and liability under the same securities laws is
designed to ensure its accuracy.' 8 It is thus appropriate to ask
whether SEC mandatory disclosure is sensitive to cultural differences
in corporate governance.
1995) (unpublished paper on file with the author) (refuting arguments downplaying importance
of corporate governance).
15 Determinism here should not conjure up simple notions of cause and effect, but multiple
pressures interacting and reacting in complex ways. See, e.g., RoE, supra note 3, at 207 ("The
fact that law and regulation is a multidimensional drama, with real (and perceived) goals of
preventing abuse or stabilizing institutions as one of the dimensions, takes nothing away from
the claim that politics, ideology, and interest groups are key to another dimension of that law-
making."). Cf, Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street A Contextual Approach to the
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REv. 649, 653 (1995) ("the con-
textualist approach attempts a more ambitious description of the legal - meaning statutory, rule,
and agency interpretation - historical, and empirical framework of specific problems").
16 See, eg., GEERT-Z, THE INTERPRETATON OF CuLTuREs, supra note 6, at 13 ("We are seek-
ing, in the widened sense of the term in which it encompasses very much more than talk, to
converse with them, a matter a great deal more difficult, and not only with strangers, than is
commonly recognized."). It is important here neither to exaggerate, nor to downplay, the
problems of cross-cultural communication about foreign corporate governance. See infra sub-
part IVB.
17 See infra subpart IIA.
18 See infra subpart IIA.
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The history of SEC mandatory disclosure of foreign corporate
governance shows that this system has led foreign companies to pro-
vide U.S. investors with little meaningful information about their gov-
ernance. A product of U.S. culture, the U.S. disclosure system was
designed to identify corporate governance information that is signifi-
cant from a U.S. perspective. This history reveals that, guided by stat-
ute and unwilling to adapt this perspective to foreign contexts, the
SEC always believed that the only relevant corporate governance in-
formation, even on foreign companies, was that identified by the U.S.
mandatory disclosure requirements. It thus took the position that for-
eign companies should generally meet the same disclosure require-
ments on corporate governance as U.S. companies.
Despite the SEC's belief and avowed position, as mandatory dis-
closure evolved, foreign companies have not had to provide the same
corporate governance information as U.S. companies. They have
been required, in fact, to supply U.S. investors with the barest of an
outline of this information. History shows that several interrelated
reasons determined this outcome: early SEC accommodations with
foreign companies that endured, primarily because of inertia; the
SEC's acknowledgement of the jurisdictional and other legal
problems of regulating foreign companies and its concern to preserve
U.S. markets for foreign securities; special interest pressures; and the
agency's efforts to maintain its importance in U.S. and international
securities regulation.19 This outcome did not also mean that the SEC
finally learned to be sensitive to cultural differences in foreign corpo-
19 Public choice theory and bureaucratic organization theory help explain the importance of
special interests and of SEC efforts at self-preservation in this history. For representative works
on these theories as applied to the SEC, see, e.g., JAMEs D. Cox ET AL, SEcuRrrITs REGULA-
MON: CAsas AND MATrmALs 24-27 (1991) (general description of theories); SusAN M. PHILPs
& J. RIcHARD ZEcHEr, THE SEC AND = PuBuc IN rRnnsT 22-24 (1981) (examination of SEC
regulations from public choice perspective); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy:
Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WAsH. & LEE L
REv. 527, 528 (1990) ("Public choice theory posits that far from seeking any independent con-
ception of the 'public good,' regulators simply and rationally seek to maximize their own level of
external support, and thus frequently allocate wealth (in the form of regulatory subsidies and/or
restraints on competition) to those groups that bid the highest in terms of such support."); Don-
ald C. Langevoort, supra note 5, at 888 (describing public choice and bureaucratic dominance
theories). See also Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARnozo L. REv. 909, 913 (1994) (arguing
from a public choice perspective that the SEC is manufacturing reasons for its continued exist-
ence); Jonathan R. Macey, A Rejoinder, 16 CARDozo L Rnv. 1765,1789-90 (1995) (same). But
see Langevoort, supra note 19, at 532-39 (describing alternative accounts to pure public choice
explanation of SEC behavior); David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey,
16 CARDOZO L REv. 1765 (1995) (same). In a major criticism of the SEC's administration of
the mandatory disclosure system, Homer Kripke highlighted the social and agency self-preserva-
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rate governance and understood the importance of designing disclo-
sure requirements that would elicit a meaningful understanding of
foreign corporate governance for U.S. investors. Rather, the SEC
maintained its belief in the primacy of the U.S. disclosure system
while accepting, for the above reasons, a minimal corporate govern-
ance disclosure for foreign companies. United States investors simply
had to find corporate governance information on these companies
elsewhere.
The SEC is at a crossroads: it could acknowledge what it has in
fact already done by taking the additional step of eliminating the few
remaining disclosure requirements on corporate governance for for-
eign companies, or it could amend the mandatory disclosure system to
enhance cross-cultural communication on this subject. The Article ar-
gues that the SEC should now take the latter road. Even if fully ap-
plied to foreign companies, the U.S. disclosure system may well miss
or obscure information that is significant in a foreign corporate gov-
ernance context. United States investors need not only corporate gov-
ernance information about foreign companies but also a conceptual
framework that will help them understand this information. The Arti-
cle thus proposes that the SEC impose an open-ended disclosure re-
quirement on foreign companies to make them provide U.S. investors
with both culturally significant corporate governance information and
the relevant conceptual framework. The SEC disclosure system must
make foreign companies translate for U.S. investors cultural differ-
ences in corporate governance.
As background to the history of SEC disclosure on foreign corpo-
rate governance, Part II of the Article first outlines the basic structure
of SEC mandatory disclosure. It next describes, in general terms, the
interrelationship between the disclosure system and the U.S. solution
to the corporate agency problem. With reference to two major ac-
counts of U.S. corporate governance, this Part explains that the oppo-
sition between strong managers and relatively powerless owners in
tion reasons for SEC behavior. See HoMER Ksupri, THE SEC AND CORPORAa DisCLosuRE:
REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPosE 2-7, 13-20, 37-47 (1979).
Sociological literature emphasizes how professionals, and groups thereof, attempt to maxi-
mize the demand for their expertise and skills. See, eg., YvEs DEZ_ALAY, MARcHANDS DE
DRorr. LA REsTRUCrtURATION DE L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL PAR LES MULTINATION-
ALES DU DROIT (1992); Yves Dezalay, Between the State, Law, and the Market: The Social and
Professional Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena, Faculty of Law
Library, University of Toronto (Jan. 27,1995) (unpublished paper, on file with the author); Yves
Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International
Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 27
(1995).
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U.S. corporate governance is a product of U.S. culture. It then sug-
gests that the SEC disclosure framework on corporate governance,
which is a product of the same culture, is closely interconnected with,
and designed to address problems related to this power sructure. The
disclosure system compels companies to give U.S. shareholders
"facts" that are relevant in a governance world where managers can
exploit their position at the expense of dispersed shareholders.
Although the system does not encourage companies to explain these
"facts", U.S. investors, familiar with U.S. corporate governance be-
cause of their own cultural background, can interpret the information
appropriately.
Part III first shows that, for some thirty years after passage of the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)20 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),21 the SEC paid little attention to disclo-
sure requirements for foreign companies and particularly those relat-
ing to their governance. It generally treated foreign companies like
U.S. companies, with several significant exceptions. This SEC ap-
proach made sense because at that time few foreign companies either
offered or listed their equity securities in the United States.
Next, Part III discusses how the SEC squarely faced foreign is-
suer disclosure and increased U.S. trading in foreign securities when
the 1964 amendments to the U.S. securities laws, through Section
12(g), 2 potentially brought a new group of foreign companies, those
traded in the over-the-counter markets, within Exchange Act report-
ing requirements. While modestly increasing corporate governance
disclosure for listed foreign issuers, the SEC exempted from U.S. re-
porting obligations this new group of foreign issuers by promulgating
a rule that required them to file with the SEC information they other-
wise disclosed in their home countries. Yet, in the discussions preced-
ing adoption of the exemption, the SEC always affirmed that its
disclosure framework, and implicitly U.S. corporate governance, were
the models to which all countries and companies should aspire. In
other words, the SEC did not offer foreign issuers the exemption be-
cause of its realization that corporate governance systems were differ-
ent and thus demanded a different kind of disclosure. As Part III also
explains, this episode identifies both the policy and pragmatic reasons,
as well as other factors, such as interest group pressure and the SEC's
desire to maintain its own importance, that determined the exemp-
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1994).
22 See 15 U.S.C. §781 (1988).
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tion, and that would continue to influence SEC policy on foreign cor-
porate governance disclosure.
In addition, Part III considers an aggressive SEC attempt in the
late 1970s to extend to foreign companies registering their securities
under the Exchange Act nearly the full U.S. disclosure framework
through a new reporting Form 20-F, and thus detailed corporate gov-
ernance disclosure based upon the U.S. corporate governance per-
spective. The SEC justified its proposal on public interest grounds
because of increased U.S. trading in foreign securities. It ultimately
backed away from the proposal, however, at least as to foreign corpo-
rate governance disclosure, again because of special interest pressure,
because of its desire to maintain its role in U.S. and world capital mar-
ket regulation, and because of a real concern that foreign issuers could
raise capital from U.S. investors outside U.S. securities markets. The
resistance to its proposal did force the SEC to acknowledge differ-
ences between U.S. and foreign corporate governance. Yet it did not
cause the SEC to shed its belief in the evolutionary primacy of the
U.S. model and thus to consider designing an innovative disclosure
framework to elicit information on foreign corporate governance.
The SEC simply allowed foreign companies to use a skeletal outline of
the disclosure framework for U.S. companies on corporate govern-
ance, which meant that foreign companies disclosed little - and no
meaningful - information on this subject.
Finally, Part III shows that in the years following adoption of
Form 20-F, the SEC had frequent occasion to revisit, and took signifi-
cant actions pertaining to foreign company disclosure. This same pe-
riod also saw considerable U.S. and foreign attention to and activity in
corporate governance in which the SEC participated, generally by ad-
dressing corporate governance disclosure in U.S. companies. The
SEC, however, never reconsidered its accommodations with foreign
companies on their corporate governance disclosure, partly because,
on foreign company disclosure matters, the SEC and its important se-
curities industry constituencies directed their attention elsewhere. Yet
studies on corporate governance should have suggested to the SEC
that its foreign corporate governance disclosure requirements were
serving no purpose and, if anything, allowing foreign companies to
give U.S. investors misleading information.
Part IV of this Article proposes an SEC disclosure requirement
(rather than an amendment to the federal securities laws) that would
compel a foreign company better to communicate to U.S. investors
the cultural particularities of its corporate governance against the
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background of its country's corporate governance system. Part IV ar-
gues that, in promulgating the requirement, the SEC should abandon
a view that it has never been able fully to put into practice, but to
which it still subscribes: that the only "correct" corporate governance
disclosure is that which comes from the application of full U.S. disclo-
sure requirements. Because these requirements are a U.S. cultural
product, they generally cannot highlight significant corporate govern-
ance information in other cultures and may well generate information
that misleads U.S. investors. Since what U.S. investors need most of
all is an explanation of any information provided about a foreign com-
pany's governance, reliance upon home country disclosure, which
presumes that an investor understands a particular foreign culture, is
also an inadequate model for reform.
Part IV thus proposes an open-ended disclosure requirement that
would demand from a foreign issuer not so much a list of specific cor-
porate governance information, but rather a cross-cultural explana-
tion of the information provided. A foreign company would thus
provide U.S. investors with an understanding of its management,
shareholder rights, controlling parties or any other corporate govern-
ance information relevant to that company and country. The SEC
could also implement the proposal by reinterpreting existing disclo-
sure requirements for foreign companies. Part IV emphasizes that the
success of the proposed reform depends upon the efforts of SEC staff
and members of the practicing securities bar in effecting this cross-
cultural communication on corporate governance.
Part IV next discusses several objections that arise from the cur-
rent evolution of worldwide corporate governance and that could
weigh against any change to the status quo of SEC foreign corporate
governance disclosure. If, in the internationalization of markets, cor-
porate governance and disclosure in most developed countries in-
creasingly resemble U.S. corporate governance and SEC disclosure,
the SEC has no reason to be concerned about disclosure of cultural
specificities that are in fact disappearing. The SEC may also not have
to revisit foreign corporate governance disclosure because no market
problem exists: U.S. investors, whether institutional or retail, have ac-
cess to other, better sources of information on foreign corporate gov-
ernance. Large institutional investors have their global proxy services;
all investors receive the benefits of technology that increasingly gives
them access to significant amounts of information about foreign com-
panies. If, moreover, a foreign market is efficient in at least a semi-
strong sense, U.S. investors can rely upon the market price of a for-
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eign company's securities which should reflect corporate governance
information about the company. There is also the continuing policy
concern that, if the SEC places an increased disclosure burden upon
foreign companies, they will be further discouraged from entering
U.S. capital markets.
Finally, Part IV argues that these objections, while important and
necessary to examine and to continue to review, do not now undercut
the need for reform of the SEC's disclosure requirements on foreign
corporate governance. It is not yet possible to assert with confidence
that the United States (or some new "international") model of corpo-
rate governance is triumphing throughout the developed world, that
alternative sources provide U.S. investors with an adequate cultural
understanding of foreign corporate governance or that market price
communicates subtleties of corporate governance. Although foreign
companies and U.S. market participants, such as investment banks,
that have traditionally opposed enhanced disclosure burdens may re-
sist increasing disclosure for foreign companies, some companies may
find in the flexible proposal a possible competitive advantage. Part IV
acknowledges, however, that, because of globalization of securities
markets and investments, worldwide corporate governance continues
to change, as do the nature of securities markets and investor access to
information about this subject. Like many SEC regulations, there-
fore, the suggested reform is provisional and subject to future market
developments.
I. SEC MANDATORY DIscLosuRE
A. The Structure of Mandatory Disclosure
United States securities laws and SEC rules and regulations im-
pose disclosure obligations upon companies whose securities are of-
fered, sold or traded in the U.S. public securities markets.23 Under
the Securities Act, which in general deals with the initial public offer-
ing and sale of securities by a company (commonly referred to as an
"issuer"), 24 no public offer of securities can be made unless a registra-
tion statement as to such securities, which contains the selling docu-
ment or "prospectus", has been filed with the SEC, and no public sale
23 See Cox, supra note 19, at 243-75,697-716,886-99; RicHARD W. JENNINGS, ET AL, SECUR-
ITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 151-249 (1992); 2 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SEcumRnEs REGULAMON 599-620 (1993).
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1988).
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can be confirmed unless the SEC declares the registration statement
effective.25
The Securities Act does not specify in detail the information a
company must include in a registration statement. It refers to two
schedules in the Act, one of which (Schedule A) identifies information
and documents that should be included in, or attached to, a registra-
tion statement filed by an issuer that is not a foreign government or
government-affiliated entity. 6 In addition, the Securities Act gives
the SEC broad rule-making power regarding the content and filing of
registration statements.27 The disclosure requirements of the Securi-
ties Act are thus only the tip of the iceberg. The SEC has promul-
gated numerous, detailed rules and forms concerning the manner of
filing and format of registration statements. 8
The Exchange Act, which is generally understood to regulate se-
curities markets,2 9 also requires companies to disclose information.
Section 12 of that Act specifies that any issuer either listing a security
on a national securities exchange or having a certain asset size and
number of shareholders must register its securities.3 Issuers subject
to Section 12's registration requirements must also file periodic and
other reports with the SEC pursuant to Section 13.31 Once again, de-
25 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (b) (1988). There are exemptions to the registration requirement
for certain kinds of securities and securities offerings. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1988) (listing exempt
securities, such as government securities); § 77d (specifying transactions exempted from the re-
gistration requirements, such as the classic "private placement" or secondary sale).
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1988).
27 See id. The Exchange Act designated a new agency, the SEC, in place of the Federal
Trade Commission, to have jurisdiction over the federal securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d
(1988). See also Cox, supra note 19, at 21.
28 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.100-494 (1995) (rules for filing and content of registration statement);
17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-915 (1995) (rules governing filing of forms); 17 C.F.R. §§ 232.10-903 (1995)
(rules governing electronic filings). The major registration forms for public offerings by a U.S.
issuer are the "S" forms (eg., S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-8). Their respective use depends upon the kind
of offering and security offered, as well as the issuer's status as a reporting issuer under the
Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.11-.13 (1995) (eligibility requirements); Forms Under the
Securities Act of 1933, reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7121-26 (S-1), 7141-46 (S-
2), 1% 7151-55 (S-3), 11 7161-65 (S-4), I 7197-201 (S-8). See generally 2 Loss & SELiGMAN,
supra note 23, at 599-620. The SEC has promulgated different forms for foreign private issuers.
See infra subpart I1D.
29 See, eg., Cox, supra note 19, at 15-21; 1 Loss & SELTGMAN, supra note 23, at 228.
30 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a),(b) & (g) (1988). Section 12(g) (as modified by Rule 12g-1, 17
C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1995)) requires registration for an issuer that, on the last day of a fiscal year,
has more than $5 million in assets and 500 shareholders of record. It thus reaches securities
traded other than on a registered securities exchange, such as those quoted on the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations ("NASDAQ") system. See generally
Cox, supra note 19, at 701-05; 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 599-620.
31 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a),(b) (1988).
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tailed SEC rules and forms provide guidance on the content and man-
ner of filing of Exchange Act registration statements and reports.32
Moreover, the Exchange Act disclosure requirements are now "inte-
grated" with those under the Securities Act.33
32 Section 12(b) lists the general disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act registration
statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1988). Section 13(a) requires the SEC to promulgate forms
for reporting purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1988). Detailed SEC rules and forms supple-
ment these somewhat sketchy statutory requirements. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-1 to 240.12h-4,
(registration), §§ 240.13a-1 to 240.13b2-2 (reports), §§ 240.15d-1 to 240.15d-21 (reports for issu-
ers having made public offerings) (1995). As in the case of Securities Act forms, the SEC has
promulgated separate forms for U.S. issuers (eg., Forms 10 and 10-K) and for non-U.S. issuers
(Form 20-F). See 17 C.F.R. § 249.240f (1995) (eligibility requirements); Forms under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, reprinted in 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 27,301-02 (Form 10), 1[
31,101-02 (Form 10-K), 29,701-27 (Form 20-F). See generally 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
23, at 743-806 (discussing foreign private issuers). See infra subparts IIIC & IIID.
33 Although much of the information required for Securities Act and Exchange Act disclo-
sure is similar, for historical reasons and given the different purposes of the two Acts, the disclo-
sure requirements were not "integrated" until the 1980s. See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in
Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340, 1341-1342 (1968) (explaining historical reasons for
different disclosure requirements). See generally VICrOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM BRATrON,
CASES AND MATERALs ON CoRPoRATE FINANCE B-7 to B-10 (4th ed. 1993) (explaining the
development of integrated disclosure); Seligman, supra note 15, at 683-92 (same). As a result of
integration, an issuer publicly selling securities may be able to use abbreviated Securities Act
disclosure forms and incorporate by reference information provided in prior Exchange Act fil-
ings. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed.
Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 3, 1982) (for description of system and forms). There is also an integrated
disclosure system for foreign companies. See infra subpart IIID. The SEC is now considering
whether registration under the two Acts can be even further integrated by registering companies
as opposed to securities. See generally John C. Coffee, Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure:
The Coming Debate Over Company Registration, 52 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1143,1155-72 (1995);
Gerald S. Backman & Stephen E. Kim, From Disclosure to Registration, 5 Bus. LAW TODAY 53
(Jan.-Feb. 1996). United States Securities and Exchange Conm'n, Report of the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Process (1996).
The theoretical justification for integration came from the efficient capital market hypothe-
sis ("ECMH"). In one of the seminal legal articles on market efficiency, Professors Gordon and
Kornhauser define the term as follows:
The efficient market hypothesis defines the best estimate of the financial returns of each
security. Thus, a good estimate should take into account all available information about
future prices. Prices are "efficient" in two senses: (1) the current price of a security best
predicts its future price and (2) the prevailing price immediately assimilates new informa-
tion provided to the market. As a consequence, no trader can earn (financial) arbitrage
profits in an efficient market because no one can identify (except by chance) securities
which are under- or overvalued.
See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Secur-
ities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 770 (1985). As Professors Gilson and Kraakman ex-
plained in a 1984 statement that still holds true today, "the [Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis] is now the context in which serious discussion of the regulation of financial markets
takes place." See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549,550 (1984). Efficiency may be empirically broken down into "weak",
"semi-strong" and "strong" forms, depending upon the kind of information (e.g., private, public
or some combination of both) that the market "processes" into stock prices. See id. at 555-56.
As Professors Gilson and Kraakman also caution, these categories are rough, empirical ones;
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Issuers are subject to still other Exchange Act disclosure require-
ments. Section 14(a) requires issuers to comply with the SEC's rules
and regulations governing solicitation of proxies.34 Issuers generally
seek proxies from, or the consent to cast the votes of, shareholders for
the transaction of business at an annual meeting. Under the proxy
rules, if an issuer requests proxies from shareholders, it must provide
them with an annual report.35 The Exchange Act also indirectly man-
dates disclosure through the rules of registered securities exchanges36
and securities associations.37 These rules generally require ongoing
disclosure of information on companies whose securities are listed on
an exchange or traded through the facilities of an association.38
determining the actual efficiency of a market requires a focus upon the market mechanisms
whereby information is processed into securities prices. See id. at 557.
If information in one of an issuer's SEC filings is reflected in market price, it makes no
sense, and is burdensome and costly, to have the issuer repeat that information in another filing.
See generally Langevoort, supra note 5, at 876-89 (discussing SEC's use of "semi-strong" version
of the ECMH, Le., the market price reflects only public information available about a company,
to justify the integrated disclosure system). For discussion of the ECMH in disclosure of foreign
corporate governance information, see infra subpart IVB.
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
35 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(d) (1995) (permitting integration of Form 10-K and this annual
report).
Management and affiliates of an issuer also have disclosure obligations. Under Section
16(a) of the Exchange Act, officers, directors and beneficial holders of more than 10% of any
class of an equity security of any company registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act must
file reports on their securities holdings in such company. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988). (Section
16 was extended to 10% holders by the 1964 amendments to the Exchange Act, see Pub. L. No.
88-467, § 8, 78 Stat. 565, amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988)). Detailed rules govern the manner and content of
this disclosure. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1 to 240.16a-10 (1995). Disclosure is also required of
persons whose acquisitions of any class of a registered equity security give them over five per-
cent of that class. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988). See also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 240.13d-101
(1995). This subsection was added to the Exchange Act by the Williams Act, see Act of July 29,
1968, 82 Stat. 456, which regulates acquisitions and tender offers of shares of companies whose
securities are registered under the Exchange Act. See generally JENNINGS, supra note 23, at 659-
662.
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (exchange registration); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1)
(1988) (defining exchange). The largest U.S. exchanges are the New York Stock Exchange and
the American Stock Exchange.
37 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (registration of securities associations). Only
one association is registered under this provision, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(the "NASD"). The NASD operates the NASDAQ system whereby market makers list bid/ask
(Le., buy/sell) quotations for securities. As a result of a recent reorganization, the NASD now
operates the NASDAQ through a subsidiary, the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. See United States
Security and Exchange Comm'n, Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Regarding the NASD and the Nasdaq Market, Securities Exchange Release No. 34-
37542, at 5 (1996).
38 See, eg., NEw YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE LIsT'rm COMPANY MANUAL § 202.05,3 Fed. Sec.
L Rep. (CCH) 23,520 (1995); [1996] Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) § 401, 23,124A; NA-
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SEC disclosure requirements thus compel a company raising cap-
ital in U.S. securities markets to provide information on a continuous
basis to investors. Legal penalties assessed against parties failing to
meet SEC disclosure obligations give information disclosed pursuant
to SEC requirements a special status.3 9 At a minimum, they ensure
that issuers and others involved in a securities offering or listing take
the disclosure seriously.40
B. U.S. Corporate Governance in Mandatory Disclosure
1. U.S. Corporate Governance
Two works, written sixty years apart, show that cultural forces
created the U.S. corporate governance outcome and shaped solutions
to its problems. According to Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means
in their classic The Modem Corporation and Private Property and
Mark J. Roe in his Strong Managers, Weak Owners,41 technological
TIONAL AssoCIATIoN OF SECURITIES DEALE.s INC. MANUAL, Schedule D., NASD Manual
(CCH) 1802-72 (1995). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 689-90 (1984) (explaining that such rules
allow companies to provide a uniform disclosure to investors without incurring the costs of de-
signing a disclosure framework). See also infra subpart HID.
Whenever a company lists stock on a U.S. exchange or an automated quotation system of a
registered securities association, it must comply with the listing standards and rules established
by the organization. The compliance is an important part of the regulatory structure of the
Exchange Act, in which Congress envisioned that exchanges and similar organizations (in SEC
parlance "self-regulatory organizations") would supervise their participants, subject to SEC
oversight. See generally Cox, supra note 19, at 1188-93.
39 See Cox, supra note 19, at 611-77,717-822,866-72 (insider penalties), 891-97 (penalties for
proxy violations); 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 2769-86 (general review of disclosure
obligations and liability provisions under the Securities and Exchange Acts). Securities ex-
changes and associations can also sanction companies for failure to comply with disclosure obli-
gations, with the ultimate sanction being delisting. See 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at
1897-1902 (involuntary delisting), 1905-06 (suspension of trading).
40 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 38, at 679, 685 (arguing that mandatory disclosure
with antifraud deterrent, if imposed in a cost-efficient way, may reduce a company's cost of
capital, benefit investors' total return, and enable companies to reveal information without wor-
rying about competitive harm from disclosure); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CoRP. L. 1, 52-53 (1983) ("By reducing the per-
ceived risk of corporate securities, compulsory disclosure would tend to reduce the risk premia
that issuers selling new securities would have to pay, thus increasing the funds available for
economic growth."). But see, eg., Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Dis-
closure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 763, 770-773 (1996) (arguing that the threat of liability actually hin-
ders disclosure because firms understandably say as little as possible in SEC-filed documents so
as to minimize their liability exposure); Macey, supra note 19, at 1783-85 (arguing that SEC
mandatory disclosure is useless because high quality firms always have an incentive to disclose
information to distinguish themselves from bad quality firms, and that high costs of meeting SEC
disclosure requirements favor established firms at the expense of start-up ventures).
41 See BE.LE & MEANs, supra note 1; ROE, supra note 3. Since U.S. corporate governance is
a complex cultural product, literature on it comes from a number of disciplines, including law,
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developments made possible large, complex economic tasks (such as
the construction and operation of railroads) in a growing, increasingly
industrialized United States in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Businesses needed to attain a critical size to accomplish these tasks in
national, as opposed to intrastate, markets.42 Small regional busi-
nesses designed for local work with limited financial resources and
management expertise were unsuitable for these new economic
challenges.
Because the large enterprises most likely to flourish in these eco-
nomic circumstances had capital requirements that local financing
could not easily meet, they eventually turned to U.S. capital market
investors. 43 Since these capital providers were geographically dis-
persed, numerous, and with small investments relative to a firm's
overall capital, they would not have the same relation to, and control
of, a firm as would owners of a small business. The complexity of the
business and operations of these firms also demanded a technical and
managerial expertise that professional or specialized training could
give and that an owner/manager of a small business generally did not
have. A new professionally-trained management class that acquired
this expertise thus received enhanced status and control, while its new
owners occupied a clearly secondary position.44
With some variations, this historical account could be given for
other developed countries.45 Where accounts diverge is in the corpo-
finance, economics and management. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corpo-
rate Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEo. L.J. 1495 (1990) (perspective of law and
economics); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Inter-
nal Control Systems, 48 J. Fn'. 831 (1993) (perspective from finance expert); John Pound, The
Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Contro 68 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1003 (1993) (perspective from public policy expert).
42 See BERi. & MEANS, supra note 1, at 3-46; ALFRED D. CHANDLER, T VismLE HAND:
Tim MANAOERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMEm AN Busn, ss 146-47 (1977); ROE, supra note 3, at 2-
8. See also BURToN J. BI.unsrirN, THm CULTURE OF PROFEssIONALisM: Tim MIDDLE CLASS
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATON IN AMERICA 194-96 (1978) (discussing devel-
opment of engineering schools and careers of engineers in new national corporate enterprises);
MAGALI SARATrI LARSON, THm RisE OF PROFEssIONALIsM: A SOaOLoGIc ANALYSIS 122-24
(1977) (same).
43 See CHANDLER, supra note 1, at 146-47. Evidence shows that large firms now generate
their funds primarily from retained earnings. See generally RIcHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART
C. MYERS, PRiNciPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 324-27 (4th ed. 1991). Such funds could be
regarded as further (re)investments by a company's capital market investors. Id. at 324.
44 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 3-140; CHANDLER, supra note 42, at 170 (describing
the growth of managerial power); RoE, supra note 3, at 2-7.
45 See ROE, supra note 3, at 149, 198. The variations would depend upon the history of a
country's technological developments, the size of its markets and the growth in the size of firms.
See CHANDLER, supra note 42, at 499 ("Smaller and slower growing domestic markets in West-
ern Europe and Japan lessened the interest of manufacturers in adopting new mass production
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rate governance outcome. The U.S. outcome is, to use Professor
Roe's words in his recent book, the situation of "strong managers,
weak owners. '46 Dispersed capital market investors generally exer-
cise little control over enterprises, which management dominate with
their direct involvement with operations, their expertise and their ac-
cess to information.
According to Professor Roe, the key to understanding U.S. cor-
porate governance as a cultural product is to comprehend the complex
forces that generated and maintained it. The forces include the pow-
erful ideological component of populism with its suspicion of, and hos-
tility to, concentrations of economic power, particularly in financial
institutions.47 United States populism helped to cause and to maintain
a fragmentation of financial institutions and a separation of them from
commercial enterprises. This result eliminated an alternative corpo-
rate governance outcome which developed in other countries where
financial institutions hold large stakes in corporations and mediate the
relation between dispersed investors and managers. 48
As Professor Roe has also shown, other complex cultural forces,
ranging from the economic to the political, determined a corporate
governance "outcome", where managers were powerful and owners
weak.49 Interest groups, such as locally-based financial institutions
and their regulators, benefitted from, and thus came to have a stake
in, the outcome.50 Federalist doctrines of government policy empha-
techniques and also reduced the incentive to build large marketing and purchasing organizations.
In Britain and France producers continued to rely on middlemen to handle their more tradi-
tional wares, which in turn were produced in a more traditional craft fashion. Where large,
integrated enterprises did appear, they remained small enough to be managed at the top by a
small number of owners.").
46 See RoE, supra note 3 (title).
47 See id. at 28-36.
48 For Professor Roe, the role of financial institutions is critical to the corporate governance
outcome. Either a country develops strong financial institutions that control management, or it
does not. See RoE, supra note 3, at 277. See also Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 77-81 (argu-
ing that banks are particularly ill-suited to act as monitors for shareholders because of their focus
upon protecting their loans to companies). An emphasis upon financial institutions, however,
may obscure important features of other corporate governance systems that rely upon family or
government control of corporations. See infra subpart IVA. See also CHANDLER, supra note 42,
at 205 (describing historical importance of State enterprises in Europe).
49 As in all cultural discussions, particularly of a country as large and diverse as the United
States, it is hazardous to make generalizations. See generally PmPRR BouRDmu, LA DIsrNc-
TION: CRITIQUE SOCIALE DU JUGEMENT 271-91 (1979) (discussing how, in a specific cultural
setting, there are always groups (and subgroups) in active contests for supremacy). See also
Pastrd, supra note 4, at 24. While "reducing" the U.S. corporate governance outcome to several
causes and groups, therefore, Professor Roe rightly stresses that a complex interrelation of these
forces and groups, as well as other factors, produced it.
50 See RoE, supra note 3, at 42-45.
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sized local, rather than national, control over economic life. By their
actions and writings, public interest lawyers and thinkers often con-
vinced politicians and ordinary citizens that large financial institutions
were inimical to them.5 '
These cultural forces also enabled (and enable) specific strategies
(and make impossible, or difficult, others) to address problems arising
from the corporate governance outcome.52 For example, executive
compensation understandably became of concern in U.S. corporate
governance where, because of their power, managers could exploit
their position by giving themselves large benefits at shareholder ex-
pense.5 3 Certain legal and business strategies have been taken, with
varying degrees of success, to limit compensation abuses, or to use
compensation instrumentally to better align management and share-
holder interests.54 In another cultural setting, executive compensation
might not even be a problem if, under a different corporate govern-
ance outcome, a strong counterparty checks managers' power.55
2. SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Corporate Governance
The history of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act reveals
that the cultural forces influencing the shape of U.S. corporate gov-
51 See id. at 36-42, 45-48. Cf. RoNEN SHAm, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELrrE
LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL 131-57 (1995) (discussing intellectual and social background of
legal supporters of New Deal's hostility to business).
52 See ROE, supra note 3, at 7-8 (describing standard U.S. solutions to agency problems: e.g.,
outside directors, hostile takeovers, proxy battles, fiduciary duties placed upon directors and
managers).
53 See generally WLULAm L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 705-09 (7th ed. 1995) (describing current debates on executive compensation);
GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExCEss: TnE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN ExECu-
TIvES 241-52 (1991).
54 See, e.g., Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, [1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056 (Nov. 12, 1992) (describing new SEC disclo-
sure of executive compensation for U.S. public companies); James Heard, Executive Compensa-
tion: Perspective of the Institutional Investor, 63 U. CINN. L. REv. 749 (1995) (president of
institutional investor advisory service describes activities of institutional investors aimed at re-
ducing executive compensation abuses).
55 See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 53, at 204-23 (discussing compensation of non-U.S. execu-
tives); Pastr6, supra note 4, at 32 (pointing out that the issue of executive compensation has not
yet been significant in France). If, however, non-U.S. corporate governance systems "converge"
towards a U.S. model, this issue may become more important abroad. See, eg., Executive Pay;
Random numbers, ECONOMIsT, June 3, 1995, at 62 (discussing heightened overseas focus on
executive compensation, particularly in Britain [whose corporate governance system most
closely resembles that in the U.S.]); Andrew Jack, Lyonnaise des Eaux breaks ground over pay
disclosur4 FIN. TimEs, June 30, 1995, at 21 (discussing how French company "breaks rank" with
market custom by increasing disclosure about executive compensation).
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ernance also led to mandatory disclosure.5 6 Both Acts were part of a
Congressional reaction to the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and both
were fueled by a populist hostility to Wall Street and to the financial
institutions of the day. Commercial and investment banks were un-
derstood to have encouraged speculation in worthless securities and to
have manipulated securities trading for their benefit, at investors' ex-
pense.57 Accompanying this populist distrust of financial institutions
was a progressive, intellectual movement that was influential in the
Roosevelt administration and Congress and that condemned the mis-
use of financial power.58
These populist and progressive forces also focused upon
problems and abuses of U.S. corporate governance, some of which
were related to financial institution involvement with commerce.59
56 How, for the over 60 years of its existence, SEC disclosure interacted with, and responded
to the particular problems in, U.S. corporate governance and what would be a cultural explana-
tion of each episode of this interaction are beyond the scope of this Article. A cultural discus-
sion of the relation of individual SEC initiatives to corporate governance requires identification
and analysis of numerous relevant cultural forces (e.g., interest group, ideological, bureaucratic,
and political pressures). See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TxANSFORMATON OF WALL
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SEcuRrrEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPO-
RATE FINANCE (1982). For specific examples of such analyses from political science and public
choice perspectives, see ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, THE SEC AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION:
THE PoLIncs OF EXPERTISE (1992); PmLLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 19 (discussing, among
other things, forces at work in disclosure, fixed commissions and market structure); Jonathan R.
Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System,
1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315 (discussing cultural forces involved in formation of national market
system). See also infra Part III.
In a recent article, Professor Paul Mahoney argues that the historical origins of the securi-
ties laws demonstrate that they were designed to address management agency problems. See
Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Cm. L. REv.
1047 (1995). The agency problems he identifies in his analysis, however, are limited to the "start-
up" or promoter phase of the formation of a corporation. See id. at 1052-54. In my view, the
historical evidence shows that the securities laws had a broader focus on the agency problems
arising from management abuse beyond the promoter setting. Yet, Professor Mahoney's empha-
sis upon corporate agency issues in SEC disclosure supports the general argument of this
subsection.
57 See SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 1-38 (describing reaction to Pecora Hearings of 1932-34
investigating abuses on Wall Street and in banks).
58 See id. at 39-72 (discussing the progressive orientation of the Roosevelt administration in
securities matters and the figures in its "Brain Trust", such as Adolf Berle and Felix Frankfurter,
influential in the design of the securities laws).
59 As noted above, Professor Berle was an important intellectual source of inspiration for the
design of the securities laws, and his work on the U.S. corporate governance situation was specif-
ically cited in Congressional hearings. See, e.g., CONG. REc. 2917, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SE-
cuRITIEs LAws: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, item 11, 175 (1983). See also id. at 2918, at
176 ("We have, on the one hand, 18,000,000 passive citizens having no actual contact with their
companies; on the other hand, a few hundred powerful managers directing and controlling the
destinies of the companies and the physical properties which they own.") (remarks of Mr. Ray-
burn referring to Professor Berle's work). See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5
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Executives and directors of large public corporations, aided by invest-
ment and commercial banks, were seen to have used their dominant
position to profit at shareholders' expense. With the help of financial
institutions, management was shown to have manipulated information
and trading activity to raise stock prices and then sell securities at
these inflated prices. Management also received "gifts" from invest-
ment banks in the form of favorable prices for new issues in other
companies, with the expectation that they would return the favor by
giving banks or their securities affiliates the securities offering busi-
ness of their companies.60
Some progressives saw the enactment of securities laws as an op-
portunity not only to address these problems of corporate governance,
but also to change altogether its U.S. form. 61 Because they viewed the
(1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF THE SEcuRrrms AcT OF 1933 AND SECURmES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 18, at 3-5 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, 1973). Cf ROE,
supra note 3, at 31-33 (observing that, in the debates on the federal securities laws, the hostility
to large concentrations of financial power in the combined investment/commercial banks of the
time indirectly maintained the U.S. corporate governance outcome, but that the actual limita-
tions on U.S. financial institutions (which reduced their corporate governance role) came from
banking regulation, such as the Glass-Steagall Act).
60 See SELiGMAN, supra note 56, at 33-35, 42-44, 87-88 (giving examples of management
abuses in the sale of securities); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 1068-73 (describing promoters'
abuses as provoking Congressional action); Seligman, supra note 40, at 45-46 & notes accompa-
nying text. See also CONG. REc., supra note 59, at 2918, at 176 ("Today we are forced to recog-
nize that the hired managers of great corporations are not as wise, not as conservative, and
sometimes are not as trustworthy as millions of American investors have been persuaded to
believe.") (remarks of Mr. Rayburn). Cf. Norman S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and
Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U. MiAMI L. REv. 671, 691-97 (1986) (describing the manipu-
lative practices used by pool operators before 1934); Steven Thel, The Original Conception of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 419-24 (1990) (referring to
abuses of corporate officers in "pool" operations).
61 See SELIOMiAN, supra note 56, at 52 (observing that Roosevelt considered the securities bill
as a "'regulation of corporations"'); at 71-72 (describing disappointment of reformers, such as
then Professor William 0. Douglas, with the failure of the Securities Act directly to address the
corporate governance situation); at 87 (describing reaction to initial bill for Exchange Act as
federalizing corporate law); at 205-10 (describing New Deal failure to put through legislation on
corporate governance). See also REPORT TO SECRETARY OF CoMMERCE OF COMM. ON STOCK
EXCHANGE REGULATION ("Roper Report"), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Comm. Print 1934), re-
printed in 5 LEGisLATIVE HISTORY OF Ti SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 16, at 4 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, 1973) ("Your committee
realizes that, perhaps, the most effective way to deal with certain evils connected with manipula-
tion of stock by directors and officers, issue of stock to insiders for inadequate consideration,
incomplete publicity of corporate accounts and similar problems is by the requirement of Fed-
eral incorporation for corporations engaged in interstate commerce."). The desire of "progres-
sives" directly to address corporate governance other than by disclosure did not end with the
New Deal. See generally ROBERTA S. KAR.ML, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: Tim SECURI-
TIEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 139-86 (1982); SELiGMAN, supra
note 56, at 534-51 (describing efforts in the 1970s to address abuses of corporate management by
a possible federal corporation law). Despite such efforts, corporate governance has always re-
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legal reform of the U.S. corporate governance outcome - strong man-
agers, weak owners - as a major purpose of these laws, the resulting
emphasis upon mandatory disclosure in the Securities Act and Ex-
change Act, as opposed to substantive regulation of the management/
shareholder relationship, disappointed them. This legislative back-
ground emphasizes that the disclosure framework is inseparable from
U.S. corporate governance. While state corporate law was recognized
then (as now) as primarily governing corporate governance and its
problems, the new federal laws were to play an indirect role in this
area.62 By forcing management to disclose information about them-
selves and their operation of companies, the disclosure framework
would dissuade management from the kinds of overreaching and
abuse characteristic of the pre-Crash years and would enhance share-
holder monitoring of management.63
The specific disclosure items mandated by the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act thus make sense with respect to the U.S. corporate
governance outcome of "strong managers, weak owners".' 4 The rele-
vant provisions of Schedule A of the Securities Act65 focus on obvious
mained "officially" at the periphery of SEC mandatory disclosure. See SELIGMAN, supra note 56,
at 534.
62 See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 29, 47-48 (1959) (discussing reference in Conference Report to fiduciary duties of of-
ficers and directors). See i& at 35 ("We were particularly anxious through the imposition of
adequate civil liabilities to assure the performance by corporate directors and officers of their
fiduciary obligations.. ."). Critics of the securities laws saw them as giving the new SEC "inde-
terminable power.., over all corporations in the country," particularly through the disclosure
requirements. See H.R. RE,. No. 1383, supra note 59, at 30-31 (minority views of Representa-
tive Schuyler Merritt). But see Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (holding
that federal securities laws should not be read to "overlap" and interfere with state corporate
law).
63 See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 59, at 11 (the disclosure framework undermines
"[d]elayed, inaccurate, and misleading reports [that] are the tools of . .. the recreant corporate
official who speculate[s] on inside information"); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 1077-81 (discussing
how securities laws addressed promoters' abuses of pre-Crash years).
64 All U.S. corporate disclosure may in fact be about corporate governance. Because a ma-
jor problem for "weak owners" is lack of information, not only about egregious management
opportunism, but also about management's conduct of the business, any disclosure addresses this
informational deficiency and thus has a corporate governance import. As markets become more
sophisticated and as blatant agency abuse (such as the promoter abuses of the 1920s) become
less common, some of the most important agency monitoring arguably occurs through enhance-
ment of the accuracy of disclosed information about business operations and financial results. I
thus disagree with Professor Mahoney's too marked contrast between the "agency" and "accu-
racy enhancement" purposes of disclosure. See Mahoney, supra note 56, at 1111. All disclosed
information serves several purposes, although certain disclosures, more than others, specifically
address the manager/owner relationship, as narrowly defined.
65 James Landis observed that, although the "core" of the later SEC registration statement
lay in Schedule A, the Schedule did not receive much attention from Congress, but was the
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areas of management abuse. In addition to demanding identification
of officers and directors, disclosure items require discussion of man-
agement compensation, stockholding, special contracts with the issuer
and relationships with underwriters.66 An issuer must also identify for
shareholders the basic rights attaching to its shares and any limitations
upon these rights that could be used further to increase management
power.67
Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act requires similar information
about management and shareholder rights as that demanded by the
Securities Act's Schedule A.68 Section 16's disclosure requirement
pertaining to securities trading by officers, directors and 10% holders,
and requiring the disgorgement of their short-swing profits, were spe-
cifically designed to counter management abuses in trading securi-
product of collaboration between the drafters of the Act and Wall Street lawyers. See Landis,
supra note 62, at 40-41. See also SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 64-65 (describing debates among
drafters whether to have Schedules included in the Act at all). This is additional evidence that
any aspect of U.S. corporate governance, as in any cultural product, is never a simple application
of a "unified" view shared by all participants, but is itself the outcome of a struggle (or compro-
mise) between opposing views and interests. See supra note 49. In 1933, therefore, management
(through its lawyers) had input into the extent of management disclosure required under Sched-
ule A.
66 See 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1994) Schedule A (4) (identity of management), (7) (securities
holdings of management, underwriters and beneficial owners), (14) (excessive remuneration for
management), (19) (net proceeds from past securities offerings), (22) (management transac-
tions with issuer), (24) (any material management contracts with the issuer). Other provisions in
Schedule A also touch indirectly on management abuses: e.g., price of securities offered to pub-
lic and manner of determination (item 16), commission or discounts given to underwriters (item
17). See also Mahoney, supra note 56, at 1071-86. An issuer must also provide information on
major stockholders (defined as a holder of more than 10% of any class of an issuer's stock), see
15 U.S.C. § 77aa at (6), which would be important in a U.S. corporation, given their ability to
influence management. See RoE, supra note 3, at 172 (observing how, in the U.S., large share-
holders are rare and thus influential). But see David Woodruff, Kerkorian Keeps 'Em Guessing,
Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 1995, at 50 (describing recent, but only partly successful, pressure upon
Chrysler Corporation by investor Kirk Kerkorian holding a 13.6% stake in the company).
67 See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa. (1994) Schedule A (9) (description of voting rights, any conversion
or preference rights and dividend rights). Although conversion and preference rights are more
typical of preference shares and are a form of contractual control of both management and
overreaching by common stockholders, see generally BRUDNEY & BRATrON, supra note 33, at
338-43, dividend rights are a classic means of controlling management by ensuring that manage-
ment returns the profits of the venture to stockholders. See id. at 561-570. See also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77aa (1994) Schedule A (30) - (32) (requiring the public filing of documents, such as the certifi-
cate of incorporation and by-laws, that would typically enumerate these rights).
68 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1)(B) (rights pertaining to securities), (D) (information about man-
agement), (E) (compensation), (F) (bonus arrangements), (G) (management and service con-
tracts), (2) (copies of certificate of incorporation, by-laws, trust indentures or corresponding
documents and underwriting agreements) (1994).
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ties.69 And in its rules for Exchange Act annual reports and proxies,70
the SEC made companies disclose management information compara-
ble to that required under other SEC disclosure provisions.7'
The traditional justification for mandatory disclosure, that it ad-
dresses the weak bargaining position of U.S. shareholders in large,
publicly-owned companies,72 also demonstrates the relationship be-
tween disclosure and corporate governance. Small investors are indi-
vidually unable, given the costs of bargaining, to compel issuers to
provide information to them. Without such information, investors
have difficulty in monitoring management as well as making an in-
formed decision, whether to purchase, hold or sell shares. By tradi-
tionally emphasizing disclosure of historical information - rather than
potentially speculative, forward-looking data (i.e., what management
has done, as opposed to what it promises to do) - in its interpretation
of statutory disclosure requirements, the SEC also supported the
"agency" focus of disclosure.73
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994). The legislative history shows that this section was designed to
address abuses of management/agents in trading on inside information and in rigging securities
prices. See Roper Report, supra note 61, at 18; S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934),
reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY OF T=E SECURITIES ACr OF 1933 AND SECURrrEs Ex-
CHANGE Acr OF 1934, item 17, at 9 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, 1973).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 29-35. Federal proxy regulation was specifically
designed to address management abuses in the manipulation of proxy machinery at shareholder
expenses. See S. REP. No. 792, supra note 69, at 12. See generally Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy
to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1173-91 (1993) (reviewing
legislative history of Section 14(a) for indications that Congress intended SEC proxy regulation
to do more than regulate corporate governance through disclosure).
71 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1823, 1938 SEC LEXIS 678 (Aug. 11, 1938)
(describing first major revision to proxy rules); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3347,7 Fed.
Reg. 10,653 (Dec. 18, 1942) (dealing with revision of proxy rules adding annual report require-
ment, management compensation disclosure, etc.); SEUGMAN, supra note 56, at 238 (describing
company resistance to the 1942 proxy rule amendments).
72 See generally BRUDNEY & BRATrON, supra note 33, at B-10 to B-13; Cox, supra note 19,
at 14-19; Seligman, supra note 60, at 9.
73 See, eg., JEINN4Gs, supra note 23, at 204 ("Historically, the SEC took a 'just the facts,
ma'am' approach to disclosure and discouraged the inclusion of forward-looking information.");
Kitch, supra note 40, at 777 (discussing traditional SEC focus upon historical facts and its views
on, and rules pertaining to, projections); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 1084-86.
Criticism of the "paternalism" of this approach, together with the recognition of the impor-
tance of prospective information in enabling market professionals better to establish prices of
securities, led to a reconceptualization of disclosure purposes, which the SEC has, to an extent,
accepted. With its theoretical basis in the ECMH, this perspective argues for public disclosure of
as much future-oriented and other "soft" information as possible so that market professionals
could adjust the stock price of companies on a fully informed basis. Public investors benefit,
even if they are unaware of the speculative information, because they can rely upon the market
price of the securities. See generally supra note 33. See eg., BRUDNEY & BRATrON, supra note
33, at B-12 to B-15; JENNINGS, supra note 23, at 204-12. See also Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and
the Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft
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It is also important to emphasize that a U.S. investor, as a mem-
ber of the culture producing U.S. corporate governance and the SEC
disclosure framework, could understand the information that a com-
pany disclosed. The disclosure requirements demand that a company
provide the specific information described above; there is no require-
ment, however, that facts about management and shareholder rights
be linked together in a coherent explanation of a company's corporate
governance that includes references to the general background of U.S.
corporate governance. Yet the information does not have much
meaning unless it is placed in a conceptual or explanatory framework
or context. While many have made this point, Stanley Fish has stated
it persistently and eloquently. As he explains:
communication occurs within situations and that to be in a situation is
already to be in possession of (or to be possessed by) a structure of as-
sumptions, of practices understood to be relevant in relation to purposes
Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MAR. L. REV. 1114 (1987); Langevoort, supra
note 5, at 876-881 (describing SEC acceptance of ECMH); Richard A. Rosen, Liability for "Soft
Information" New Developments and Emerging Trends, 23 SEc REG. L. J. 3 (1995); Seligman,
supra note 15, at 694-96 (explaining recent SEC emphasis in disclosure of "soft", evaluative
information). The recently-passed Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 grants com-
panies a safe-harbor from Securities Act and Exchange Act liability for "forward-looking state-
ments." See Title I, §102, H.R. Rep. 104-369; Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference ("The Conference Committee has adopted a statutory 'safe harbor' to enhance mar-
ket efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forward-looking information.").
Some question whether the SEC, the courts and Congress have gone overboard in their
acceptance of the ECMH, particularly when other finance theories have questioned some of
ECMH's assumptions. See generally BRuDNEY & BRATION, supra note 33, at 128-47; JENNIos,
supra note 23, at 209-28; Lawrence Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure,
and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 843, 854-59 (1994) (describing "chaos theory" and
its implications for mandatory disclosure); Langevoort, supra note 5, at 866-72 (describing noise
theory).
Despite the more sophisticated approach and understanding of disclosure, the SEC has not
neglected its traditional disclosure emphasis upon providing information that a typical retail in-
vestor can understand. Although a recent trend in this direction may have a clear political ori-
gin, L.a, an SEC chairman (Arthur Levitt) appointed by a Democratic president (William
Clinton), the SEC has placed renewed focus upon this historical mission. See Proposed Amend-
ments to Rules and Forms, Securities Act Release No. 7212, 60 Fed. Reg. 47,844 (Sept. 14,1995)
(proposal dealing with simplified mutual fund prospectuses); Jeffrey M. Laderman, The Prospec-
tus Tries Plain Speaking, Bus. Wi, Aug. 14, 1995, at 72 (describing SEC-encouraged and -ap-
proved program to deliver simplified, "plain speaking" mutual fund prospectuses). See also
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Address at the National Press
Club Luncheon (Oct. 13, 1994) ("Instead of working exclusively through the industry, we are
now working at grassroots, by listening to the needs of the investors and doing our best to edu-
cate them, working from the bottom up."); UNITED STATES SEcurTIEs AND EXCHANOE
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON Disc-osuRF SIMPLIFICATION 3 (1996) (arguing for
more readable SEC disclosure documents); <http: //www.sec.gov>. (SEC web site providing in-
vestors with basic information on securities markets and SEC activity).
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and goals that are already in place; and it is within the assumption of
these purposes and goals that any utterance is immediately heard.74
SEC disclosure has traditionally discouraged a company from
providing investors with an explanatory framework (it is "just the
facts").75 Corporate governance information, with or without a sup-
plied explanation, is likely to have a coherent meaning for a U.S. in-
vestor because he or she will have the appropriate conceptual
framework (or language) to make sense of it. Since a U.S. investor is
within the same culture that produced U.S. corporate governance, its
problems and the SEC's disclosure system as a response to these
problems, the U.S. investor76 is likely to find disclosed corporate gov-
ernance information to be of immediate significance: this is the kind
of information that he or she would expect to be highlighted because
it "makes sense" in terms of his or her understanding of corporate
governance.
To take a somewhat exaggerated example, assume that under
Item 403 of Regulation S-K (which details disclosure requirements for
U.S. companies),77 a U.S. issuer reveals that no beneficial owners of
more than 5% of such issuer's securities exist. Suppose further that
74 See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TXT IN TIS CLASS?: THE AuTHoRIY OF INTERPRETVE
COMMuNITIES 318 (1980) (emphasis in original). See also STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LrrERARY AND LEGAL
STUDies 26 (1989) ("the self [is] always and already constrained by the contexts of practice
(interpretive communities) that confer on it a shape and a direction"); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 129 (1995) ("I have thus defined the concept of the 'Back-
ground' as the set of nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable states of function.").
75 See supra note 73. The "materiality" qualification to disclosure could compel a company
to give some explanation to the "facts" presented. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994); 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.408 (1995) ("In addition to the information expressly required to be included in a registra-
tion statement, there shall be added such further material information, if any, as may be neces-
sary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading."). Even this qualification generally requires the inclusion of other facts,
rather than an explanation of information already presented. See infra subpart IVA. But see
McMahon & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 501 U.S. 1249 (1991) (holding that "the disclosure required by the securities laws is mea-
sured not by literal truth, but by the ability of the material to accurately inform rather than
mislead prospective buyers") (citation omitted).
76 As Stanley Fish has often observed, see FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra
note 74, at 31-32, cultures are not monolithic. See also GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CUL-
TURES, supra note 6, at 13 (cautioning us carefully to observe differences even between ourselves
and those closest to us). Some U.S. residents and investors could not make sense of the corpo-
rate governance "facts" given by a U.S. company (ie., corporations, finance and investments,
foreign or domestic, would be an unknown world to them). The reference to a U.S. cultural
understanding, however, at least describes what a U.S. investor with a basic familiarity with U.S.
securities markets would understand about corporate governance in U.S. companies.
77 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.403(a) (1995) (requiring disclosure of beneficial owners of more than
five percent of any class of the registrant's voting securities).
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pursuant to Item 401's disclosure requirement on directors and execu-
tive officers,78 the company shows that its management and directors
have occupied these positions for some time. Additional disclosure
under Item 202, which is a description of shareholder rights,79 states
that the board is classified and that the issuer has a charter provision
making change-of-control difficult. Discussion of executive compen-
sation under Item 40280 reveals high executive compensation in rela-
tion to peer issuers, as well as some insider participation in
compensation decisions. Further disclosure of the dividend policy
under Item 20181 points to excessive retention of funds by manage-
ment and reinvestment in negative net present value schemes.' No
general discussion in a disclosure statement would explain to an inves-
tor that this information suggests a classic case of management oppor-
tunism in the U.S. context of dispersed shareholders. Aware of the
risk of such opportunism because of his or her cultural background
and provided with the relevant corporate governance information by
the disclosure, however, a U.S. investor could arrive at a meaningful
conclusion about the existence and risks of management opportunism
in this case. 3
If SEC disclosure is so closely related to U.S. corporate govern-
ance and if corporate governance is so culturally determined, what
happens when the disclosure framework is imposed upon foreign com-
78 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401(a), (b) (1995) (disclosure of information about directors and of-
ficers, including periods in which they have served in such positions).
79 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.202(a)(1)(vi), (a)(5) (1995). See ROBERT C. CLAm, CoRoRaE
LAW 780-81 (1986) (on classification); RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THm LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcouiSrONs 731-794 (1995) (describing defensive tactics to ward off
hostile offers).
80 See 17 C.F.R. § 229A02 (1995) (detailing disclosure on executive and director compensa-
tion and manner of compensation decision).
81 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(c) (1995) (requiring disclosure on dividends for past years).
82 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 43, at 73-75 (basics of present value investing). Cf.
Jensen, supra note 41, at 847-48 (describing difficulties for management to bring itself to exit
unprofitable businesses).
83 Professor Mahoney is thus right to assert that U.S. corporate governance information is
straightforward for a company to disclose and for an investor to understand. See Mahoney,
supra note 56, at 1094. However, his assertion needs to be qualified by the observation that it
applies only to U.S. companies and investors (or to those in countries, such as the United King-
dom, with similar corporate governance), not necessarily to all foreign companies disclosing their
corporate governance information to U.S. investors. See infra subpart IVA. The above textual
example about management and director misbehavior "signalled" through disclosure is some-
what exaggerated, but not entirely far off from many real examples of abuse in U.S. corpora-
tions. See, eg., Diana B. Henriques, 71es That Bind: His Directors, Her Charity, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1995, at DI (describing such abuse in Morrison Knudsen Corp.); Joan E. Rigdon & Joan
S. Lublin, Call to Duty: Why Morrison Board Fired Agee, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1995, at B1
(same).
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panies entering U.S. capital markets? Has the SEC, as administrator
of U.S. securities laws, adjusted the inevitable U.S. cultural orienta-
tion of SEC disclosure requirements so that foreign issuers meaning-
fully disclose their corporate governance attributes to U.S. investors,
who will not have the necessary cultural background to make sense of
them? Answers to these questions require a review of the history of
SEC disclosure of foreign corporate governance.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF SEC MANDATORY DIscLosuRE OF
FOREIGN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Early SEC Accommodations to Foreign Companies
In the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, Congress did not
single out for special treatment foreign issuers or their securities, ex-
cept for debt securities issued by foreign governments.' Abuses in
sales and trading of foreign securities (particularly foreign govern-
ment securities), many of which had proved to be worthless following
the 1929 Stock Market Crash, ensured that Congress did not exempt
them from the securities laws.85 In the years immediately following
passage of the Acts, the SEC made some accommodations to its rules,
forms and practice for foreign private issuers, without spending much
time or effort in considering their special situation. The lack of SEC
84 The Securities Act included a special disclosure Schedule B for securities issued by a for-
eign government or a political subdivision thereof. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1994) Schedule B. The
only other reference to foreign issuers in the Securities Act is in Section 6(a), which provided
that a foreign issuer would need an authorized representative in the U.S. to sign the registration
statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This Article does not consider SEC
treatment of foreign government securities.
85 See Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess., 89 (1933) (observing that sales of foreign private securities would be treated the
same as sales of U.S. domestic securities); Federal Securities Act Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before
the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerc 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 86-87, 127 (1933) (discuss-
ing amount of worthless securities of foreign private issuers and foreign government issuers sold
in U.S. from World War I to 1933); H.R. CoNF. REP. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 20-23 (1933),
reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: LEGisLATWE HISToRY 1933-1982, Item 17, at 271-74
(1983) (representing Title II of the bill that would have established a Corporation of Foreign
Security Holders which would negotiate with foreign governments that had defaulted on their
bonds); STOCK EXCHANGE PRACrICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 125-50 (1934),
reprinted in 2 FEDERAL SEcUrEs LAws: LEGISLATVE HISTORY 1933-82, item 76, at 1387-1412
(1983) (detailing abuses in sales of foreign bonds). See also Landis, supra note 62, at 42; SEUiG-
MAN, supra note 56, at 68-70 (describing the attempt to add Title II to bill); Seligman, supra note
61, at 24-27 (describing abuses in the selling of foreign securities, particularly foreign govern-
ment bonds, during the years preceding enactment of the securities laws and the legislative re-
sponse to such abuses); Richard A. Stephens, Reevaluation of Disclosure Requirements for
Foreign Issuers: Securities Act of 1933, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 135, 139 n.12 (1977) (describing
abuses in foreign securities offerings).
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attention made sense because few foreign securities were then sold or
traded in the United States.16 Yet even in these early days of regula-
tion, the SEC acknowledged - without making much of its observation
- that differences existed in U.S. and foreign corporate governance.
A foreign private issuer publicly offering its securities into the
United States was required to use the form for registering securities
applicable to U.S. companies.8 7 From early in its administrative life
the SEC interpreted the Securities Act broadly to give it the power to
adapt statutory disclosure requirements to the circumstances of partic-
ular companies or classes of companies.88 The SEC made a few prac-
tical accommodations to foreign private issuers pursuant to this
power. One accommodation specifically concerned corporate govern-
ance as defined by the U.S. perspective. Because the SEC realized
that companies in many foreign countries kept executive compensa-
tion secret, the SEC permitted foreign private issuers to disclose ag-
gregate compensation amounts for management and directors, instead
of the specific compensation of individual executives and directors
that Schedule A and the Securities Act form required. 9
86 See 2 Loss & SEiGMAN, supra note 23, at 760-62 (quoting address of former SEC Chair-
man Garrett on early U.S. trading of foreign securities in the United States); John R. Stevenson,
Legal Aspects of the Public Offering of Foreign Securities in the United States Marke4 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 194, 194-95 & n.5 (1959) (describing small amount of foreign securities sold in
United States between enactment of securities laws and 1954). See also Exchange Act Release
No. 660, 1936 SEC LEXIS 204, at *1-*2 (May 8,1936) (pointing out that, in 1936, U.S. trading in
foreign securities was concentrated in foreign debt ($800 million), as opposed to equity ($70
million), securities).
87 See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Amendment to Form S-1 Regarding Rights Offerings By
Certain Foreign Private Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 3735, 1956 SEC LEXIS 151, at *1
(Dec. 21, 1956) ("Form S-1 ... is the principal form used for the registration of securities of
commercial and industrial companies under the Securities Act of 1933."). Some thought was
given to designing offering forms for foreign private issuers, but no action was taken because of
the small number of such issuers offering securities into the U.S. See Stephens supra note 85, at
145 n.55.
88 Under Section 7 of the Act, the SEC could waive a disclosure requirement "if [the SEC]
finds that the requirement of such information or document is inapplicable to such class [of
issuers] and that disclosure fully adequate for the protection of investors is otherwise required to
be included within the registration statement." 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1994). See Stephens, supra
note 85, at 144-45 (discussing the SEC's construction of this provision to allow the SEC to waive
Schedule A requirements for certain classes of issuers).
89 See Bodolus, supra note 7, at 112 (first Chief of SEC's Office of International Corporate
Finance explained the historical accommodations to foreign issuers under the Securities Act by
observing that "[u]nder the Securities Act, proceeding on a case-by-case basis, we do accept less
prospectus disclosures in such areas as management remuneration."); Stephens, supra note 85, at
159-61 (describing early accommodation to foreign issuers on disclosure requirements). Item
(14) of Schedule A requires disclosure of compensation of directors and officers (the latter to be
named if the compensation exceeds $25,000). 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1994) Schedule A. Securities
Act Form S-1, which supplanted the SEC's early basic Securities Act registration forms, see
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The SEC also accommodated foreign issuers in Exchange Act re-
gistration and reporting. In adopting special registration and annual
report forms for the different categories of foreign issuers and securi-
ties,90 the SEC noted that "[i]n view of the disparity between the laws
and practices existing in the several countries it was necessary to intro-
duce greater flexibility in the requirements." 91 The major difference
between these forms and those used by U.S. companies on corporate
governance matters was that, as in the Securities Act context, foreign
issuers could give aggregate management compensation amounts.
Foreign issuers also did not have to provide information on the stock-
holding of executives and directors, although Section 12(b)(1)(D) and
Exchange Act forms applicable to U.S. issuers specifically required
such disclosure.92
Securities Act Release No. 2887, 1942 SEC LEXIS 44, at *3-*4 (Dec. 18, 1942), initially trans-
lated these requirements into disclosure of the compensation of individual directors and of the
three highest paid executive officers if an individual's compensation exceeded $20,000 (a thresh-
old gradually adjusted upwards). See Amendments to Form S-1, Securities Act Release No.
3323, 1948 SEC LEXIS 383, at *2-*3 (Dec. 17, 1948). The SEC gave similar accommodation
(Le., aggregate disclosure) to foreign issuers on their disclosure of shareholdings of officers, di-
rectors and 10% shareholders. See Stephens, supra note 85, at 161-62.
From an early date, the SEC required special disclosures from foreign companies, but not
on corporate governance matters. See id at 140 and accompanying notes, 162-64 (describing
SEC rules requiring information on foreign country risks). See infra notes 227-28.
90 The SEC promulgated three registration forms for foreign private issuers (which at the
time meant issuers from countries other than Cuba and those located in North America) that
listed their securities on a registered U.S. stock exchange: Form 19 for the then equivalent of
ADRs; Form 20 for securities other than bonds; and Form 21 for bonds. See Exchange Act
Release No. 445, 1935 SEC LEXIS 463, at *1 (Dec. 20, 1935). The SEC prescribed comparable
annual report Forms 19-K, 20-K and 21-K. See id. See also Exchange Act Release No. 660,1936
SEC LEXIS 204, at *1 (May 8,1936) (describing expiration of temporary exemption from regis-
tration to foreign issuers following adoption of forms); Exchange Act Release No. 1058, 1937
SEC LEXIS 304, at *1 (Feb. 10, 1937) (similar expiration for exemption from annual report
requirement).
91 See Exchange Act Release Nos. 323-325 (Class B), 1935 SEC LEXIS 316, at *1 (July 15,
1935).
92 See Registration Forms for Foreign Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 7747,30 Fed. Reg.
14,743, 14,745 (Nov. 16, 1965) (requiring, in proposed combination of Forms 20 and 21, no dis-
closure of management and director shareholdings). U.S. issuers used Form 10 for registration
and Form 10-K for annual reports. Both of these forms provided more detailed information on
executive compensation than did the foreign reporting forms, as well as information on aggre-
gate management and director stockholding. See Exchange Act Release No. 445 (Class B), 1935
SEC LEXIS 464, at *3-*4 (Dec. 20, 1935); Notice of Proposed Revision of Form 10, Exchange
Act Release No. 4224, 1949 SEC LEXIS 51, at *26-*30 (Mar. 11, 1949); Notice of Proposed
Revision of Form 10-K, Exchange Act Release No. 4223, 1949 SEC LEXIS 50, at *11-*17 (Mar.
11, 1949). See generally Richard A. Stephens, Reevaluation of Disclosure Requirements for For-
eign Issuers: Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 45 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 494, 519-22 (1977) (dis-
cussing history of differences between Exchange Act disclosure for foreign and U.S. companies).
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In addition, the SEC made what would prove to be an important
accommodation to foreign issuers on two major Exchange Act provi-
sions relating to corporate governance: it exempted them from the
proxy rules of Section 14(a) and the insider reporting requirements of
Section 16. It justified this exemption primarily on the ground that
few foreign corporations in fact listed their stock on U.S. exchanges.
In its view, applying the proxy and insider trading requirements to
foreign issuers would thus have limited effect. 94 The SEC also alluded
to difficult jurisdictional and enforcement problems that would arise if
it attempted to apply to foreign companies these rules dealing with the
conduct of a firm's management and governance. 95 The SEC would
highlight these problems in its later consideration of foreign issuer
disclosure.
B. 1964 Exchange Act Amendments and Section 12(g)
The SEC revisited Exchange Act disclosure obligations of foreign
companies in connection with its rulemaking pursuant to the 1964
amendments to that Act. Among other things, the amendments ad-
ded Section 12(g),96 which required Exchange Act registration for
93 The exemption, placed first in Rule AN18, stated that "[s]ecurities for which the filing of
applications on Form 18, 19, 20 or 21 is authorized shall be exempt from the operation of Sec-
tions 14(a) and 16." Exchange Act Release No. 412 (Class A), 1935 SEC LEXIS 422, at *1 (Nov.
6, 1935). See also Exchange Act Release No. 412 (Class B), 1935 SEC LEXIS 423, at *1 (Nov. 6,
1935) (describing temporary exemption prior to promulgation of Rule).
94 See Exchange Act Release No. 412, 1935 SEC LEXIS 423, at *1 (Nov. 6, 1935). In an
interesting, but cryptic remark, the SEC observed that the insider rules would have limited effect
if applied to foreign companies because the primary market for the foreign securities would be
outside the United States. See id. The harm Congress intended to address through Section 16
would arise, however, from insider trading in the issuer's securities, whether done within or
without the United States. The SEC may have simply realized that, for jurisdictional reasons, it
would be difficult to enforce application of Section 16 to officers and directors of foreign compa-
nies. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and the Foreign Issuer Exemption: A Study
in the Process of Accommodating Foreign Interests, 54 Com. L. REv. 358,369-78 (1969) (discuss-
ing potential problems of imposing Sections 14 and 16 on foreign issuers). The SEC did observe
that the proxy rules would apply to a foreign issuer if "the consent or authorization [sought by a
foreign issuer] makes any important change in the security and if remuneration is paid in connec-
tion with the solicitation of such consent." See Exchange Act Release No. 412 (Class B), supra
note 93, at *1.
Foreign issuers were thus unaffected by amendments to proxy rules concerning specific is-
suer disclosure on corporate governance matters. See Exchange Act Release No. 1823, supra
note 71, at *20-*22 (disclosure as to election of directors and executive compensation plans);
Exchange Act Release No. 3347, supra note 71.
95 See Stephens, supra note 92, at 497-503 (describing potential jurisdictional problems of
applying Sections 14(a) and 16 to foreign companies).
96 See Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c)(1), 78 Stat. 565, amending Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 12,15 U.S.C. § 781(1964) (now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1994)).
Section 12(g)(1) required an issuer to register its securities if such issuer had assets exceeding
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companies whose securities traded in the U.S. over-the-counter mar-
kets. 7 Congress was concerned that the subsection might adversely
affect existing U.S. markets for securities of unregistered foreign issu-
ers and upset relations with these issuers and their home countries by
extending SEC jurisdiction to foreign companies that had not taken
the affirmative steps of either listing or publicly offering their securi-
ties in the U.S. It thus empowered the SEC to exempt foreign issuers
from Section 12(g)'s registration requirements. 98
In several releases following the 1964 amendments, the SEC
made proposals on disclosure by foreign private issuers.99 For foreign
issuers that publicly offered securities in the United States and/or
listed their securities on a registered U.S. stock exchange, it proposed
$1,000,000 and if its securities were held of record by more than 500 persons. In 1986, the SEC
raised the Section 12(g) asset limit to $5,000,000. See Rule 12g-1, Final Rules, Exchange Act
Release No. 23406, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,360 (July 14, 1986).
97 Securities trading in an over-the-counter market does not benefit from the facilities of an
organized exchange where a specialist supervises a market between buyers and sellers. In the
over-the-counter market, dealers hold themselves out as willing to make a market in certain
securities and publish their quotations. See generally Cox, supra note 19, at 6-8. At the time of
passage of Section 12(g), securities quoted on the NASDAQ system were considered not to be
listed. See infra note 193.
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(3) (1994) (providing for "such exemption [if it] is in the public
interest and is consistent with the protection of investors"); Notice of Proposed Amendments,
Exchange Act Release No. 7746,30 Fed. Reg. 14,737,14,738 (Nov. 16,1965) (describing exemp-
tion); Temporary Exemption for Foreign Issuers, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7427,
1964 SEC LEXIS 173 (Sept. 15, 1964) (granting temporary exemption from reporting require-
ment until Nov. 30,1965 pending promulgation of rule); Extension of Temporary Exemption for
Foreign Issuers, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7867, 1966 SEC LEXIS 684 (Apr. 21,
1966) (extending exemption until Nov. 30,1966). See also 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at
776 n.77 (describing initial Senate bill that would have exempted all foreign securities, unless the
SEC, by rule or regulation, provided otherwise - an approach favored by the SEC); Martin E.
Goldman & J. L. Magrino, Foreign Issuers and Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 23 Bus. LAW. 135, 135-36 (1967) (describing history of exemption); Richard M. Philips &
Morgan Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Act Amendments of 1964, 1964 DuKE L.J. 706,
755; Stephens, supra note 92, at 508 - 09 n.354 (describing legislative history). For a description
of the growth of U.S. markets (both organized and over-the-counter) in foreign securities prior
to the 1964 amendments, see Nathaniel Samuels, The Investment Banking Background of Issuing
and Marketing Foreign Securities in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND INVEST-
mrrr 411, 412-418 (John F. McDaniels ed., 1964).
99 See Exchange Act Release No. 7746, supra note 98; Exchange Act Release No. 7747,
supra note 92; Exchange Act Release No. 7748, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,745 (Nov. 16, 1965); Exchange
Act Release No. 7749,30 Fed. Reg. 14,747 (Nov. 16,1965). The SEC reported that, in preparing
the proposals, it studied U.S. trading markets for foreign securities, disclosure obligations of
companies in foreign countries and U.S. disclosure practices of such companies. See Exchange
Act Release No. 7746, supra note 98, at 14,738. The study does not appear ever to have been
published. See Buxbaum, supra note 94, at 374-75 (objecting to "private" nature of rule-making
process leading up to the proposals).
150
Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication
17:119 (1996)
revised forms for Exchange Act registration and annual reporting.100
For foreign companies brought under the Exchange Act by Section
12(g), it offered those having de minimis U.S. contacts an outright ex-
emption'0 1 and others a registration form that required them to pro-
vide the SEC only with information that they made public abroad.10 2
The SEC also proposed narrowing its exemption to the proxy and in-
sider trading rules for foreign issuers.103 Although not the major focus
100 The SEC proposed to combine the existing Form 20 (registration of equity) and Form 21
(registration of debt) into a revised Form 20 that would be used for registration of either kind of
security. See Exchange Act Release No. 7747, supra note 92, at 14,743. See also Exchange Act
Release No. 7748, supra note 99, at 14,745-46 (proposing a revised Form 20-K to replace annual
reporting Forms 20-K and 21-K).
The SEC also proposed an interim reporting form for reporting foreign issuers (except
North American, Cuban and Philippine issuers), which were exempt from the requirement of
filing interim reports. Because, according to the SEC, more foreign countries were requiring
interim reporting, it proposed an interim report for foreign issuers. See Exchange Act Release
No. 7749, supra note 99, at 14,747-48 (foreign issuer would provide in a Form 6-K interim report
information that an issuer (i) is required to make public in its country of domicile, (ii) filed or
made public with a foreign exchange, or (iii) distributed to its security holders).
101 The SEC proposed Rule 12g3-2, which would exempt from Exchange Act registration any
foreign issuer (other than a North American or Cuban issuer) that, while meeting the asset and
shareholder tests, in fact had fewer than 300 holders of record resident in the U.S. See Exchange
Act Release No. 7746, supra note 98, at 14,739. It would also exempt all American Depositary
Shares from Section 12(g), see id, because the underlying foreign securities would be either sub-
ject to or exempted from registration.
102 See Exchange Act Release No. 7747, supra note 92, at 14,743 (explaining that a foreign
issuer must provide the SEC with information it made public in its home country, filed with a
local stock exchange or distributed to its security holders). Under the proposal, these foreign
private issuers would not have to fie an annual report, but would have to furnish a year-end
balance sheet, profit and loss statement, description of business and an outline of rights of secur-
ity holders, if their home country filings did not include such information. See Exchange Act
Release No. 7746, supra note 98, at 14,738. The SEC also proposed requiring U.S. brokers and
market makers to police compliance with this new registration requirement by foreign issuers
whose securities traded in the over-the-counter market. See id. at 14,740 (describing proposed
Rule 15c1-10 requiring brokers to disclose to their customers the identity of foreign issuers fall-
ing to register under Section 12(g), and Rule 17a-10 requiring market makers in securities of
unregistered foreign issuers to furnish information to investors on these issuers).
103 See Exchange Act Release No. 7746, supra note 98, at 14,738-39. The SEC had earlier
proposed to amend Rule 3a12-3, which was the successor to Rule AN18. In Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 6912,1962 SEC LEXIS 32 (Oct. 11, 1962), the SEC wished to exclude from the proxy
and insider trading exemption foreign companies that had significant U.S. operations or a major-
ity of U.S. directors. This proposal was withdrawn by Exchange Act Release No. 7517, 30 Fed.
Reg. 1,010 (Jan. 22, 1965).
The SEC's 1965 proposal to narrow the rule was an attempt to bring within SEC jurisdiction
foreign companies and actions having significant U.S. contacts. Under the proposal, foreign pri-
vate issuers would no longer have a blanket exemption from Sections 14 and 16 of the Exchange
Act. Some foreign companies deemed to be U.S. companies would lose the exemption alto-
gether. See Exchange Act Release No. 7746, supra note 98, at 14,740 (exemption would not
apply if either 50% of foreign issuer's voting securities were held by U.S. residents or it con-
ducted its principal business in the United States.). A foreign private issuer would also lose the
proxy exemption if it did anything more in the United States than distribute to its U.S. security
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of any of the proposals,0 4 foreign corporate governance disclosure
was implicated in all of them. More importantly, the proposals and
the reaction to them displayed policies and concerns that the SEC
would increasingly use in designing its foreign corporate governance
disclosure, as well as the force of the special interests and pressures
that pushed the SEC to minimize any disclosure burden on foreign
companies.
In the Release on new Exchange Act Forms 20 and 20-K, the
SEC explicitly addressed foreign corporate governance by proposing
to add to existing disclosure of the aggregate compensation of direc-
tors and officers disclosure of their aggregate pension benefits and op-
tions.10 5 The SEC explained that it had traditionally been deferential
to foreign companies on management disclosure issues because of its
recognition that foreign issuers had different disclosure regimes
abroad.10 6 By this deference, the SEC could have been signalling its
sensitivity to cultural differences in other countries and thus its recog-
nition of different corporate governance, e.g., that detailed discussion
of compensation might not matter where management/agents were
less powerful than they were in the United States.
Other SEC remarks suggest a different reading of the SEC's posi-
tion: the SEC believed that the only appropriate corporate govern-
ance disclosure was U.S. disclosure and, implicitly, that the only
important corporate governance information pertaining to foreign
companies was that susceptible of being identified by the U.S. disclo-
sure framework. According to the SEC, its study of foreign markets
and corporations showed to its satisfaction that foreign countries were
increasingly adopting disclosure systems similar to the one in the
United States.0 7 It thus felt justified in requiring more disclosure
from foreign private issuers on management compensation matters,
without yet equalizing foreign and U.S. company disclosure.'0 8 The
holders a notice of the shareholder meeting and a name of a provider of proxy forms, or have its
depositary bank do more than request voting instructions from shareholders. See id. at 14,739.
The SEC thought that the proposal would not hinder these general methods of communication
between foreign issuers and their U.S. shareholders. See id.
104 In fact, the SEC's primary attention in the proposals was to disclosure of business and
financial information, see Exchange Act Release No. 7746, supra note 98, at 14,738, not of "qual-
itative" management information, an approach that would come to characterize the SEC's view
of foreign company disclosure. See infra subpart IIIC.
105 See Exchange Act Release No. 7747, supra note 92, at 14,743.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id. ("The trend toward greater disclosure abroad has led some countries to require
some form of disclosure as to the benefits conferred upon management, and the Commission
now believes that it is both desirable and feasible to require certain information in this connec-
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SEC implied that it was an agent in the evolution of other countries'
systems towards U.S. disclosure and corporate governance. 10 9
The SEC's confidence in the inevitability, and thus the superior-
ity, of U.S. disclosure and corporate governance also characterized its
proposal on registration of foreign companies under Section 12(g).
Since the proposal would have permitted certain foreign issuers basi-
cally to use home country disclosure for Exchange Act purposes, it
again appeared to demonstrate the SEC's sensitivity to cultural differ-
ences. Although the pertinent part of new Form 20 to be used by
Section 12(g) foreign companies required little specific disclosure on
any subject, and no disclosure on corporate governance, the SEC sug-
gested, however, that in the not too distant future disclosure compara-
ble to that required under U.S. law would be required for foreign
companies under the laws of their home countries. The SEC justified
its proposal because of "the continuing improvement in the reporting
of financial and economic information by foreign issuers" in their
home countries and the likelihood that this "improvement w[ould]
continue". 1 0 The SEC left unposed and unanswered an obvious ques-
tion: if foreign disclosure became identical to U.S. disclosure, what
would be the purpose of imposing SEC disclosure requirements on
foreign companies?
If the SEC's U.S. cultural perspective made it ready to pass
quickly over differences in foreign corporate governance and disclo-
sure systems, one could well ask why, in its proposals, the SEC did not
simply insist upon complete U.S. style disclosure for all foreign com-
panies, including the new class of foreign issuers whose securities were
traded in the U.S. over-the-counter markets. The SEC's approach in
fact made sense from a pragmatic perspective. Because U.S. investors
had increased their trading in foreign securities, for the first time in its
history the SEC had seriously to confront the U.S. situation of foreign
issuers, as well as at least to look at their home country corporate
governance and disclosure systems. Confronted with a new situation,
the SEC took a cautious position. Since it concluded that the foreign
systems were generally evolving towards a U.S. model, it justifiably
proposed minor adjustments to its Exchange Act registration and dis-
tion with foreign registrants. At the same time, the Commission recognizes that most foreign
issuers do not make such disclosures in their own countries as to individual directors and
officers.").
109 Id. (explaining that it "encourag[ed] this improvement" in foreign disclosure). See also
Exchange Act Release No. 7748, supra note 99, at 14,746 (similar expression of SEC views on
new Form 20-K).
110 See Exchange Act Release No. 7747, supra note 92, at 14,743.
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closure requirements for reporting foreign companies and a relatively
light disclosure burden for the major new category of foreign issuers
falling under its jurisdiction because of Section 12(g).
The SEC also had intellectual and doctrinal justifications for its
pragmatism - justifications that it would develop in later amendments
to its foreign corporate governance disclosure. These reasons help to
explain its light treatment of Section 12(g) foreign companies. In the
releases, the SEC suggested that SEC disclosure should not be the
same for foreign issuers that, through no activity of their own, found
their securities traded in the United States as for foreign issuers that
had made a U.S. public offering or listing.11' This distinction between
voluntary and involuntary entry into U.S. capital markets drew sup-
port from legal considerations of jurisdiction and comity.1" 2 The SEC
might well question its basis for jurisdiction, and the appropriateness
for comity reasons of its asserting jurisdiction, over a foreign person
that had few U.S. market contacts. These justifications also supported
the SEC's unwillingness to extend full U.S. corporate governance dis-
closure to foreign issuers that had sought U.S. capital markets. Be-
cause, as we have seen, U.S. corporate governance disclosure is
directly related to, and has an indirect effect upon, the corporate gov-
ernance of firms subject to the disclosure system, the SEC might well
hesitate before placing the full corporate governance disclosure bur-
den on a foreign issuer (for example, through application to that is-
suer of Section 16), and it might be reluctant to be perceived by
foreign governments as interfering in the "internal affairs" of their
corporations.
To this pragmatic and doctrinal account of the SEC's rulemaking
one needs to add the additional complexity of interest group pressure
that led to the SEC's accommodation with foreign issuers and to its
111 See id. (pointing out that such issuers had not "sought the American capital market"). But
see Edward F. Greene, et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the Inter-
national Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAw. 413, 426 (1995) (arguing that the difference does not
make sense because it places in the involuntary category issuers that sell securities in the United
States through private placements or that sponsor an ADR program). Later SEC releases on
foreign company disclosure repeat, like a refrain, the reference to improvement in foreign disclo-
sure and to the concept of voluntary vs. involuntary entry into U.S. markets. Cf. Langevoort,
supra note 19, at 533 (observing that SEC rhetoric has instrumental force in SEC bureaucracy, as
it is used there to justify new SEC proposals by demonstrating that they agree with traditional
SEC policies).
112 See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 92, at 498 (discussing legal considerations applying to exten-
sion of U.S. disclosure obligations to foreign issuers); COMM. ON INT'L LAW, ASS'N OF THE BA
OF THE CrrY OF NEw Yo~ac, THE 1964 AM ENDmET T HE SECuRIS Acr OF 1934 AND THE
PROPOSED SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMISSION RULEs - INT'L LAW ASPECTS, 21 Rac.
A.B.C.N.Y. 240, 244-52 (1966) [hereinafter NYC BAR ASS'N].
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accompanying failure to contemplate a disclosure design that might
compel foreign issuers to explain their corporate governance to U.S.
investors.113 By the 1964 amendments, certain parties had an interest
in minimal disclosure burdens on foreign issuers. These parties in-
cluded foreign issuers and authorities in their home countries that op-
posed any U.S. intrusion into the regulation of their corporations and
markets. 14 Investment banks and other market professionals that
provided markets for foreign securities and had financial relationships
with foreign issuers, as well as the commercial banks involved in the
depositary programs, also opposed major reforms to foreign company
disclosure that could injure existing markets in foreign securities and
drive business offshore." 5 Other opponents were members of the se-
curities bar who represented such issuers, banks and market profes-
113 See Stephens, supra note 92, at 497 n.91, 498-499 & notes accompanying text, 508-09
n.354 (alluding to this pressure).
114 See 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 23, at 779 (describing British and Canadian govern-
ments' objections to proposed registration of foreign companies that had neither listed nor of-
fered their securities in the United States). See generally Buxbaum, supra note 94, at 362, 375
and notes accompanying text; Goldman & Magrino, supra note 98, at 137. Foreign issuers not
previously subject to Exchange Act jurisdiction would object to the additional burden of compli-
ance as well as the added risk of Exchange Act liability. Admittedly, the proposed disclosure
requirements of registration for "involuntary" Section 12(g) companies were minimal and, pur-
suant to Instruction E of Form 20, in their provision of information the companies were exempt
from Exchange Act liability. See Exchange Act Release No. 7747, supra note 92, at 14,743. Yet
failure to register would subject the companies to civil and criminal sanctions, and registration
would also mean that, because the companies would be under the SEC's jurisdiction, the SEC
could later decide to remove the exemption, e.g., to increase the information requirements and
to impose liability upon these foreign issuers. See, eg., NYC BAR Ass'N, supra note 112, at 244
(articulating this point). The logic of the SEC's position - that disclosure regimes would improve
abroad - could argue for a later expansion of SEC jurisdiction over these companies (Le., that
such foreign companies would in the future be in a better position to meet the disclosure re-
quirements for U.S. companies).
Much opposition came from North American and Cuban issuers that were ineligible for the
special minimal disclosure requirements of proposed Form 20. See Exchange Act Release No.
7746, supra note 98, at 14,738. Cf. Stephens, supra note 92, at 497 n.291.
115 See Buxbaum, supra note 94, at 375 (referring to opposition of American dealers in for-
eign securities); Stephens, supra note 92, at 508-09 n.354 (citing reactions of investment banks
and Investment Bankers Associations to the proposals). But see SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at
312 (observing that the New York Stock Exchange favored imposing additional burdens upon
foreign securities traded in the over-the-counter markets, which would enhance attractiveness of
exchange listing for these securities). As Professors Gilson and Kraakman have explained, pro-
fessional traders would generally support the extension of mandatory disclosure to more compa-
nies because they would no longer themselves have to gather and verify information about such
companies. See supra note 33, at 639-40. Because, however, the proposals also required broker-
dealers to monitor foreign company compliance with Section 12(g), these professionals had a
countervailing incentive to reduce their own regulatory burden and thus to oppose the
proposals.
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sionals and who had a financial interest in the outcome." 6 Since, from
the public choice perspective, the SEC had a political need to main-
tain an outside constituency that would validate its own importance
and guarantee its own survival as a market regulator, it had to be par-
ticularly sensitive to the warnings of U.S. market professionals and the
securities bar that excessive regulation would injure existing U.S. mar-
kets for foreign securities." 7
The final rules, which were not adopted for over a year and a half
after the proposals," 8 confirm the force of the SEC's cultural confi-
dence, its doctrinal concerns, and interest group pressure in limiting
disclosure burdens on foreign issuers. While the minimal increase in
disclosure about management compensation in the revised Forms 20
and 20-K remained as proposed," 9 the rules relating to Section 12(g)
registration and the proxy and insider trading rule exemption were
scaled back to forms that have remained basically unchanged to this
day.120 As the SEC explained, further examination of foreign disclo-
sure regimes following the proposals had convinced it to exempt out-
right from Section 12(g) registration foreign issuers that did not meet
the basic exemption criterion (i.e., have fewer than 300 U.S. share-
116 While the securities bar opposed the SEC's rule-making under Section 12(g), see, e.g.,
NYC BAR ASS'N, supra note 112; Stephens, supra note 92, at 497 n.291, 502 n.319, it was likely
to come out ahead under any outcome (Le., it would either do the new registration work or
benefit from other foreign company and investment banking business).
117 Cf. Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 8066, 32
Fed. Reg. 7,845, 7,846 (Apr. 28, 1967) ("The Commission also consulted with representatives of
American brokers, dealers, financial analysts, the principal banks issuing American Depositary
Receipts (ADR's) and other persons who are interested in foreign securities, and received rec-
ommendations from interested domestic and foreign groups."); SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 311-
23 (describing effort by SEC to line up Congressional support for a bill for securities law
amendments).
118 See Exchange Act Release No. 8066, supra note 117; Exchange Act Release No. 8067, 32
Fed. Reg. 7,853 (Apr. 28, 1967); Exchange Act Release No. 8068, 32 Fed. Reg. 7,851 (Apr. 28,
1967); Exchange Act Release No. 8069, 32 Fed. Reg. 7,853 (Apr. 28, 1967). Amended Rule
3a12-3, however, was adopted one year earlier. See Adoption of Amendment to Rule 3a12-3,
Exchange Act Release No. 7868, 31 Fed. Reg. 6,705 (Apr. 21, 1966).
119 See Exchange Act Release No. 8067, supra note 118, at 7,847; Exchange Act Release No.
8068, supra note 118, at 7,851. Because foreign issuers most affected by these rule changes, i.&,
foreign companies with securities listed on U.S. exchanges, had already made similar manage-
ment compensation disclosure in their Securities Act filings, see sources cited supra note 89, para
1, they would not have considered the same disclosure in the Exchange Act context to be partic-
ularly burdensome.
120 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1995); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1995). See also Greene, supra
note 111, at 428-29 (observing that, although more foreign securities are sold and traded in the
United States because of increased use of private placements and ADR facilities, the SEC has
never revisited Rule 12g3-2).
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holders). 121 To receive the exemption, these issuers only had to fur-
nish the SEC with information required under the laws of their home
countries. 22 With little explicit justification, the SEC allowed its ex-
emption from the proxy and insider trading rules to remain broad.123
C. Foreign Company Disclosure on Form 20-F
The SEC returned to foreign corporate governance disclosure in
1976. This particular action was part of an overall SEC interest in
corporate governance inspired by governance scandals involving U.S.
public companies in the 1970s and generally entailing illegal payments
121 According to the SEC, following the proposals it had consulted with interested groups and
asked foreign issuers to document disclosure requirements in their home jurisdictions. On the
basis of this research, the SEC observed "the continuing improvement in the quality of the infor-
mation now being made public by foreign issuers, together with the improvement
which may reasonably be expected to result from recent changes and current proposals for
change in relevant requirements ...." See Exchange Act Release No. 8066, supra note 117, at
7,846.
122 Rule 12g3-2(b) provided that an issuer falling within Exchange Act jurisdiction because of
Section 12(g) shall be exempt if it (or a government agency of its country) furnishes the SEC
whatever information the issuer "(a) has made public pursuant to the law of the country of its
domicile or in which it is incorporated or organized, (b) has filed with a stock exchange on which
its securities are traded and which was made public by such exchange, or (c) has distributed to its
security holders." Id. at 7,848. The final rule, unlike the proposed rule, provided no require-
ment of minimum information. As a way of further lightening the disclosure burden, the Rule
required the provision of only certain information falling in the above categories, including U.S.
defined corporate governance facts, i.e, "changes in management or control; the granting of
options or the payment of other remuneration to directors or officers; transactions with direc-
tors, officers or principal security holders; and any other information about which investors
ought reasonably to be informed," see id. at 7,846; Rule 12g3-2(b) (3); see also Exchange Act
Release No. 8069, supra note 118, at 7,853 (with similar language), but again only if a company
disclosed such information in the home country. The Rule continued to exempt a foreign issuer
with fewer than 300 holders resident in the United States. See Rule 12g3-2(a)(1). The influence
of investment banks upon the SEC was revealed in the latter's decision not to adopt rules requir-
ing broker-dealers to monitor foreign issuer compliance with the Rule. See Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 8066, supra note 117, at 7,846 (warning brokers to pay attention to an SEC list on
complying Section 12(g) foreign issuers in recommending foreign securities to their clients and
promising to monitor foreign issuer compliance with Section 12(g)).
123 In Exchange Act Release No. 7868, supra note 118, issued before the final releases on the
Section 12(g) exemptions, the SEC finalized a new Rule 3a12-3(b), which excluded from the
historic proxy rule and insider trading exemption only a company where both 50% of its out-
standing securities were held by U.S. residents and either its business was principally conducted
in the United States or 50% of its directors were U.S. residents. The adopted Rule also returned
to the former Rule's language of a blanket, rather than piecemeal, exemption from Sections 14
and 16. The SEC justified this retreat by observing that, as of the Release's date, it had not yet
decided how to treat foreign issuers for Section 12(g) purposes. See id at 6,705. However, it did
not revisit (and substantially change) the rule either following final adoption of Rule 12g3-2 or
since that time. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1995) (only applicable provisions of Section 14 from
which a foreign issuer is not exempted are those dealing with tender offers). See Stephens, supra
note 92, at 493-95 (describing the contradictions in the SEC's final Rule 3a12-3 release).
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and bribes.124 Just as, because of the scandals, the SEC addressed cor-
porate governance disclosure in U.S. companies, it also undertook to
reform foreign corporate governance disclosure. The more specific
catalyst for the SEC action on foreign companies was a study of for-
eign disclosure systems by the newly created SEC Office of Interna-
tional Corporate Finance, which was established in January 1973 to
deal with, among other things, issues arising from the selling and trad-
ing of foreign securities in the United States. 125
The SEC did not take advantage of this renewed consideration of
foreign issuers to understand the differences between corporate gov-
ernance and disclosure systems in foreign countries and those in the
United States. Still fixed in its U.S. perspective, the SEC measured all
foreign systems of governance and disclosure by its own standards and
generally found them wanting, although it acknowledged that they
were gradually evolving toward the U.S. model. On the basis of its
study, the SEC proposed that Exchange Act disclosure requirements
for a foreign company voluntarily seeking U.S. capital markets should
now closely resemble those required for a U.S. company.
For a number of reasons, however, the SEC substantially modi-
fied this proposal and accepted an accommodation with foreign issu-
ers that, at least on foreign corporate governance, required little U.S.-
style disclosure. The SEC came to realize that the doctrinal basis for
enhanced corporate governance disclosure for foreign companies was
124 SEC debate and Congressional inquiry in the 1970s focused on failures in director over-
sight that resulted in illegal use of corporate funds. See SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 534-51.
This activity led to passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91
Stat. 1494 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ft), which prohibited Exchange Act reporting compa-
nies from engaging in foreign bribery and required such companies to improve their internal
auditing controls. At this time, the SEC attempted to improve corporate governance disclosure
for U.S. companies. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 11079, 39 Fed. Reg. 40,766, 40,768
(Oct. 31, 1974) (amending Rule 14a-3 on proxy solicitation to require more information in an-
nual reports); Exchange Act Release No. 11641, 1975 SEC LEXIS 850 (Sept. 10, 1975) (amend-
ing Form 10-Q to improve disclosure therein); Exchange Act Release No. 13346, 1977 SEC
LEXIS 2252 (Mar. 9, 1977) (approving NYSE rule change requiring listed companies to have an
audit committee composed solely of outside directors); Exchange Act Release No. 15384, 43
Fed. Reg. 58,522 (Dec. 6, 1978) (amending proxy forms to require increased information about
director nominees). See generally KAImmL, supra note 61, at 139-86.
125 See Securities Act Release No. 5355, 1973 SEC LEXIS 2127 (Jan. 11, 1973). The first
director of the Office explained that it conducted a study of overseas securities markets in order
to provide a basis for "our present and future policies regarding foreign issuers and foreign
participation in the United States markets and our market structure." See Bodolus, supra note 7,
at 108. See also Cohen, supra note 7, at 371-72 (explaining that the Office has "also been as-
signed the task of developing rules and regulations designed to encourage and facilitate offerings
either originating abroad or intended to be sold abroad.") (emphasis in original). The establish-
ment of the Office was itself important evidence of the then growing internationalization of the
securities markets.
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not free of doubt.126 While not the substantive regulation of corpo-
rate governance desired by the drafters of the federal securities laws
and early SEC chairmen, like William 0. Douglas, SEC disclosure had
an indirect effect on a company's governance. Yet judicial interpreta-
tion of the securities laws, particularly the 1977 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green which checked the SEC's
reforms on corporate governance disclosure, 127 reaffirmed the tradi-
tional primacy of state corporate law in corporate governance. More
specifically, as already seen in the Section 12(g) rule-making, disclo-
sure requirements were particularly sensitive in the foreign context
where the SEC could be seen to be interfering with the "internal af-
fairs" of foreign firms and thus with the laws of foreign sovereigns.
Although courts had held that a U.S. listing of a foreign security es-
tablished subject matter jurisdiction over foreign parties for anti-fraud
purposes,"~ the SEC had some doubts how far it could legally extend
its jurisdiction without interfering with international law or laws of
other nations.
The SEC also backed away from its proposal because of its con-
cern about preserving U.S. securities markets from international com-
petition. The late 1960s and early 1970s had revealed, through the
spectacular growth of the Eurobond market, that there was a strong
offshore alternative to U.S. capital markets where foreign issuers
could attract U.S. investors. The SEC could simply no longer take for
granted the worldwide dominance of the U.S. securities markets that
it regulated. 29 Because the SEC's existence depended upon the con-
tinued profitability of these markets and their participants, it re-
sponded to its constituencies (i.e., investment bankers and securities
126 I owe the following observations to Professor Roberta Karmel, who was an SEC Commis-
sioner at the time of the proposal.
127 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (holding that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act did not regulate
violations of a state law fiduciary duty, absent a disclosure problem, and declining to "federalize
the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, partic-
ularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden").
128 See, eg., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds on
rehearing en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (discussing the
effects of foreign transactions in American securities); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (highlighting fraudulent conduct occurring in the U.S.);
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (same).
See generally Cox, supra note 19, at 1333-70; JENNINGS, supra note 23, at 1573.
129 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7, at 372-75 (describing the growth of the Eurobond market,
Le., where U.S. and foreign companies raised debt financing in Europe through issuances in
dollar-denominated securities, a market whose growth was stimulated by the imposition of an
Interest Equalization Tax on foreign borrowers in the United States and U.S. restrictions on
foreign investment by U.S. multinationals (which caused them to raise funds abroad through
their non-U.S. subsidiaries)).
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lawyers) when they supported the foreign issuers' contention that the
SEC's proposal would drive them offshore and injure U.S. markets.130
This SEC response also dovetailed nicely with a public interest ration-
ale, for, by acceding to this pressure, the SEC helped maintain for
U.S. investors a U.S. market in foreign securities. Moreover, in arriv-
ing at an accommodation with foreign issuers that called for only mini-
mal corporate governance disclosure, the SEC contributed to its own
self-preservation by ensuring that it would have an important voice in
international, as well as national, disclosure debates.' 3' The history of
this proposal on foreign corporate governance thus reveals a complex
context of SEC doctrinal deliberation, interest group pressure, SEC
concern to justify its existence, and genuine public interest motiva-
tions by SEC personnel.
In 1976, the SEC asked for public comment on the desirability of
modifying Forms 20 and 20-K to require disclosure similar to that for
U.S. issuers. 32 It gave a neutral justification for the request: "[t]he
theory has been advanced that amendments of this nature might not
only make more meaningful the information available to investors
concerning foreign issuers, but also improve the domestic market for
foreign securities and thereby facilitate the free flow of capital among
nations.' 33  In the SEC's view, increased disclosure about foreign
companies should give investors more and better information, and this
should result in lower costs of capital for foreign issuers and a better
U.S. market for foreign securities. Moreover, that Forms 20 and 20-K
required "substantially less information" from foreign companies than
what domestic companies supplied on recently amended Forms 10 and
10-K could also justify significant amendments to the foreign issuer
reporting forms.' 3 4
130 Cf. Langevoort, supra note 5, at 888 and notes accompanying text (describing SEC's "sig-
nalling" to constituencies); Macey, Agency Obsolescence, supra note 19, at 912-21 (describing
strategies taken by an agency threatened with obsolescence).
131 As an agency subject to political pressures, the SEC also felt the increasing force of a
deregulatory political philosophy and heightened concerns about U.S. competition that were
manifested at the end of the 1970s during the last years of the Carter administration. Cf
KARMEL, supra note 61, at 184-86.
132 See Means of Imposing Disclosure by Certain Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 13056, 41 Fed. Reg. 36,992 (Dec. 10, 1976).
133 Id. This rhetoric may also have signalled to the SEC's constituencies that the SEC had not
yet taken a firm position on the issues raised in the Release.
134 Id. (also observing that enhanced disclosure by foreign companies would redress any com-
petitive disadvantages suffered by U.S. issuers in U.S. capital markets because of the latters'
disclosure burdens). See, e.g., Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Registration Forms S-1
and S-2 under the Securities Act of 1933 and to Forms 10, 10-K and 10-Q, Securities Exchange
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In the request for comment, the SEC showed little desire to un-
derstand cultural differences in disclosure and governance and to
adapt its disclosure framework to them. Rather, the SEC suggested
that "better" disclosure for foreign companies meant U.S. disclosure,
regardless of the foreign country. Instead of considering that its dis-
closure framework might not elicit for U.S. investors meaningful in-
formation about the culturally sensitive area of foreign corporate
governance, the SEC simply emphasized that U.S. issuers made
greater disclosure than did foreign issuers on corporate governance
issues, as defined by the U.S. perspective. 35 The SEC exhibited some
sensitivity to foreign issuers in requesting comment on "the desirabil-
ity, feasibility, and potential impact of such measures on the United
States domestic markets for foreign securities, including the reaction
of foreign issuers, organizations, and governments to any possibly in-
creased disclosure burdens" and the "ability of foreign issuers pres-
ently to comply with substantially the same annual reporting
requirements imposed on domestic issuers". 36 Yet the SEC's policy
concern that "such [increased disclosure] requirements would result in
foreign issuers not using our markets,"'1 37 and not a desire better to
understand, and thus to produce useful disclosure of, foreign differ-
ences, primarily motivated this attention to foreign issuers.
In its proposal to replace Exchange Act Forms 20 and 20-K with
new Form 20-F, 138 the SEC also exhibited its confidence in the univer-
sality of U.S. disclosure and corporate governance and its blindness to
the importance of cultural differences in these matters. It was aware
that customs and laws on disclosure were different abroad. In duti-
fully summarizing the comments that it had received on its earlier con-
cept release, for example, the SEC cited objections to enhanced
foreign company disclosure based upon these differences, including an
intriguing comment that information produced by some U.S. disclo-
sure requirements would not be "meaningful" for a foreign com-
Act Release No. 10180, 173 SEC LEXIS 2865, at *3 (June 1, 1973) (improving disclosure on
issuer's business and management).
135 See Exchange Act Release No. 13056, supra note 132, at 36,992 (citing the Form 10 and 10-
K requirements that U.S. issuers discuss security holdings by directors and officers, family rela-
tionships between officers and directors, legal actions pertaining to them, their interest in corpo-
rate transactions and individual director and management compensation data).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 14,128, 42 Fed. Reg. 58,684 (Nov.
2, 1977) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. part 240).
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pany.139 Rather than considering an alternative disclosure framework
to the choices between little or no foreign company disclosure, and
disclosure equivalent to full U.S. standards, the SEC opted for the
latter approach in its proposal. It pointed out that the same reasoning
used in its Section 12(g) rulemaking justified this selection: since for-
eign disclosure standards were improving, increased disclosure would
not be burdensome for foreign companies, and, in any event, it would
push foreign companies (and, implicitly, foreign market authorities) in
the "right" direction.140
A resurgence of a traditional public interest activism in the SEC
reminiscent of the New Deal SEC, which corporate governance
abuses had inspired, reinforced the SEC's focus on the primacy of
U.S. disclosure and corporate governance. Although in its request for
comment the SEC "signalled" its neutrality to interested parties, in its
rule proposal the SEC took a position openly adverse to its constitu-
encies. 141 It explicitly identified the many commentators to its earlier
release who had disagreed with additional disclosure burdens upon
foreign companies as "special interests" whose "economic interests"
"may not coincide with those of public investors." 4 The SEC's "pri-
mary mandate" was not to accommodate these parties, but to protect
public investors by giving them adequate disclosure on foreign securi-
ties. 43 By proposing to make disclosure for foreign companies the
same as that for U.S. companies, the SEC thus sought to encourage
these investors to purchase foreign securities, which would break the
hold of sophisticated and professional investors on such investment
139 See id. at 58,686 ("Generally, these comments expressed the view that certain of the sub-
ject disclosure requirements should not be applied in present form to foreign companies either
because the resulting disclosures would not be meaningful or would be inappropriate or imprac-
ticable to provide under foreign business practice, laws or customs.") (emphasis added).
140 Id. at 58,687 ("improvements [in foreign disclosure] have continued and should continue
in the future") (emphasis added).
141 One can only speculate as to the reasons for this shift from benign "signalling" to overt
opposition to interest groups. Between the time of the original request for comment and the
proposal came the election of a Democratic President (Carter) and his appointment of a new
SEC chairman. The election may have emboldened activists on the SEC staff to return to a
favorite subject: corporate governance reform.
142 Exchange Act Release No. 14128, supra note 138, at 58,685. The SEC clearly identified
these special interests:
Although the majority of written comments received were opposed to or critical of the
tentative proposals, relatively few comment letters reflected the views of interested parties
other than foreign issuers, stock exchanges and broker-dealers who would be most directly
affected thereby. The Commission notes in this connection that economic self-interest in
maintaining the status quo is not necessarily consistent with the interests of investors in full
and fair disclosure.
Id.
143 Id. at 58,687.
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opportunities.144 So concerned was the SEC to provide a disclosure
framework whereby U.S. investors would receive adequate informa-
tion about foreign companies, that in the Release it did not stop to
consider that the U.S. disclosure framework might be a poor tool for
the task.
The SEC acknowledged in passing the complex doctrinal and pol-
icy reasons that had led to the existing situation of minimal foreign
disclosure: the jurisdictional problems of enforcing U.S. disclosure
standards on foreign companies and, indirectly, of affecting their gov-
ernance; the comity concern over interference with national sover-
eignties; and finally, but significantly, the fear of injuring U.S. markets
for foreign securities. 45 Observing that "internationalization of the
world's capital markets" meant that more foreign securities were find-
ing, or would find, their way to U.S. investors," the SEC explained
that it had to protect U.S. investors by equalizing foreign company
and U.S. disclosure. 147
With its U.S. perspective of addressing the problem of manage-
ment power over dispersed shareholders, the SEC thus proposed a
new Form 20-F that demanded considerably more U.S.-style corpo-
rate governance information than Forms 20 and 20-K had required.
While the existing forms simply asked for an identification of the com-
pany or government controlling the issuer, 48 the proposed form re-
quired disclosure of more "control" information. 149 The proposed
144 See it
145 d.
146 See id. (noting that the repeal of the Interest Equalization Tax meant that more foreign
issuers would come directly to the U.S. capital markets).
147 See id. at 58,687 and note 6 (discussing improvements to U.S. company disclosure and
possible competitive harm to U.S. companies from lesser disclosure burdens on foreign compa-
nies). The SEC's allusion to possible harm to U.S. companies was puzzling. If increased disclo-
sure resulted in lower costs of capital for a foreign issuer (Le., investors would no longer demand
a higher return for undisclosed risks), foreign companies, not U.S. companies, would be at a
competitive disadvantage because of their lesser disclosure obligations. See id. at 58,686.
148 See Forms, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 Fed. Reg. 7,853, 7,854 (1967) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. Sec. 249.221).
149 A foreign issuer would have to identify, to the extent practical, (i) all owners of more than
five percent of any class of voting securities, (ii) the total holdings of the securities of the issuer,
or of any of its parents or subsidiaries, by all directors and management and (iii) any "arrange-
ments" that might result in changes of control. See Exchange Act Release No. 14128, Proposed
Form 20-F, Item 5, supra note 138, at 58,697. Since a foreign issuer might have difficulty identi-
fying its five percent shareholders because many foreign shares were held in bearer form, the
SEC permitted a foreign issuer to identify such holders "to the extent practicable". See also id.
(requiring a company to "[d]escribe any arrangements, known to the registrant, including any
pledge by any person of securities of the registrant or any of its parents, the operation of which
may at a subsequent date result in a change in control of the registrant"); id. Item 4 (requiring
the foreign company to explain, by list or diagram, the structure of the corporate group (Le.,
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form, mirroring the requirements for U.S. companies, also demanded
such information about each director and officer as (i) age, (ii) term of
office, (iii) any "arrangement or understanding" pursuant to which the
officer or director had obtained the position, (iv) family relations with
other officers and directors and (v) a description of the director's ex-
perience and competence. 50 Under the proposed form, a foreign is-
suer had to disclose certain legal events concerning a director or
officer, including criminal convictions and proceedings, bankruptcy of
the person or related businesses and any violation of securities, bank-
ing or insurance law, if they were material to an evaluation of the
person's "ability and integrity". 151 Finally, proposed Form 20-F re-
quired that a foreign issuer give information about director and officer
compensation, direct or indirect, that was more extensive than the ag-
gregate remuneration information required by Forms 20 and 20-K.' 52
The SEC also proposed increasing the information that share-
holders would receive as to rights and interests pertaining to their
shares, which again made sense from the U.S. corporate governance
perspective that stressed the need to address the powerlessness of dis-
persed capital markets investors. A foreign issuer would thus disclose
to investors any sales of unregistered securities occurring during the
parents and subsidiaries of which it was a part). These disclosure items were all borrowed from
Forms 10 and 10-K. See Stephens, supra note 92, at 520 n.421.
150 See Exchange Act Release 14128, supra note 138, at 58,697 (adding to existing Forms 20
and 20-K's disclosure of the name, address and position of the individual directors and officers).
151 See id.
152 If a foreign issuer disclosed compensation information as to each individual director re-
ceiving over $40,000, and the three highest paid officers in the foreign jurisdiction, it had to do so
in the Form 20-F. See id at 58,698. If the company made no such disclosure in the foreign
jurisdiction, it could continue to give only aggregate compensation for such individuals, as well
as aggregate compensation for all directors and officers as a group. A similar breakdown was
required for pension or retirement benefits. See id. at 58,699. See also Item 8 (requiring a de-
scription of any consideration the foreign issuer received for granting the options to directors
and executives and the market value of the security on the day of the grant); ild. at 58,699-700,
Item 9 (requiring disclosure of any "material" interest by a director, officer, five percent share-
holder, or relative thereof, in any recent (ie., within the last three years) transactions with the
issuer, any indebtedness (over $10,000) to the issuer by any such party and any transaction by
any such party with a pension, savings, retirement or similar plan provided by the issuer); id at
58,700, Item 10 (requiring disclosure of material proceedings to which any director, officer, five
percent holder or any associate of such is named or has a material interest); id. at 58,702, Item 18
(requiring disclosure of insurance or indemnification provisions for a director or officer (to be
used only when Form 20-F served as an annual report or when an issuer had not otherwise
provided this information in previous interim filings)). See generally Stephens, supra note 92, at
520 n.421.
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three years prior to the filing, 53 as well as any legal possibility that
terms of registered capital stock could be modified other than by a
majority vote of shareholders. 54 Furthermore, shareholders would
learn if the foreign company had modified shareholder rights, if it had
increased or decreased share capital (and details pertaining thereto),
or if it had submitted any matter to the vote of security holders. 155
Form 20-F did not go forward as proposed. It took over two
years for the final rules and forms to be adopted,'156 and they repre-
sented a significant reduction in the proposed corporate governance
disclosure requirements for foreign companies. Although based upon
the U.S. disclosure framework, foreign company disclosure on this
subject was substantially less than that required of a U.S. issuer. Can-
153 See Exchange Act Release No. 14128, supra note 138, at 58,701, Item 12 (requiring disclo-
sure of details of the sale, such as price, identity of underwriters, their commission and the Secur-
ities Act exemption under which issuer made the sales).
154 Id. Item 13(b).
155 Id. at 58,702-703 Items 19, 21, 22. See also id. at 58,702, Item 20 (requiring disclosure of
defaults upon senior securities, to be used when Form 20-F served as an annual report and when
an issuer had not otherwise disclosed the information in a Form 6-K); id. at 58,704-705 (requiring
the attachment of more exhibits than had Forms 20 and 20-K). In addition, the SEC proposed to
revise interim reporting Form 6-K to require foreign issuers to provide translations or English
summaries of any information disclosed therein and to integrate disclosure therein with disclo-
sure in Form 20-F. See id. at 58,690.
The SEC also wished to clarify that the longstanding exemption of foreign issuers from
Exchange Act Sections 14 and 16 in Rule 3a-12 (last amended in 1966) did not apply to provi-
sions added to Section 14 by the Williams Act. See Exchange Act Release No. 14128, supra note
138, at 58,691 (referring to Williams Act Amendments to the Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439,
82 Stat. 454-457 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77m(d), (e), §§ 78n(d), (e), (f) (1994)).
According to the SEC, the pertinent Section 14 provisions "are as important to those United
States investors who invest in securities of foreign issuers as to those who invest in the securities
of domestic issuers, as well as to the issuers of such foreign securities." Id. In clarifying that
tender offer regulation applied to all shareholders holding Exchange Act registered securities,
the SEC was acknowledging a recent Court case, Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1,
23 (1977), where the Court had held that the main purpose of the Williams Act was the protec-
tion of investors. Whereas the Williams Act made sense in U.S. corporate governance, where
the tender offer (Le., market for corporate control) was an important management disciplining
device, its applicability to all foreign companies, where different relations between management/
shareholders might exist, was questionable. The SEC's proposal, which was adopted as pro-
posed, proved to have the unintended effect of causing foreign companies to exclude U.S. share-
holders from foreign tender offers. See International Tender and Exchange Offers, Securities
Act Release No. 6897, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,803 (June 14,1991)
(permitting a foreign issuer to follow home jurisdiction rules in proceeding with a tender offer to
U.S. security holders, provided that fewer than 10% of the target class are U.S. holders, and
proposing a special F-form for de minimis exchange offers). See generally Jill E. Fisch, Impru-
dent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 523
(1993).
156 See Rules, Registration and Annual Report Form For Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-16371, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 82,363 at
82,548 (Nov. 29, 1979).
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didly admitting that it had met almost uniform opposition to its propo-
sal to equalize the disclosure burdens for U.S. and foreign issuers, 157
the SEC spoke in the final release in rhetoric that, rather than af-
firming the confidence of an agency defending small investors over
special interests, expressed a solicitude for the latter. 5 8
Despite the opposition to its proposal, the SEC did not abandon
its own confidence in the "correctness" of U.S. corporate governance
and disclosure. It made an accommodation to foreign companies but
did not - nor was it really urged to - modify in any novel way its
disclosure framework when applying it to foreign companies and cul-
tures. The SEC did not take up the alternative of completely defer-
ring to foreign disclosure standards, nor, more importantly, did it
consider designing a disclosure framework that might be open and
flexible in communicating differences in foreign companies' govern-
ance, although the comment process brought these differences to the
forefront.'59 The SEC appeared to expect that, in time, with evolution
in disclosure abroad and because of efforts in international organiza-
tions, disclosure standards and corporate governance worldwide
would mirror the superior U.S. forms.
Although presented with an opportunity to examine critically its
belief in the primacy of U.S. corporate governance and disclosure, the
SEC made a pragmatic, rather than theoretical, response to the mar-
ket and legal situation. Upon the basis of comments from market par-
ticipants and further reflection, it simply acknowledged changing
market conditions that undermined its proposal. As it observed, since
securities markets had become increasingly international, U.S. inves-
tors purchased securities of companies that had different disclosure
and other business customs. As a result of this internationalization,
not only national authorities, like the SEC, but also supranational or-
157 See id. at 82.549-50.
158 See id. at 82,549 (emphasizing "its traditionally flexible approach and attitude in adminis-
tering the disclosure requirements for foreign issuers").
159 See id. at 82,548 ("At the same time, the Commission recognizes that there are differences
in various national laws and businesses and accounting customs which the Commission should
take into account when assessing disclosure requirements for foreign issuers."). The SEC was
aware of the alternative of deferring to home country disclosure requirements. See id. at 82,550
("Some of the commentators suggested alternative approaches as: reciprocal or country-of-ori-
gin treatment. . . "). Because, as will be seen below, the SEC adopted a skeletal framework of
disclosure on corporate governance matters that, in some cases, was based upon foreign disclo-
sure standards, arguably the SEC was implicitly accepting this alternative. There is, however, no
suggestion in the rulemaking that this was the reason for the SEC's approach, as opposed to the
others discussed below.
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ganizations were examining disclosure standards.16 Rather than in-
sisting upon its own disclosure framework, the SEC wanted to
contribute to these international efforts and to take account of this
international market situation. 16 1 The SEC's concerns about the legal
basis for the effects of its regulation on corporate governance in for-
eign companies, described earlier, also supported a modification of its
proposal.
Other remarks in the final release also demonstrate that, despite
its recognition of the existence of national differences in governance
and disclosure, the SEC never questioned its cultural perspective and
generally focused its attention upon protecting its constituencies. 162
Opposition to its rule proposal made the SEC aware that the proposal
potentially threatened the economic well-being of certain U.S. market
participants. From a public choice perspective, the SEC pragmatically
modified its proposal to respond to the needs and wishes of these im-
portant constituencies. United States capital markets no longer domi-
nated the world of investment, as the Euromarket had proved.
Foreign issuers, reluctant to have any increased disclosure burden
placed upon them, could remain offshore, and interested U.S. inves-
tors could follow them there. 63 United States market participants (as
well as the foreign issuers themselves) that financially benefitted from
U.S. markets for foreign securities brought this message home to the
SEC. These groups primarily included the organized marketplaces,
such as the U.S. stock exchanges, and the investment banks that spe-
cialized in offerings and trading of foreign securities.' 61 They also
160 See id. at 82,548 ("The world capital markets are becoming increasingly international in
nature. Not only the Commission, but the other organizations discussed below [the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Economic Community, and the
United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporation] are today concerned with the exami-
nation and reevaluation of the general systems of securities regulation in international
markets.").
161 See id.
162 Cf. Dezalay, supra note 19, at 2 (suggesting that one should not accept uncritically a state-
ment of purpose by a group or State (or impliedly a State agency)); Dezalay & Garth, supra note
19, at 32 (same).
163 See Exchange Act Release No. 16371, supra note 156, at 82,549 ("The foreign private
issuer commentators, with one exception, generally were opposed, in whole or part, to the pro-
posed Form 20-F. A number indicated that they would be compelled to re-evaluate their partici-
pation in the United States capital markets in terms of their own benefits and costs if the
proposals were adopted.").
164 See id. at 82,549-50 ("The remaining non-issuer commentators, with several exceptions,
also were opposed to the proposals. Their major objections included the following: ... the
perceived reluctance and/or refusal of foreign issuers to comply with the proposals if adopted
and the consequent impairment of the United States capital market for foreign securities, the
international flow of capital and investment opportunities for United States investors .... ").
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numbered the Wall Street securities lawyers who represented both in-
vestment banks and the foreign issuers and whose legal business might
be adversely affected by a decline in U.S. markets for foreign
securities.165
From a survival perspective, moreover, the SEC's accommoda-
tion to foreign companies on corporate governance disclosure was a
good tactical move, particularly if the SEC became the dominant
voice in international deliberations and negotiations over disclosure
and corporate governance standards. A serious economic injury to
U.S. investment banks, to other participants in the U.S. capital mar-
kets and to the securities bar, all of which provided the agency with
employees and its members and staff with sources of future employ-
ment,'166 would harm the agency as well. By accommodating foreign
issuers with a reduced disclosure framework, yet one subject to con-
stant interpretation and reevaluation, the SEC maintained its primary
role in the U.S. dialogue over disclosure. It also turned the existence
of other national disclosure frameworks and the movement towards
international disclosure standards to its benefit. For in its position as
regulator of the U.S. capital markets, it would be the chief U.S. repre-
sentative in international bodies developing these standards, as well as
in negotiations with individual countries. 67
See also 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 776-785; 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at
1809. As U.S. investment banks increasingly expand their operations offshore, a question arises
as to whether they care any longer about U.S. regulation of foreign companies, or whether that
mantle has been assumed by those whose business is limited to the U.S., e.g., U.S. securities
exchanges and investment banks lacking an international presence. See, e.g., The Americans are
Coming, OTHER PEOPa'S MONEY, special supplement to ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at 23-25
(describing global expansion of U.S. investment banks).
165 U.S. securities lawyers had (and have) a financial interest in maintaining the importance
of U.S. capital markets, where their expertise is necessary, and/or in making U.S. law the center-
piece of international capital market activity. See infra note 246.
166 See, e.g., Jeffrey Taylor, Quinn Joins Top Officials Leaving SEC, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1996,
at C1 (describing departure of head of Division of Corporation Finance to become partner in
Wall Street law firm).
167 See Exchange Act Release No. 16371, supra note 156, at 82,549 ("The Commission has
reviewed and been influenced by the standards proposed or adopted by these organizations and
believes its present action is broadly consistent therewith. The Commission will continue to
encourage and participate to the extent practical with the work of these organizations."). In the
years following promulgation of Form 20-F, the SEC actively participated in negotiations with
foreign market authorities and in international organizations, such as the International Organi-
zation of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), attempting to harmonize disclosure. See infra
note 201; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES CoMMISSIONS, ANNUAL REPORT
1992, app. 1 (1992) (listing SEC as member in this voluntary association of approximately 90
members, the majority of which are national securities regulatory agencies, and describing the
organization's purpose as developing international cooperation in the regulation of securities
transactions); Richard M. Kosnik, Comments on "Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into the U.S.
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As a result of the opposition and its own reconsideration, there-
fore, in the final Form 20-F, the SEC replaced fullblown U.S.-style
corporate governance disclosure requirements for foreign issuers with
a "bare bones" disclosure outline. With respect to control, the SEC
required the foreign issuer to disclose only persons holding more than
10% (instead of the proposed 5%) of a class of voting securities and
only if the company's shares were in registered, as opposed to bearer,
form. 168 As for disclosure benefits, observing that the proposed dis-
closure had been found "inconsistent with the requirements of many
foreign jurisdictions and international guidelines" and that it had re-
ceived much criticism on this aspect of its proposal, the SEC returned
to the few disclosure requirements of Forms 20 and 20-K. 69 In the
final release, moreover, the SEC demanded disclosure on manage-
ment conflicts of interest in certain transactions only if a foreign com-
Markets," 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1237, 1253 (1993) (describing SEC participation in
IOSCO's harmonization efforts). An active SEC in international fora would benefit its U.S.
constituencies, particularly securities lawyers, whose legal expertise on disclosure might come to
have an international value. Cf. Dezalay, supra note 19, at 2 ("The generalization of the north-
American model of the lawyer as privileged operator of a 'regulatory process' defined in
juridicial terms is one of the stakes - and one of the supporting elements - in a process of 'global-
isation' which is also a battle for global domination."). Not surprisingly, therefore, prominent
U.S. securities lawyers are active, side by side with SEC personnel, in these fora.
168 See Exchange Act Release No. 16371, supra note 156, at 82,551 (also requiring disclosure
of the shareholdings of directors and officers as a group and any known arrangements for a
change in control). Final Form 20-F did not require a company to give an organizational dia-
gram of itself, its parents and subsidiaries.
169 See id. at 82,550-551. The revised item required the foreign issuer to give information
about each director and officer's term of office, "arrangement or understanding" pursuant to
which the office had been obtained and family relations with other directors and officers. See
Form 20-F, Forms Under the Exchange Act of 1934, reprinted in 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
29,721, at 21,748 (June 8, 1988). It abandoned, however, the requirement of a somewhat exten-
sive discussion of a director's or officer's business background and legal proceedings. See Ex-
change Act Release No. 16371, supra note 156, at 82,551. In a curious footnote, the SEC noted
that the information it had sought was "most relevant in proxy solicitations," but that Rule 3a12-
3 exempted foreign companies from the proxy rules. See id. at 82,551 n.13. This was hardly a
convincing justification, because a main reason for the proxy rule exemption (Le., few foreign
issuers listed in the U.S.) was no longer valid.
On compensation matters, the SEC abandoned its effort to single out the highest paid direc-
tors or officers and instead returned to the aggregate compensation approach of Forms 20 and
20-K. See id. at 82,551. See also Disclosure of Management Renumeration by Certain Foreign
Private Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6157, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,131 (Jan. 7, 1980) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 231) (adopting guide for preparing Securities Act disclosure statements that
formally allowed what the SEC staff had previously permitted informally - aggregate compensa-
tion disclosure, and abandoning proposal, see Disclosure of Management Renumeration by Cer-
tain Foreign Private Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 5880,44 Fed. Reg. 58,676 (Nov. 2, 1977)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 231), to have foreign issuers disclose compensation of highest
paid executives).
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pany disclosed such information under foreign law. 170  The SEC
abandoned other corporate governance-related items without much
explanation. 171
In its final Form 20-F, the SEC did take a few limited steps (be-
sides those mentioned above) in improving disclosure related to for-
eign corporate governance, again from the U.S. corporate governance
perspective. In particular, it retained certain proposals pertaining to
foreign issuer disclosure of shareholder rights.172 As in the earlier
Rule 12g3-2 compromise, the SEC's accommodation to foreign issuers
on corporate governance disclosure in Form 20-F would remain essen-
tially unchanged to this day.
D. Recent SEC Initiatives on Foreign Companies
Several reasons explain why the SEC has not revisited its accom-
modations with foreign issuers on corporate governance disclosure.
Inertia provides one explanation: a compromise, once reached, is
likely to be left undisturbed unless one of the concerned parties later
finds itself at a disadvantage. From a public choice perspective, the
interest groups identified above, investment banks, foreign issuers and
their respective securities counsel, had little desire to reopen an issue
the outcome of which was favorable to them. Rather, they spent their
time and effort on other disclosure matters, such as financial state-
ment disclosure, that in their view hindered the development of U.S.
markets for foreign securities. 173 Given the influence and agenda-set-
170 See Exchange Act Release No. 16371, supra note 156, at 82,552. See 2 Loss & SELiGMAN,
supra note 23, at 769 (observing that "these [disclosure] requirements significantly compromise
the more demanding conflict of interest requirements" imposed on U.S. companies) (text ac-
companying note 59).
171 See Exchange Act Release No. 16371, supra note 156, at 82,552 (with the SEC stating that
"[t]he following proposed items have not been adopted because the information they would
have required was largely irrelevant to United States investors in foreign securities, disclosed
elsewhere in the Form 20-F or because of other reasons ... ."). These items included indemnifi-
cation of directors and officers, recent sales of unregistered securities, increases and decreases in
outstanding securities, and submission of matters to a vote of security holders.
172 See id. at 82,552 (describing acceptance of proposals on description of securities and de-
scription of material changes in the terms of registered securities). The SEC also maintained,
although in somewhat altered form, a proposal to make interim information from foreign issuers
more accessible to U.S. shareholders. See id. at 82,553 (describing the requirement that Form 6-
K materials needed English translation or English summaries only if information was distributed
to securityholders or consisted of material press releases).
173 See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 7029, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,252 (Nov. 3,1993) (proposal); Securities Act Release No. 7053, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,331 (Apr. 19,1994) (adoption) (allowing foreign issuers eligible to
use Form F-3 to have a cash-flow statement prepared in accordance with International Account-
ing Standards). The literature on accounting standards is extensive. Se4 eg., Symposium, Enter-
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ting ability of these groups with the SEC and with international securi-
ties organizations, the SEC's attention to disclosure reflected their
focus. From a bureaucratic importance and survival perspective,
moreover, the SEC enhanced its own importance by taking an active
role in international efforts to harmonize financial statement disclo-
sure, and not by revisiting the closed question of foreign corporate
governance disclosure.
The SEC also had practical and jurisprudential reasons for its in-
activity on this subject. The SEC's resources are limited, and it has
concentrated them on issues, such as financial statement disclosure,
that it may believe are of greater importance to investors. 174 By ad-
dressing disclosure in financial statements and related areas, such as
management's analysis of financial statements, the SEC could be seen
to have treated in an economical, but indirect, manner corporate gov-
ernance: the SEC provided investors with the necessary and sufficient
information to determine whether management was properly operat-
ing a company. In addition, since, as shown above, corporate govern-
ance is bound up with the internal affairs of a corporation, since for
historical and legal reasons the SEC never obtained direct jurisdiction
over this subject matter, and since jurisdictional and comity concerns
kept the SEC from interfering with foreign corporate governance, 75
the SEC took the reasonable legal position of not reopening this po-
tentially messy can of worms.
ing the U.S. Securities Markets: Opportunities and Risks for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L LJ. S1 (1994) (articles of Richard Kosnik, Pat McConnell, M. Elizabeth Rader concerning
SEC and foreign accounting standards); Michael A. Schneider, Note, Foreign Listings and the
Preeminence of U.S. Securities Exchanges: Should the SEC Recognize Foreign Accounting Stan-
dards?, 3 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 301 (1994). See also Greene, supra note 111, at 438-41 (fo-
cusing almost entirely on issues related to financial statement disclosure). In their argument that
the SEC should defer, for foreign company disclosure, to home country standards, Greene advo-
cates a position calculated to appeal to the SEC, because he conditions deference on the effi-
ciency of a foreign market (a concept that in its uncritical form (which they use) is accepted by
the SEC, see Langevoort, supra note 5, at 873-89), on minimal home country disclosure stan-
dards, for which Form 20-F is a model, and on minimal market standards established by interna-
tional organizations. See Greene, supra note 111, at 439, 441. Is it any surprise that Edward
Greene, a former SEC general counsel and Director of the Division of Corporation Finance,
would recognize which chords would have the most resonance with SEC staff?.
174 See Use of Abbreviated Financial Statements in Documents Delivered to Investors Pursu-
ant to the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities Act Release
No. 7183, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,634 (June 27, 1995) (proposing,
among other things, to streamline financial statements in annual reports and SEC filings "so as
to make the reports more readable and useful to the general shareholder body", particularly in
"their voting decision" for directors). If the SEC's current goal is to produce more readable and
thus more meaningful disclosure documents, might this not also argue for a better discussion of
such "soft" matters as corporate governance, particularly foreign corporate governance?
175 See supra text accompanying notes 126-128.
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It is surprising, however, that the SEC never revisited foreign cor-
porate governance disclosure, except occasionally and briefly to con-
firm its position. Corporate governance as defined to refer to the
agency relationship between management and owners is after all itself
a specific topic of disclosure under both the Securities Act and Ex-
change Act.176 It is thus not a subject that, under its statutory man-
date, the SEC should ignore or fail to reconsider. In its earlier
pronouncements, moreover, the SEC had suggested that its position
was provisional: it understood foreign disclosure regimes to be evolv-
ing and implied that it would have to revisit all disclosure matters in
the future. While, as discussed below, the SEC had numerous oppor-
tunities to reconsider foreign corporate governance disclosure in the
years after 1979, particularly in light of increased internationalization
of securities markets, it failed to examine whether any evolution had
occurred either in foreign corporate governance disclosure or on the
general subject of foreign corporate governance. Yet, paradoxically,
this SEC inaction occurred at a time of growing worldwide awareness
and analysis of differences in corporate governance and even renewed
SEC recognition of the importance of corporate governance
disclosure.
Had the SEC seriously looked at foreign corporate governance
disclosure after 1979, it still may not have recognized that cultural dif-
ferences in foreign countries demanded a different disclosure (or dis-
closures) to produce meaningful communication to U.S. investors. All
signs, in fact, suggest that the opposite would have occurred: i.e., that
the SEC remained confident in the primacy of U.S. disclosure and cor-
porate governance. If, for the reasons discussed earlier, it could not
impose its U.S. centered views upon foreign issuers, it could at least
promote them indirectly through its participation in international se-
curities market associations. Yet a serious reconsideration of foreign
corporate governance disclosure by the SEC might at least have com-
pelled it momentarily to shed its cultural blinders because scholarly
and other reflection had increasingly emphasized cultural differences
in corporate governance systems. 77
The most important SEC initiative on foreign issuer disclosure
since 1979 was the development of an integrated disclosure system for
foreign issuers. The catalyst for this action was the SEC's adoption of
integrated disclosure for U.S. issuers, which had involved an extensive
reconsideration of, and revisions and reproposals to, Securities Act
176 See Mahoney, supra note 56, at 1092-93 (arguing that it is the main subject of disclosure).
177 See supra note 5.
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and Exchange Act forms and specific disclosure requirements.178 The
SEC had asked whether it should extend integration to foreign issuers
and how this extension should be effected.179 In a release issued
before final adoption of the U.S. integrated disclosure system, the
SEC proposed both revisions to Form 20-F, and, for the first time,
specific "integrated" Securities Act Forms F-1, F-2 and F-3, tailored to
the needs of foreign issuers.180
The rhetoric of this proposal, so different from the righteousness
of the Form 20-F proposal, showed that the SEC intended to rein-
force, and not to upset, its accommodations with foreign issuers, the
investment banks, and the securities bar. Thus, the SEC did not even
raise the issue of corporate governance disclosure for foreign compa-
nies. Acknowledging its legislative mandate to treat foreign private
issuers in the same manner as U.S. issuers in disclosure matters, and
the public interest goal of giving investors the "same type of basic
178 See supra note 33. As the SEC explained its goal in integration, "[t]he Commission's
integration program involves a comprehensive evaluation of the disclosure policies and proce-
dures underlying the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with a view
toward integrating the information systems under those Acts so that investors and the market-
place are provided meaningful, nonduplicative information periodically and when securities are
sold to the public, while the costs of compliance for public companies are decreased." See Com-
prehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release
No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,693-94 (Sept. 2, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
Securities lawyers and SEC study groups had for years pushed integration. See id. at n.5, n.12
(citing REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
FROM THE DISCLOSURE POLICY STUDY, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAPPRAISAL OF AD-
MINISRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE 1933 AND 1934 ACrs (March 1969) (the "Wheat Report"));
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON CORPORATE DIsCLOsuRE TO THE SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMIssION (Comm. Print 1977). The integration project involved over two years of
SEC effort. Se4 eg., Integration of Securities Act Disclosure System, Securities Act Release
No. 6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 2, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 239) (describing
integration proposal and amendments to Form 10-K); Comprehensive Revision to System for
Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902 (Aug.
6, 1981) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 239) (reproposal for integrated disclosure forms); Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6383, supra note 33 (adoption of integrated disclosure forms, as well as
system of continuous offering or "shelf' registration).
179 See Securities Act Release No. 6235, supra note 178, at 63,708 (observing that "[t]he diver-
sity of foreign disclosure standards and the major departure from the Commission's traditional
policy such a system would represent [eg., having separate Securities Act forms for foreign issu-
ers] make design of any such system especially difficult.") (footnote omitted).
180 See Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers, Securities Act Release No.
6360, 46 Fed. Reg. 58,511 (Nov. 20, 1981) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210). In general, Form
F-1 was the residual form to be used for all foreign private issuers. Only foreign issuers that had
been Exchange Act reporting issuers for at least three years could use Forms F-2 and F-3, which
allowed incorporation of a foreign issuer's primary Exchange Act filing, the Form 20-F. Use of
either of these forms depended upon the kind of securities offering the foreign issuer proposed.
See id. at 58,517-18 (chart explaining usage).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:119 (1996)
information" about foreign companies as they received from U.S.
companies,181 the SEC nevertheless emphasized the phenomenon that
had caused it to back away from its ambitious Form 20-F proposal:
that excessive disclosure burdens upon foreign private issuers might
keep them from using U.S. capital markets. Understandably, the SEC
gave the argument a public interest slant: if foreign companies stayed
offshore, U.S. retail investors would either be denied the opportunity
to invest in them or would be thrown to the mercies of foreign disclo-
sure systems.'82 Again understandably, the SEC made no reference to
the obvious consequence of driving away foreign issuers - harm to its
investment banking and securities bar constituencies and to its own
importance.
As the SEC explained, the balancing of the two public interest
policies, investors' need for information and their need for investment
opportunities, led to its "principle of voluntarism", which it presented
as such a fundamental SEC policy that the SEC omitted mention of
the principle's relatively recent historical origin. 183 It would impose
disclosure requirements comparable to those applied to U.S. compa-
nies on only those foreign companies that had sought U.S. markets
through a listing or public offering; other foreign companies would
receive the flexible disclosure treatment of Rule 12g3-2. Even for the
foreign "voluntary" entrants to these markets, the SEC would create
additional separate forms for Securities Act purposes as it had for Ex-
181 See id. at 58,512. The SEC highlighted developments in international disclosure standards,
which it supported, and observed that "in many cases the disparity between the accounting and
disclosure practices of the United States and many other countries is narrowing." Id. It re-
peated its evolutionary belief that, in time, foreign countries would develop the same disclosure
regime as the U.S. See id. at 58,519. See also Greene, supra note 111, at 418-24 (arguing -
understandably given the authors' "interested" position as Wall Street securities lawyers - that
the proposal was not so accommodating to foreign issuers because of its emphasis upon disclo-
sure of business segments and financial statement reconciliation to U.S. GAAP).
182 See Securities Act Release No. 6360, supra note 180, at 58,513 (discussing loss of foreign
investment opportunities for U.S. investors); id. at 58,519 (observing that "discouraging registra-
tion [of foreign companies] may not be in the public interest because the disclosure in the for-
eign market may be less than that required in filings with the Commission even with the
proposed accommodations.").
183 See id. at 58,512 ("Much of the complexity in this area is caused by two principles the
Commission adopted in its early years. First, a distinction is made between foreign issuers that
voluntarily enter the United States securities markets and those companies whose securities are
traded in the United States without any significant voluntary acts or encouragement by the is-
suer.") (emphasis added); id. at 58,513-14 (" ... the Commission regularly has sought to balance
the competing policy interests underlying each interpretation using a principle of voluntarism.
According to that principle, the more voluntary steps a foreign company has taken to enter the
United States capital markets, the degree of regulation and amount of disclosure more closely
approach the degree of regulation of domestic registrants.").
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change Act reporting so that it would have the flexibility to respond to
"their distinctive problems". 84
In the proposed Securities Act forms for foreign issuers, the pri-
mary description of a foreign company and its business would come
from an amended Exchange Act Form 20-F, which would either ac-
company a prospectus or be incorporated by reference therein, or
whose items would serve as a model for the prospectus description of
the company and business.'8 5 The proposed major amendments to
Form 20-F all dealt with the financial statements and disclosure items
requiring a summary of or commentary on these statements.8 6 The
SEC proposed no change to its earlier accommodations on corporate
governance disclosure. When the new Securities Act forms were fi-
nally adopted a year later, the corporate governance disclosure items
remained expectedly untouched.187
184 See id. at 58,513, 58,519 (explaining "that separate forms for foreign registrants are consis-
tent with the practice under the Exchange Act and will meet the concerns of foreign issuers that
their distinctive problems will continue to receive specific Commission attention in connection
with any future amendments to general disclosure requirements.").
185 Form F-3 would thus incorporate the Form 20-F by reference; use of Form F-2 would
involve delivery of the Form 20-F with the prospectus; and the Form F-1 would essentially re-
quire a reproduction of the Form 20-F in the prospectus. See id at 58,524-30. The specific offer-
ing information (e.g., determination of offering price, use of proceeds) would come pursuant to
Regulation S-K requirements and would thus generally be the same for domestic and foreign
issuers.
186 See id. at 58,514-15 (proposing (i) to amend the Management's Discussion and Analysis
(which was essentially a commentary on the financial situation of a company) in line with a
recently expanded version of the same for domestic companies and (ii) to clarify when a foreign
issuer could use foreign financial statements reconciled to U.S. GAAP, and when full U.S.
GAAP disclosure was needed).
187 See Foreign Issues Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6437, 14 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. 2099 (Nov. 19, 1982). As the SEC observed, the response from interested
groups - "foreign registrants, foreign and domestic stock exchanges, foreign and domestic ac-
counting firms, securities firms, law firms, bar associations, accounting associations, and others"
- was overwhelmingly favorable. See id. at 2100. Commentators simply pushed the SEC to be
even more accommodating to foreign issuers. The SEC responded by revising its traditional
distinction between North American and other foreign issuers to allow Mexican issuers ways to
use the foreign forms and Canadian issuers initially to use them before having to switch to the
forms for U.S. issuers. See id.
Similarly, when the SEC proposed, and adopted, a special form, S-4, for registering securi-
ties offered in an exchange offer, a business combination (often in a merger context) or similar
transaction, it designed a comparable form, Form F-4, for foreign issuers. See Business Combi-
nation Transactions, Securities Act Release Nos. 6535, and 6535A [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,628 (May 9, 1984) (proposal); Business Combination Transactions,
Securities Act Release No. 6579,7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,419 (Apr. 23,1985) (adoption).
The Form for domestic issuers required corporate governance disclosure (Le., management and
shareholder rights information) equivalent to what the proxy rules would demand; Form F-4, by
contrast, simply required information identical to the skeletal corporate governance information
in Form 20-F. See Securities Act Release No. 6579, supra, at 62,081. Because the Form F-4
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The SEC similarly reaffirmed its position on foreign corporate
governance in the context of stock exchange and securities association
listing standards. In 1986, the major U.S. stock exchanges, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange
(Amex), as well as the NASD on behalf of the NASDAQ, submitted
rule changes that would exempt foreign companies from, among other
things, the exchanges' corporate governance practices. Under the ex-
emptions, if eligible foreign companies followed corporate governance
practices consistent with the laws of their home country, they would
be exempt from the exchanges' rules on this subject. 188 According to
the exchanges, important foreign companies were reluctant to list
their securities on the exchanges because the corporate governance
practices and related reporting standards for a listed company were in
some cases inconsistent with laws and practices in their home
countries. 189
The SEC approved the rule changes at the very time when it was
attempting (ultimately unsuccessfully) to use its influence over ex-
changes to address corporate governance abuses by U.S. compa-
nies.190 Its major justification for approving the exemptions was that
could be used for proxy purposes, however, the SEC required even foreign issuers to meet cer-
tain U.S. proxy requirements (e.g., explain availability of dissenters' rights) when they used the
new Form in this way.
188 See Self Regulating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 23469, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,618
(July 25, 1986) (NYSE); Self Regulating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 23064, 51
Fed. Reg. 11,125 (Mar. 25,1986) (Amex); Self Regulating Organizations, Exchange Act Release
No. 22506, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,769 (Oct. 4, 1985) (NASD). The proposals also dealt with interim
reporting requirements imposed by the exchanges on foreign companies. Regulation by ex-
changes and securities associations included rules on listed companies' corporate governance
practices. See, eg., Naw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMP'ANY MANUAL § 3 (1995) ("Cor-
porate Responsibility"); Part 1. Original Listing Requirements, [1996] Am. Stock Ex. Guide
(CCH) 10,001-10,046; Part 7. Shareholders Meetings, Approval and Voting of Proxies, [1996]
Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) [1 10,191-10,206; Arts. II, VII, X, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DEALERS INC. MANUAL, NASD Manuel (CCH) 11 1121-24, 1231-36 (1995). See
supra note 38. para. 1.
189 See, eg., Exchange Act Release No. 23469, supra note 188, at 27,619 n.4 (citing foreign
issuer problems with NYSE rules (i) requiring quarterly reports, (ii) barring dual class capitaliza-
tions with varying votes per share and votes based upon length of holding stock, (iii) specifying
quorum requirements for shareholder votes, and (iv) demanding audit committees, independent
directors, classification of a company's board of directors). See also id. at 27,619 (arguing that
the rule change would enhance trading in foreign securities, that it would improve competition
among the exchanges and, significantly, that the proposed rules were consistent with the SEC's
"special" treatment of foreign issuers on governance matters, particularly the proxy rule exemp-
tion). The NASD had no corporate governance requirements for the NASDAQ, but proposed
to adopt such standards for national market system securities that were quoted on the NAS-
DAQ. See Exchange Act Release No. 22506, supra note 188, at 41,770.
190 See Self Regulating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 24634, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230,
24,232 n.13 (June 23, 1987) (observing that it was considering a NYSE proposal to modify the
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investors would not be hurt, because the typical world class foreign
companies eligible for the exemptions were followed by analysts and
otherwise subject to exchange and SEC disclosure requirements. 191 It
also observed that the exemptions enhanced the competitiveness of
U.S. exchanges in attracting foreign issuers, since foreign issuers
would not necessarily alter their governance structures to develop a
U.S. secondary market for their securities.192 Once again, therefore,
the SEC responded to the need of its constituencies, the U.S. stock
exchanges and their investment banking members, to develop a U.S.
market for foreign securities. As in the case of Rule 12g3-2, the SEC
simply left foreign corporate governance issues arising from listing
standards to foreign practice. 93
It is not an overstatement to say that the greatest amount of SEC
activity on international securities matters has occurred during the last
one share, one vote listing requirement at the same time as it was reviewing the proposed rule
changes on foreign issuers). See generally Cox, supra note 19, at 918-20; 4 Loss & SEUGMAN,
supra note 23, at 1837-56 (general discussion of the one share, one vote controversy). See also
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating the SEC's Rule
19c-4, which barred securities exchanges and associations from listing low-vote stock, because, in
its view, the SEC had overstepped its statutory authority by attempting to interfere directly with
corporate governance (as opposed to disclosure) matters).
191 See Exchange Act Release No. 24634, supra note 190, at 24,232. The reliance upon disclo-
sure requirements for foreign issuers is curious because, as the SEC recognized, "federal securi-
ties laws traditionally have accorded different treatment to foreign issuers regarding periodic
reporting and other requirements due, in part, to recognition of the differing legal requirements
and practices which are applicable to such issuers." ld. at 24,233. See also id. at 24,231 (also
justifying approval of rule change because the NASDAQ, in operating without any corporate
governance requirements for foreign companies, had benefitted competitively at the expense of
registered securities exchanges by attracting more foreign issuer listings).
192 See id. at 24,233. See also id. at 24,231 (noting that U.S. investors could easily invest in
foreign markets); id. at 24,233 (repeating argument that U.S. investors would be better protected
by investing in foreign securities through U.S. exchanges).
193 The SEC was less accommodating to foreign issuers when it extended the applicability of
Section 12 of the Exchange Act to foreign companies quoted on the NASDAQ system because
of the growing similarity of that system to securities exchanges. See Foreign Securities, Securities
Act Release No. 6433, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 83,272 at 85,460 (Oct.
28, 1982) (noting that such foreign companies were now considered to have "voluntarily" sought
U.S. capital markets); Foreign Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6,493, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,435, at 86,294-96 (Oct. 6, 1983). See generally Note, Re-
quiring Foreign Issuers Listed on NASDAQ to Register: Investor Protection at What Cost?, 4 Wis.
INrrL L. J. 86 (1984). Although the SEC encountered opposition from industry groups contend-
ing that the rule change would drive foreign issuers offshore, not all SEC constituencies opposed
it: registered U.S. stock exchanges, which were then losing volume to NASDAQ, stood to gain if
the disclosure burdens upon foreign issuers were the same both in the securities exchanges and
on the NASDAQ. Cf. Self Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34956,59 Fed.
Reg. 59,808 (Nov. 9, 1994) (amendment 1 and 2 to proposed rule restricting the quotation of
foreign securities on an OTC Bulletin Board Service to those registered under Section 12,
thereby excluding companies exempt from registration under Rule 12g3-2).
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decade. Major rule initiatives have introduced exemptions for resales
of foreign securities into the U.S., 194 safe harbors for offshore distribu-
tions, 95 regulation of foreign tender offers,196 a multijurisdictional dis-
closure system with Canada, 197 as well as refinements to the offering
forms for foreign private issuers.198 The SEC has completed a lengthy
and important study of foreign markets,199 issued policy statements on
internationalization,200 and has continued to develop its relationships
with foreign securities regulators and to participate in international
194 See Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6862, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933
(Apr. 30, 1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200) (release adopting Rule 144A that provides
exemption for resales of securities to "qualified institutional buyers"); Resale of Restricted Se-
curities, Securities Act Release No. 6839, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I
84,427 at 80,220-32 (July 11, 1989) (reproposal); Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act
Release No. 6806, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,335 (Oct. 25, 1988)
(proposal).
195 See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 (May
2, 1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200) (final adoption of Regulation S governing offshore
offerings and resales).
196 See International Tender and Exchange Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6897, supra
note 155; Concept Release on Multinational Tender and Exchange Offers, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 28,093, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,606 (June 6,1990).
197 See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Re-
porting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6902, [1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,812 (July 1, 1991) (permitting, among other things, certain Cana-
dian issuers to make offerings in the U.S. pursuant to Canadian disclosure standards).
198 See, e.g., Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Compa-
niaes: Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker-Dealer
Research Reports, Securities Act Release No. 7053 [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,331 (Apr. 19, 1994) (expanding companies that could use Form F-3). The SEC
has also continued to examine the role of ADRs in the U.S. markets, see American Depositary
Receipts, Securities Act Release No. 6894, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,740 (May 23, 1991) (concept release on ADRs); see also American Depositary Receipts,
Securities Act Release No. 6438, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,300 at
85,548-49 (Nov. 19,1982) (proposal); American Depositary Receipts, Securities Act Release No.
6459, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,329 (Mar. 18,1983) (adoption of
Form F-6 for ADRs); 2 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 23, at 774 n.71 (describing history of SEC
treatment of American Certificates, which includes ADRs), and it has promulgated an exemp-
tive rule pertaining to foreign broker-dealers' communications with U.S. investors, see 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15a-6 (1995). See generally 3D HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuRrrms AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 15.13 (1995); EDWARD F. GREENE, ET AT-, U.S. REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SEcuRrms §§ 2.01-2.04 (1993).
199 See REPORT OF THE STAFF OF mm U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N TO THE
SENATE COMM. ON BANKiNG, HOUsiNG AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND Tm HoUsE COMM. ON EN-
ERGY AND COMMERCE, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, at VII-4 (1987).
See also DMSION OF MARKET REGULATION, UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMM'N, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQurIy MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
(Jan. 1994) (discussing in passing foreign markets).
200 See UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS (Nov. 1988).
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organizations.21' Amid all of this activity and reflection, however, it
has never revisited, or even questioned, the accommodation that it
reached with foreign issuers, whether "voluntary" or involuntary par-
ticipants in the U.S. capital markets, on corporate governance disclo-
sure. And it has maintained this position precisely when, as in so
many periods throughout recent U.S. history, corporate governance
has become an issue of considerable legal and even political debate,
and when the SEC has taken positions in this debate, including on
corporate governance disclosure. 20 2
Given all of this recent SEC activity on foreign companies and
internationalization in general, it is not possible that the SEC has sim-
ply overlooked foreign corporate governance disclosure, although, for
the reasons given above, other subjects have occupied the SEC's at-
tention. When the SEC has considered the issue, it has noted the con-
tinued differences between U.S. and foreign disclosure on corporate
governance and has even alluded to differences in the underlying cor-
porate governance systems.2 3 Rather than using these occasions as
201 See generally JENNINGS, supra note 23, at 1566-72 (describing Memoranda of Understand-
ing ("MOUs") between the SEC and various foreign market authorities that generally deal with
the sharing of information in enforcement matters); Peter E. Millspaugh, Global Securities Trad-
ing: The Question of a Watchdog, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 355, 363-66 & notes
accompanying text (1992) (describing MOUs and SEC activity in international organizations,
including IOSCO); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 192-93 (1990) (discussing
international efforts to harmonize disclosure standards, including the work of IOSCO, of which
the SEC is a member); INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF SECURrTInS COMMISSIONS, COMPAR-
ATIVE ANALYSIS OF DiscLostum REGIMES (1991) (noting that Linda Quinn, Director of the
Division of Corporation Finance, was the chairman of the working party that put together this
comparative analysis of disclosure in fourteen countries); Arthur Levitt, Toward A New Global
Partnership: Integrity, Stability, and Opportunity, Remarks at the International Organization of
Securities Commissions 1993 Annual Conference (Oct. 26, 1993) (copy on file with author) (SEC
chairmen discusses SEC's past and future work with IOSCO); Richard Breeden, Speech given at
the XVII IOSCO Annual Conference (Oct. 27, 1992) (copy on file with author) (SEC chairman
discusses his work as first Chairman of IOSCO's Technical Committee). See also supra note 167.
202 Whether one thinks that the SEC is justified in entering the corporate governance debate,
see Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Pressure, supra note 19, at
943-45, it has done so. See, eg., Securities Act Release No. 6962, supra note 54 (revising disclo-
sure on executive compensation, but specifically excluding foreign private issuers); Regulation of
Communication Among Securityholders, Exchange Act Release No. 30,849,57 Fed. Reg. 29,564
(June 24, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 240) (amending proxy rules to enhance communi-
cation among shareholders). See generally Coffee, supra note 1.
203 See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 6568, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder], Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,743 (Feb. 28, 1985) (concept release on the possibility of harmonizing disclosure in
three jurisdictions (U.S., U.K. and Canada) with similar legal traditions, using either (i) a recip-
rocal approach or (ii) the adoption of a common disclosure format). The SEC observed that
there were significant differences with respect to "disclosure of management's business experi-
ence, remuneration, and its beneficial ownership of securities of the issuer" in the three coun-
tries and that one major difficulty of using the "common prospectus" approach was "the
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an opportunity to rethink its position, the SEC has reaffirmed and
almost celebrated its accommodations with foreign issuers on corpo-
rate governance disclosure. °4 It has not entertained the possibility
that a culturally sensitive and meaningful way of disclosing foreign
corporate governance differences to U.S. investors might exist; it has
not reflected further upon the continued evolution (or lack thereof) of
foreign corporate governance systems and home country disclosure;
and it has not reconsidered its position on foreign corporate govern-
ance disclosure in light of this evolution, if any evolution has occurred.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF SEC FOREIGN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE
A. The Proposal
The above cultural history has set forth the origins of SEC disclo-
sure requirements on foreign corporate governance where, in Rule
12g3-2 companies, the SEC has left an explanation of foreign corpo-
rate governance to home country disclosure, whether or not such dis-
closure actually deals with corporate governance, and, in Securities Act
and Exchange Act reporting companies, a skeletal corporate govern-
ance disclosure framework based upon the U.S. perspective provides
U.S. investors with little information. The SEC has in essence all but
relegated U.S. investors to the explanations of foreign corporate gov-
ernance provided either in the home countries or elsewhere.
This Subpart argues for a reform of this situation where SEC dis-
closure requirements do not compel foreign companies to provide
U.S. investors with culturally meaningful information about their cor-
difficulties associated with reaching agreement with the participating countries on disclosure
standards". Id. at 87,322-23. In its 1987 study of internationalization of the Securities Markets,
the SEC devoted a chapter to disclosure standards in major foreign markets and, in that chapter,
pointed to differences in disclosure on corporate governance between the U.S. and such foreign
markets. See, e.g., DIVIsIoN OF MARKET REGULATIONS, U.S. SECURITms AND EXCHANGE
COMM'N, supra note 199, at 111-84 (discussing disclosure requirements under European Informa-
tion Directive); see also U.S. SEcuRrrms AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, supra note 200, at 2 ("In
seeking solutions to common problems, securities regulators should be sensitive to cultural dif-
ferences and national sovereignty concerns."); CormARA VE ANALYSIS OF DiscLoSURE RE.
GIMs, supra note 201, at 6 (noting that, on disclosure concerning management in fourteen
countries, "[t]here is little commonality in disclosures on this topic beyond the basic require-
ments that directors and officers be identified").
204 See, e.g., Simplifications of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Compa-
nies, Securities Act Release No. 7053, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,331, at 85,203-04 (Apr. 19, 1994) (in expanding the number of foreign private issuers eligible
to use short-form and shelf registration, the SEC observed how accommodating it had tradition-
ally been for such issuers, particularly highlighting the exemption from proxy rules and insider
stock reports, as well as the lessened management disclosure in Exchange Act filings).
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porate governance. An amendment to SEC disclosure requirements
is needed to enhance cross-cultural communications on this subject.
This Subpart first suggests that any reform should occur by SEC rule-
making and not through additional legislation. It next briefly explains
why reform should not involve either an increased application to for-
eign issuers of current disclosure requirements on corporate govern-
ance for U.S. companies or a deference to home country disclosure
standards. It then offers a proposal for reform: the imposition of an
"open-ended" disclosure requirement on foreign companies that com-
pels them to explain their corporate governance. This Subpart shows,
through a few examples, how this requirement would result in the pro-
vision of more culturally meaningful information than the present dis-
closure requirements generate.20 5
SEC rule-making, rather than Congressional legislation, can best
accomplish this reform to foreign corporate governance disclosure.
From a pragmatic perspective, absent some cataclysm in financial
markets, Congress is now unlikely, as a political matter, to increase
disclosure burdens upon any class of issuers.20 6 The reform, more-
over, is well-suited for SEC rule-making. As noted earlier, in the fed-
eral securities laws Congress established issuer disclosure, which
includes corporate governance disclosure, and it envisioned that, by its
rules and regulations, the SEC would "flesh out" the statutory disclo-
sure requirements and apply them to different kinds of issuers.20 7 It is
therefore within the SEC's jurisdiction to redesign disclosure on cor-
porate governance for foreign issuers. Although SEC rule-making
produced the current unsatisfactory situation, the SEC should have
the first opportunity to remedy it. As explained below, the disclosure
requirement proposed herein also makes use of SEC resources and
administrative flexibility.
In undertaking the reform, the SEC should not use the current
corporate governance disclosure requirements for U.S. companies as a
model for foreign issuer disclosure, as it did in the original Form 20-F
proposal. Because of the cultural origins of both corporate govern-
ance and disclosure systems, the SEC must abandon its tenaciously-
held view that U.S. corporate governance and disclosure are the ends
to which all foreign systems are evolving. As this Article has shown,
U.S. mandatory disclosure makes sense in terms of, and in fact plays a
205 1 expect to explore this proposal in another paper on corporate governance and SEC
disclosure.
206 See infra note 235.
207 See discussion supra subpart H1A.
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role in, U.S. corporate governance. It is unlikely, however, to lead to
the production of culturally meaningful information when applied to a
foreign issuer operating in a different corporate governance system.
A U.S. investor is not necessarily harmed when SEC disclosure
requirements do not force a U.S. issuer to provide him or her with an
explanation of its disclosed corporate governance "facts", for the in-
vestor possesses the appropriate conceptual framework to understand
them. The same would not necessarily be true if full U.S. disclosure
requirements on corporate governance were applied to a foreign is-
suer. The U.S. disclosure system may, or may not, reveal information
that is significant for the corporate governance of such issuer and its
home country. Because the SEC disclosure system would not require
the foreign company to explain its corporate governance information
in terms comprehensible to a U.S. investor, that investor has little
choice but - and is in fact invited - to apply the same conceptual
framework to these facts as he or she would apply to corporate gov-
ernance information about a U.S. company. This application would
produce meaningful communication if the corporate governance of
the company and country at issue were the same, or had considerable
overlap with, that of a typical U.S. company. But this sameness or
overlap of corporate governance in different countries is questionable
because of the cultural origin of these systems.2 8
Application of full U.S. corporate governance disclosure require-
ments to foreign issuers might even make the present situation worse.
A disclosure statement that presented corporate governance informa-
tion of no particular significance to a foreign issuer and its home coun-
try and left the U.S. investor to interpret such information in
accordance with his or her U.S. conceptual apparatus violates the
most basic rule of U.S. securities laws and regulation: that an issuer
disclose all material information and not omit any information neces-
sary to make the disclosed information not materially misleading. 0 9
This materiality requirement, so central in the SEC disclosure frame-
work, thus argues against the traditional U.S. centered SEC approach
of imposing full U.S. corporate governance disclosure on foreign
issuers.
A few examples clarify this fundamental problem of applying
U.S. disclosure standards on corporate governance outside the context
of U.S. companies. Another constituency besides management and
shareholders may have a significant role or influence in a given coun-
208 See supra note 4. But see infra subpart IVB.
209 See supra note 75.
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try's and company's corporate governance system. World-class
French public companies, for example, have a special relationship
with the French State, which is often their former direct or indirect
controlling owner, even if the State no longer has any significant own-
ership in them. ° While the State establishes and maintains this rela-
tionship in many and often subtle ways, one method is through the
formation of a management elite whose members have received train-
ing in State schools, spent much of their professional lives in the State
bureaucracy and who are thus inclined to be receptive to State pres-
sures and policies (often indirect) regarding their companies. 1
Some of these companies have, in SEC terms, "voluntarily"
sought U.S. capital markets by making U.S. public offerings and ex-
change listings.212 Given the skeletal U.S. disclosure requirements on
corporate governance applied to these companies, their disclosure
statements say little about the relationship between their governance
and the State. They generally describe the companies' relationship to
the French State as an historical (or soon to be historical) matter, i.e.,
a subject of nationalization and privatization, and not at all an issue of
corporate governance. 1 3 Yet even a full application of U.S. corporate
governance disclosure requirements would not compel a company to
210 See, eg., Fanto, supra note 4, at 29-37.
211 See iiL at 36-37. See generally MICHEL BAUER, Lns 200: COMMENT DEVIENT-ON UN
GRAND PATRON? 123-97 (1987) (discussing the State path to an executive career); The Soft-Shoe
Shuffle, EcoNOMisT, Special Supp. Nov. 25, 1995, at 14-15.
212 This group includes French companies privatized in the most recent round of French
privatization that began in 1993, such as the Soci6t6 Nationale d'Elf Acquitaine and Rhfne-
Poulenc S.A. See Fanto, supra note 4, at 49-56.
213 For example, in Item 4 of Rh6ne-Poulenc's 1994 Form 20-F ("Control of the Company"),
there is a short paragraph about the control of the company by the French State prior to priva-
tization. RHONE-POULENC, FORM 20-F 51 (1994) [hereinafter RH6NE-PouLENC]. Item 10,
which describes management and directors, similarly refers, as a historical matter, to the domi-
nation of the board by the French State prior to privatization. Id at 96. An investor might note
that, as of the end of 1994, the French State still owned, directly or indirectly, approximately
12% of Rhfne-Poulenc's share capital and could conclude from this that the French State had a
continuing influence on the company. These figures do not convey the pervasiveness of this
influence, partly due to management/State relations. And, in any event, the disclosure document
states that the French State no longer controls the company. See id. at 51.
In some cases, the French State has maintained an overt role in the corporate governance of
a privatized company. It not only has an approximately 13% indirect shareholding of the So-
ci&6t Nationale d'Elf Acquitaine, but also a "golden share" (action spicifique) permitted under
the French privatization legislation that basically allows the French State to approve any change
of control of the company or sale of its significant subsidiaries. See SocitLr NATioNALE Era
AcourrArNE, PRosPEcTus 16-17 (1994). See generally ALiCE PEZARtD, DRorr DES MARCHfiS
MoN-TARE Er BouRSmR 386-89 (1994); Fanto, supra note 4, at 57-58. As a company gets
further from its privatization, any discussion of the State relationship drops from SEC disclosure
documents, except for a reference to the "fact" of continuing direct or indirect State sharehold-
ings. See, eg., ALCATEL ALSTHOM, FORM 20-F 24 (1994).
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reveal or to explain this kind of State influence. It would only rein-
force the impression that the disclosure framework now conveys to a
U.S. investor: that corporate governance is the same in France as in
the United States.
Another example of French corporate governance information
that current "bare bones" disclosure requirements do not require a
company to explain and that full U.S. disclosure would also not reveal
involves the corporate governance role of certain significant share-
holders. The French privatization legislation permits the Minister of
the Economy to sell a significant block of a company's stock to a
group of institutional shareholders in a private placement (which may
accompany the public offering of the company's shares). With their
prior stockholding, members of the group can collectively hold 20-
40% of the existing share capital of a company as a result of this trans-
action.214 These members, which are bound together by a sharehold-
ers' agreement, are generally other French companies, often financial
institutions, some of which themselves have the target company as a
shareholder.
Although in France there is disagreement over the purpose of the
cross-shareholding arrangement, known as a "noyau dur", there is lit-
tle dispute about its effect: to insulate management from market dis-
cipline.215  The formal agreements between these shareholders
generally expire after a few years, yet evidence suggests that the
groups persist informally following this expiration. 1 6 While in SEC
disclosure documents companies with a noyau dur have described the
presence of these groups in the companies' capital, they have not ex-
plained sufficiently the purposes of the arrangements.217 Application
214 See Fanto, supra note 4, at 59-67.
215 See FRANCois MOPiN & CLAUDE Dupuy, LE COEUR FINANCIER EUROPf-EN 46-54 (1993);
Frangois Morin, La Privatisation de la BNP et la formation d'un nouveau pOle financier, 28 RE-
VUE .CONOMIQUE Er FINANCIERE 121,126-31 (1994); Fanto, supra note 4, at 59-67. Cf. OmER
PASTRng, LES NouvE ux PamRs DE A FiNANcE 101-31 (1992).
216 See Fanto, supra note 4, at 64 n.201
217 The descriptions of these cross-shareholdings, while occasionally detailed, are often mod-
els of obscurity. For example, in its Securities Act prospectus Rh6ne-Poulenc explained that the
"stable shareholders" were "assuring the cohesion and stability of the shareholder base of the
Company." See RHONE-POULENC, PROSPECrus 18 (1993). In its Form 20-F, the company ex-
panded upon this description, but failed to clarify what purpose the shareholding arrangement
served:
The protocole [shareholder agreement between members of the noyau dur] is not a voting
agreement and, as described above, none of the terms of the protocole address the subject
of voting. The protocole was transmitted to the Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs, the self-
regulatory organization that has general regulatory authority over French stock exchanges,
and it issued an opinion that the contractual arrangement among the Stable Shareholders
established by the protocole does not in and of itself constitute an action en concert or the
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of full U.S.-style corporate governance disclosure would not change
this situation: it might cause a French issuer to list more "facts" about
the shareholding group, but not to provide an explanation of the
group's role in corporate governance.218 Designed as they are to elicit
specific factual information from an issuer, SEC disclosure require-
ments would not lead to production of a coherent account of a corpo-
rate governance phenomenon that has no U.S. equivalent.
Because, therefore, application of full U.S. disclosure require-
ments on corporate governance would generate information signifi-
cant only in the U.S. cultural context (and perhaps in some related
foreign circumstances) and would still not provide the necessary ex-
planation of foreign corporate governance information, these require-
ments cannot serve as a basis for reform. Trying to compose an
exhaustive list of corporate governance information from present dis-
closure requirements, moreover, would produce an unwieldy format
and would, in any event, be fruitless because, given corporate govern-
ance differences, no list would ever be complete. The cultural speci-
ficity of corporate governance ensures that it would be difficult, at
least for now, to find one set of disclosure requirements that would
cause foreign issuers from numerous countries to identify and to ex-
plain in a meaningful way their corporate governance.219
Relying upon corporate governance disclosure made under the
laws of the home country of a foreign issuer would provide no better
basis for reform than using the full U.S. model. Even if, under foreign
disclosure rules, a foreign issuer revealed considerable information
about its corporate governance, this information would be both a
taking of action together by a group under French law. Although each of the seven stable
Shareholders has a representative on the Company's Board of Directors (See "Item 10:
Directors and Officers of Registrant") [out of 15 member board], the Company is not aware
of any agreement among these representatives to take action together as a group. It is the
Company's view that the Stable Shareholders do not control the Company.
RHONE-POULENC, supra note 213, at 52-53. An investor is left with numerous questions: what,
one wonders, is the import in U.S. terms of the above determination by the French market au-
thorities? why do the stable shareholders have so many board seats? what is the difference
between "cohesion" and "control"?
218 For example, full application of Item 401 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (1996),
might generate a better description of interconnections between board members and of the ex-
perience of board members and executives, while the requirements of Item 404 concerning re-
lated transactions, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (1996), might cause a French issuer to describe
transactions between members of the shareholder group and the company (but only if such
members surpassed the 5% ownership threshold).
219 International standards developed by international advisory groups have not been satis-
factory from the perspective of explaining cultural differences or of identifying one set of disclo-
sure requirements that meaningfully communicates corporate governance information in all
contexts. See discussion infra subpart IVB.
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product of a foreign culture and addressed to members of that cul-
ture.220 These individuals would be well positioned to make sense of
the disclosed information because they had the appropriate back-
ground, i.e., possession of the language, knowledge of customs and
practices. They would be able to do what is most difficult in interpre-
tation: to add other information and a conceptual framework to the
disclosed facts to make those facts meaningful. To return to one of
the earlier examples, a French investor would understand the impor-
tance for a company's governance (i.e., susceptibility to State influ-
ence) of the State background of its major executives and directors.
The U.S. investor would first need a good translation of the for-
eign-disclosed information. Even more importantly, he or she would
also need a "conceptual" translation that would supply the minimal
background information and explanatory framework necessary to
make the disclosed information meaningful. This kind of translation
is particularly important if the foreign disclosure system, like U.S. dis-
closure requirements, legally compels a company to reveal only dis-
crete facts about its governance. As anyone who has ever tried to
translate a document from a foreign language knows, a literal word-
by-word, or even sentence-by-sentence, translation of a foreign docu-
ment will at best confuse a U.S. investor and at worst produce non-
sense. The SEC itself has recognized that, even in countries whose
cultures most resemble that of the United States and that have similar
disclosure frameworks, significant differences lie behind apparent sim-
ilarities,22 1 which reaffirms Clifford Geertz's point about the strange-
ness of the familiar. A U.S. investor, in short, relies upon home
country disclosure on corporate governance at his or her peril.
The above remarks therefore point to a novel SEC disclosure for-
mat on foreign corporate governance. The proposal is an "open-
ended" requirement that a foreign issuer explain for U.S. investors in
language and terms understandable to them its own corporate govern-
ance in the context of corporate governance of its home country. The
proposed disclosure requirement would try to elicit meaningful expla-
220 Available evidence suggests that other developed countries have disclosure frameworks
that cause their companies to reveal less, not more, corporate governance information. Cf. IN-
TERNATIONAIZATON OF THE SEcurrms MARKETs, supra note 199, at II-11 to 11-24; Merritt
Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market
for Securities 45 n.100 (Feb. 28, 1996) (unpublished paper, on file with author). This evidence is
not neutral, because it accepts the primacy of the U.S. model of corporate governance. To my
knowledge, no country has yet produced a disclosure framework specifically designed to help
communicate information to foreign investors.
221 See supra note 203.
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nation of such "soft" information as customs, practices and trends in a
country's corporate governance as they pertain to a particular foreign
company. Under the proposal, a foreign issuer would have to keep
the U.S. investor from applying a ready U.S. explanation to the corpo-
rate governance facts that it discloses. A U.S. investor should under-
stand that corporate governance facts appearing to be the same in
foreign corporate governance may have a considerably different
meaning. The SEC should not expect the foreign issuer to supply a
general treatise on its country's and its own corporate governance so
much as a focused explanation of significant features of a company's
governance accompanied by the necessary background account of a
foreign governance system.
As an example of the kind of disclosure this requirement should
elicit, it is useful to return to the previous examples on corporate gov-
ernance in large French public companies. Because of the relation-
ship between the French State and these companies that partly arises
from the State-oriented background of company management, a
French company should describe and justify its selection of manage-
ment. If, as has often recently been the case, top executives come
from a State professional background and education, the company
should discuss this selection as part of a cultural practice by French
companies. The company should also justify its selection process not
only by stating the qualities and abilities of particular executives, but
also by explaining what benefits in general individuals with this back-
ground (as opposed to those with other experience) are thought to
bring to the company or companies. This discussion should also lead
to a frank analysis of the relationship between the company and the
State that arises because of this executive background and that other
practical and cultural factors (i.e., some remaining direct or indirect
State ownership) enhance. If a French company selected its top exec-
utives in a different manner, e.g., from progression up the corporate
ladder, it could distinguish its selection process against this standard
and explain the competitive benefits of its distinction.222
222 See BAtER, supra note 211, at 51-120,201-37 (describing other ways of reaching the sum-
mit of executive power in France: being a member of the family controlling a company and,
more rarely, working up the firm ladder). There is some evidence that the path of firm experi-
ence, prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries, is beginning to take hold in France. See, e.g., The
Eminence Grise of French Business, EcoNoMIsr, May. 6, 1995, at 70 (suggesting that traditional
system of French management selection may not survive in global marketplace). Given the
number of scandals in large French public companies involving executives who came from a
State background, a French company might gain a market competitive advantage by distinguish-
ing its executive selection process. See, eg., The Mighty Fall, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 38;
Stewart Toy, Under Suspicion: Le Tout Business Elite, Bus. Wr., Jan. 22, 1996, at 58.
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Similarly, under this requirement French public companies would
have to explain better than they now do the effects and purposes of
the stable shareholder networks. It is not enough for a French com-
pany, as the Rh6ne-Poulenc SEC disclosure documents demonstrate,
to make a cryptic reference to an opinion by a French market author-
ity (which appears to be a literal translation without any other expla-
nation) and to provide an equally elliptical reference to the "stability"
and "cohesion" of shareholders. 2 3 As noted earlier, French econo-
mists and finance specialists differ about the purposes of these net-
works. Management in a particular French company may not
understand all the possible effects of the networks, but it knows more
than what its SEC filings currently disclose and, most importantly,
why it favors the stable shareholder structure.
The networks may, for example, be part of a provisional coopera-
tive solution by the French State and management of newly privatized
companies to protect these companies from the hostile takeovers that
would occur if non-French institutional investors come to dominate a
company's capital, a solution that will not be needed once French in-
stitutional investors (i.e., mutual funds, pension funds) become larger
and can make greater investments in these companies.224 Company
management should not be able to offer this explanation in private
conversations, but not in disclosure documents. They should clearly
explain why, and for whose benefit, the company should be protected
in this way against a hostile takeover (or other forms of market disci-
pline) and why French institutional investors would likely be more
passive than foreign investors. In other words, if the networks consti-
tute a technique, partly designed by the French State, to keep French
companies under French ownership (or at least away from the control
of international, i.e., Anglo-Saxon, investors), U.S. investors should
understand this purpose and possible effect.'
To elicit such explanations requires a modification to Form 20-F's
items on control of the issuer, management and description of securi-
ties. The modification could take several forms, one of which would
be to insert a proposed disclosure requirement, as follows, in one of
the above items:
223 See supra note 217.
224 See Fanto, supra note 4, at 63-65; PAs-r=, supra note 215, at 121-26. Cf. A Summer of
Tumbrils, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 51 (discussing purposes and problems of interlocking
shareholdings in French big business).
225 Disclosure on the French stable shareholder network would thus be related to a discussion
of the subtle connections between the State and company management.
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The registrant shall describe and discuss those distinctive or special char-
acteristics of the registrant's corporate governance practices that are un-
likely to be known or understood by U.S. investors and that could
materially affect the registrant's operations and future financial perform-
ance. The registrant should provide enough background material on
general corporate governance practices and related matters in the for-
eign country in which registrant is organized so that a U.S. investor unfa-
miliar with such country will be able to understand the registrant's
discussion of its corporate governance practices. Examples of character-
istics that might be discussed include registrant's selection of directors
and executive officers, including the educational and professional back-
ground it desires in such directors and officers, the role of different cate-
gories of shareholders in registrant's governance, and the role of
constituencies other than shareholders (such as the government of the
foreign country in which registrant is organized) in registrant's govern-
ance, whether or not such constituencies have a direct or indirect owner-
ship interest in registrant. The purpose of the description and discussion
shall be to provide investors with an understanding of registrant's corpo-
rate governance practices against the background of corporate govern-
ance in registrant's country of organization and, if appropriate, the
material differences between these practices, their purposes and effects
and those typical of U.S. registrants with which U.S. investors are likely
familiar.226
The SEC would provide an explanatory commentary for this modifi-
cation, which the rule-making notice and comment procedure would
further refine.
Another form of the proposal would be for the SEC simply to
adopt a different interpretation of current disclosure requirements.
Item 1 of Form 20-F on description of business demands that an issuer
provide a general discussion of "material country risks" that could af-
fect the issuer's business.22 7 Similarly, management's discussion and
analysis of its financial condition and results of operation in Item 9
requires a discussion of "any pertinent governmental economic, fiscal,
monetary, or political policies or factors that have materially affected
or could materially affect, directly or indirectly, their operations or
investments by U.S. nationals."22 8 In an interpretive release, the SEC
226 This proposal is modeled upon other Form 20-F disclosure items mandating an explana-
tion by a foreign issuer of its country and business risks. See infra text accompanying notes 227-
28.
227 See Form 20-F, Item 1(b) Forms Under the Exchange Act of 1934, reprinted in 5 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 29,721, at 21,748 (June 8, 1988) ("The registrant shall briefly describe any
material country risks which are unlikely to be known or anticipated by investors and could
materially affect the registrant's operations."). See Stephens, supra note 85, at 140 and notes
accompanying text (explaining that this provision was meant to encourage issuers to discuss
potential uncertainties arising from a U.S. investment in a foreign company).
228 See Form 20-F, Item 9, Instruction 10, supra note 169, at 21,753.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:119 (1996)
could explain that, henceforth, these provisions demand an explana-
tion by a foreign issuer of its corporate governance practices. The
SEC would then offer issuers guidance as to the kind of disclosure that
is consistent with the above suggestions.
This reform to current SEC disclosure on foreign corporate gov-
ernance also demands a new kind of effort from both the SEC staff
and practicing securities lawyers. To the extent it focuses on the issue
at all, the staff must cease insisting that all disclosure on corporate
governance resemble U.S. disclosure and should become sensitive to,
and require from foreign issuers an adequate explanation of, differ-
ences in foreign corporate governance. In fact, the SEC staff is partic-
ularly well situated and well-suited to make the proposal successful.
They review disclosure statements from many different foreign issu-
ers; trained as lawyers, they understand the general subject of corpo-
rate governance; and, as nonspecialists on corporate governance in
foreign countries, they can demand, in their review of foreign issuer
disclosure statements, explanations that make sense in U.S. tenns.2 9
A reform of foreign corporate governance disclosure will also re-
quire more from practicing securities lawyers. These lawyers can en-
hance cross-cultural communication on corporate governance, not just
because of their training and resources. Wall Street law firms often
have offices in major foreign countries or, at the very least, their busi-
ness frequently takes their lawyers abroad. Some major law firms
have foreign lawyers as partners and associates who could aid in the
process of translating the culturally unique aspects of a foreign corpo-
rate governance system.3 ° And, whether they work for a foreign is-
suer or an investment bank advising the issuer about a U.S. listing or
offering, these lawyers generally have close contact with the company
and its executives. Whenever the disclosure process is now done well,
the good results emerge from a dialogue between lawyers, investment
229 Because foreign issuers desiring to make an initial public offering in the U.S. generally
have numerous disclosure problems (particularly on accounting), they and their counsel often
make contact with the SEC early in the U.S. capital-raising process. At such time, the staff could
begin to explore with a foreign issuer what would constitute in its case adequate corporate gov-
ernance disclosure. The SEC could also develop specialists on corporate governance for a spe-
cific country, and these specialists might spend some time with their regulatory counterparts in
that country in order to familiarize themselves with corporate governance developments and
issues there. As explained above, see supra note 73, moreover, the proposed disclosure require-
ment is consistent with the SEC's recent emphasis on clearly understandable disclosure of "soft"
information.
230 See, eg., William B. Matteson, Building an International Practice, 23 INT'L Bus. L. 516-20
(1995) (discussing the international practice of a large Wall Street firm); see generally Globalisa-
tion of the Legal Profession, 23 INV'L Bus. L. 502-48 (1995) (issue devoted to the subject).
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bankers and company officials with the result that they translate infor-
mation about a foreign company into a framework and language that
U.S. investors can understand. 23 1
Because of the skeletal SEC disclosure requirements on foreign
corporate governance, there is no incentive or need now for securities
lawyers involved in a U.S. securities offering or listing to produce any
meaningful communication on this subject.232 If a different disclosure
standard were adopted, practicing lawyers would be challenged to aid
in a cross-cultural communication on one matter about which they
should have considerable expertise, as opposed to so many other sub-
jects of disclosure such as business descriptions and financial state-
ments, about which lawyers can claim, by training and even through
practice, no special knowledge. For all they (and their law professors)
try, most lawyers are neither accountants nor financial economists;
their expertise lies in the law. Performing this disclosure task well
would also demand from them considerable intellect and cultural sen-
sitivity. Although challenges exist in securities law work, most practi-
tioners (in their candid, as opposed to recruiting, moments) would
admit that too much time is spent on the routine, often stultifying
tasks of managing a paper-intensive process. 23 3
231 The above comments are based not upon an exhaustive review of prospectuses, but upon
the author's approximately five years of experience, in this country and in Europe, helping for-
eign company officials and investment bankers write offering and listing documents for SEC
purposes.
232 This is not to say that such communication does not occasionally occur. See, eg., Steven-
son, supra note 86, at 206-07 (discussing the difficulty of explaining foreign corporate governance
differences in SEC prospectuses).
233 The purpose of the proposed modification to SEC disclosure on foreign corporate govern-
ance is not to give more employment to lawyers (although these days, as some of us law profes-
sors know all too well, many young lawyers could use more, and better, employment), or to
further the global "hegemony" (to turn Edward Greene's word back against him) of Wall Street
securities lawyers and the SEC staff. If the proposal makes sense for other reasons, it may also
ameliorate securities practice in a small way.
For legal and practical reasons, the above reform does not reach corporate governance dis-
closure by foreign companies that can use the Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption. The jurisdictional and
comity concerns that, some thirty years ago, weighed against the SEC's extending mandatory
disclosure to these companies have only been reinforced in a world of international securities
markets. Any reform to corporate governance disclosure from such companies would likely
have to await a major change to mandatory disclosure. See, eg., Greene, supra note 111, at 443-
44 (discussing abolition of Rule 12g3-2 in favor of significant deference to foreign disclosure
standards for foreign companies "voluntarily" entering U.S. markets).
That U.S. investors purchasing securities of such exempt companies (which are increasingly
numerous) will thus continue to rely upon home country disclosure for foreign corporate govern-
ance information may be an acceptable state of affairs. The growth in the use of Rule 12g3-2(b)
primarily arises from companies making placements under Rule 144A to qualified institutional
investors. See id. at 417, 425. Because these investors are all very large institutions that prefer to
make securities purchases outside the mandatory disclosure system and that have the economic
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:119 (1996)
B. A Response to Some Objections
The proposed reform to foreign corporate governance disclosure
admittedly runs counter to some current thinking about mandatory
disclosure and foreign companies. For varying reasons that have been
raised in the past (i.e., concern about alienating foreign issuers, im-
provements in foreign disclosure systems), there is increasing support
for U.S. deference to home country disclosure standards.'- 4 From a
practical perspective, the political tide is running against any increase
in disclosure burdens upon issuers.2 35  Even more importantly, any
proposal for reform is perilous in the current market environment: the
globalization of investments, securities markets and market partici-
pants, and the technological developments affecting markets, are so
transforming the functioning and understanding of these markets, as
well as the rationale for disclosure, that one must formulate a reform
cautiously, lest one find that the reasons justifying it already swept
away. It is worthwhile, then, to consider and to answer several objec-
tions to the proposed reform, many of which are related to globaliza-
tion and technology. Although I now find these objections (which
might be seen as alternatives to the proposal) not entirely satisfactory
and thus see continued reason for the reform despite them, I recog-
nize that, in the evolving market and technological situation, they
(and others) could in time carry more weight.
power to negotiate for desired disclosure (or to obtain it elsewhere), the SEC need not necessar-
ily be concerned about the kind of foreign corporate governance disclosure they are receiving.
Any reform in SEC mandatory foreign corporate governance disclosure, moreover, will likely
have an impact upon disclosure in Rule 144A placements because disclosure documents in such
transactions are generally modelled upon SEC disclosure documents. See, e.g., RENAULT, OF-
FERING CIRCULAR (1994) (offering circular used in Renault's Rule 144A offering that, for all
practical purposes, looks like an SEC prospectus - including in its discussion of corporate
governance).
Z34 See, eg., Fox, supra note 220, at 4-5 (arguing that a company's disclosure in all capital
markets should be determined by home country standards); Greene, supra note 111, at 438-43.
235 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, tit. 1,
§106, 110 Stat. 3416,3424 (1996) (amending securities laws to require commission, when engaged
in rulemaking, also to consider "whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation"). See Id. tit. 5, § 509 at 3449 (requiring commission to prepare within one
year a report "on progress in the development of international accounting standards and the
outlook for successful completion of a set of international standards that would be acceptable to
the commission for offerings and listings by foreign corporations in the United States markets").
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DIscLosuRE SIMPLImCATION, supra note 73 (making recom-
mendations aimed at, among other things, the simplification and readability of disclosure). See
also Michael Schroeder, Guess Who's Gunning for the SEC, Bus. WK., Aug. 14, 1995, at 40
(describing Republican attacks on SEC). The one possible exception is in disclosure on complex
financial products or derivatives.
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It could be contended that, while a focus upon the uniqueness of
specific corporate governance systems and an understanding of them
as cultural products were once worthy goals, the SEC's minimal dis-
closure of foreign corporate governance turns out now to make per-
fect sense. Not only, one might argue, are there large areas of overlap
between corporate governance systems, but also, because of increas-
ing globalization and internationalization of the securities markets,
these areas of overlap will inevitably expand.3 6 Capital market fi-
nancing is gradually replacing other forms of corporate finance in
many countries throughout the world. This kind of financing invaria-
bly brings with it U.S.-style corporate governance (i.e., strong manag-
ers, weak owners), and such corporate governance demands U.S.-style
disclosure as a response to its problems. In time, so the argument
goes, foreign countries will adopt disclosure about management and
shareholder rights not so different from what the SEC now requires of
U.S. companies. Then either foreign companies could easily comply
with U.S. disclosure requirements, or - what amounts to the same
thing - U.S. investors will be able to rely upon home country disclo-
sure, which will be identical to U.S. disclosure.
This objection is basically an assertion of a standard economic
argument about the evolutionary emergence of an economic form
(here a corporate governance structure) particularly well-suited to ex-
isting circumstances. 3 7 And, given the current transformation of in-
ternational securities markets, it has a considerable intuitive appeal.
It is possible, for example, to suggest from existing evidence that
French corporate governance is progressing, albeit in fits and starts,
towards a U.S.-style system because French capitalism, despite such
phenomena as the noyaux durs, is beginning to resemble a capitalism
of dispersed shareholders. Supporting evidence would include not
only the improvement in French capital markets and a gradual trans-
formation in the shareholder base of large French public companies
(i.e., from State and State-controlled financial institutions to unaffili-
ated institutions and retail investors),23 8 but also French corporate
governance initiatives advocating reforms (such as disclosure of exec-
utive compensation) that make sense in U.S. corporate governance
236 See Ramseyer, supra note 4, at 2006 (providing an example of this objection). Cf ROE,
supra note 3, at 198 ("Perhaps finance fragments anyway as a nation advances economically.
This kind of statement is difficult to disprove, since those with this view can always assert that
the natural economic fragmentation is just around the comer.").
237 See generally ROE, supra note 3, at 3-8.
238 See CONIssION DES OPRAIIONS DE BouEsE, 27 AME RAPPORT AU PPs.MENT DE LA
RAPuBuoun 112-16 (1994); Fanto, supra note 4, at 41-49.
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terms.239 In recent years, moreover, the primary French market regu-
lator, the Commission des Op6rations de Bourse (COB), has gained
increasing powers and expertise over French capital markets, with one
of its goals being the improvement of disclosure or transparency - a
goal that makes sense in a world of dispersed shareholders. 24 0 French
corporate finance, corporate governance and disclosure may all be-
come indistinguishable from similar U.S. phenomena.
This objection, moreover, does not depend upon the triumph of a
U.S. model of corporate governance. Globalization may create a new
"world" corporate governance that, while similar to, may not be the
same as, U.S. corporate governance. This new form may reflect the
emergence, and perhaps dominance, of an international capital mar-
ket institutional investor that seeks specific relationships with compa-
nies and that requires certain disclosure of them.241 If this
international governance and investor exists, national market authori-
ties should be focusing on them, rather than on reforming their disclo-
sure of differences in other national corporate governance systems,
which may soon be obsolete. The SEC's major initiatives exempting
sales of securities to large institutional investors or transactions in
which such investors generally participate from disclosure require-
ments would be the appropriate kind of regulation in this context.24 2
Efforts to harmonize disclosure schemes, or even corporate gov-
ernance, whether on a regional or international level, may also be
seen as attempts to respond to the needs of these new international
investors. From this article's perspective, such harmonization is gen-
erally unsatisfactory because it ignores cultural differences. It either
reflects a model adapted from the most politically powerful or astute
country involved in the harmonization effort or it is so general as to be
useless in disclosing in a meaningful way significant information in any
239 CONSEIL NATIONAL DU PATRONAT FRANC s, AssocIArION FRANCAISE DES EN.
TREPRisEs PxuvtEs, THE BOARD OF DiEBCrORS OF LISTED COMPANIES IN FRANCE (July 10,
1995) (committee of executives of major French companies proposes reforms to board structure
in France); CONMUssIoN DES OPPRA ONS DE BOuRSE, supra note 238, at 85-89 (setting out
recommendations for corporate governance reform in France).
240 See Fanto, supra note 4, at 43-44.
241 Cf. Coffee, supra note 33, at 1182-85 (discussing the relationship of institutional investors
with issuers).
242 See supra notes 194-195. Arguably, Rule 144A and Regulation S exempt from SEC regu-
lation global securities offerings and trading among companies and large institutional investors.
See generally Sara Hanks, Rule 144A: Another Cabbage in the Chop Suey, 24 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 305, 321-31 (1990) (discussing the SEC's reasoning in accommodating large
institutional investors).
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national setting.24 3 By contrast, harmonization of disclosure has con-
siderable appeal if it constitutes an international effort to respond to
the needs of a new kind of transnational institutional investor.
Because it is not clear how this complex situation will play out, it
is difficult to say now with confidence that the U.S. model of corpo-
rate governance and disclosure will prevail in the developed world.244
As the case of France suggests, evidence points in two directions: the
adoption of the U.S. model and the emergence of a new form of
French corporate governance distinct from U.S. corporate govern-
ance. Professor Roe cautions that even U.S. corporate governance
may be changing, partly in response to foreign pressures.245 Even if
the U.S. model is transforming foreign corporate governance systems,
moreover, this phenomenon is not just the adaptation of the most suit-
able form to given market circumstances, but also a complex cultural
process involving local parties whose interests lie in promoting a U.S.
model of governance and disclosure.24 6 This process brings with it fur-
243 Cf. Dezalay, Between the State, Law and Market: The Social and Professional Stakes in
the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Area, supra note 19, at 17-19 (discussion of the
formation of an international field); Fox, supra note 220, at 41 (arguing that harmonization is
unlikely to work since there is an economically optimal level of disclosure in each country);
Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from
Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. Rv. 557, 590 (1994) (criticizing the formalist strain in harmonization
efforts). On harmonization in securities laws, see, e.g., Warren, supra note 201, at 190-93; Bean
Counters, Unite!, EcoNoMIsT, June 10, 1995, at 67-68 (discussing development of international
accounting standards). As an example of the minimal disclosure that has emerged from harmo-
nization, see Council Directive of Mar. 5, 1979 Coordinating the Conditions for the Admission of
Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, No. L 66 OFF. J. EuR. CoMns. 21, 30-31 (1979)
(describing very minimal disclosure on corporate governance matters).
244 See RoE, supra note 3, at 198-99 (discussing failure of German and Japanese corporate
governance yet to evolve toward U.S. market capitalism).
245 See id. at 223, 275-81. See also Fanto, supra note 4, at 1-6 (referring to changes in U.S.
corporate governance with the rise of U.S. institutional investors as a new possible check upon
management power); Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 107-11 (arguing that U.S. financial institu-
tions, even if laws are changed to allow them to own large stakes in enterprises, will likely never
be a factor in U.S. corporate governance, given the advanced development of U.S. capital mar-
kets). Cf. Kester & Luehrman, supra note 14 (discussing corporate governance in LBO firms
that differs from standard U.S. model).
246 See Dezalay, supra note 19, at 1-4; Dezalay & Garth, supra note 19, at 61-62. See generally
DEZALAY, supra note 19, at 119-61. Adoption of U.S.-style corporate governance in a particular
country would thus be a complex process that might be occasioned by pressure from interna-
tional organizations (where the SEC and U.S. lawyers would be significantly represented), by
the influence of U.S. groups, such as institutional investors and U.S. lawyers through their offices
and business, and by domestic forces, such as foreign lawyers and investment bankers with U.S.
training, who would find it in their interest (i.e., because their expertise would be valued) to
support U.S.-style changes to governance and disclosure. Cf. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 19, at
40-41 ("As is true for the entire field of business law, the Anglo-American model of the business
enterprise and merchant competition is tending to substitute itself for the Continental model of
legal artisans and corporatist control over the profession.") (citation omitted); Fanto, supra note
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ther complications, including the possibility of a failure for the U.S.
model that owes more to social struggles than economic logic. 24 7
Although in its strongest form this objection to the reform consti-
tutes a recognition of the complex process of convergence (or noncon-
vergence) of corporate governance systems, it does not support
remaining with the status quo of SEC disclosure requirements on for-
eign corporate governance. While the new international institutional
investors exist, they do not yet dominate world or national markets.248
Although these new investors may have different relationships with
corporations and disclosure needs, national market authorities still
have to focus their disclosure requirements upon the prevailing na-
tional investors, which are both institutional and retail. And, as noted
above, harmonization of disclosure frameworks is unlikely to help
these investors in understanding foreign corporate governance. That
the role of the institutional investor in international corporate govern-
ance is evolving, however, supports reform at the SEC (rather than in
Congress), which can continue to adapt its regulations to changing
market circumstances.
Another objection to reform is that the SEC should not modify
its disclosure requirements for foreign issuers, because no market
problem exists. If information about foreign corporate governance is
4, at 67-74 (discussing U.S. institutional investors in France); MICHEL ALBERT, CAPrrALISME
CoN'rRE CAPITAUSME 12-20 (1991) (arguing against the importation into France of U.S. market
capitalism in favor of a corporate governance system more similar to that in Germany, partly
because of the disfavorable "social" results of U.S. capitalism).
247 For example, French corporate governance may now be a subject of discussion and analy-
sis in France because, given scandals regarding executives and current market circumstances,
there is some perception that the traditional corporate governance form no longer "works" ade-
quately. Cf PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLmN OF A THmoRY OF PRACTICE 169 (Richard Nice, trans.,
1977) ("It is when the social world loses its character as a natural phenomenon that the question
of the natural or conventional character (phusei or nomo) of social facts can be raised.") (foot-
note omitted); Pastr6, supra note 4, at 19 ("C'est quand les tensions se font plus vives que les
contradictions d'un systhme de pouvoir apparaissent au grand jour et appellent les rdformes.").
248 See, eg., Jun-Koo Kang and Rene M. Stulz, Why is there a Home Bias? An Analysis of
Foreign Portfolio Equity Ownership in Japan (Dec. 7-9, 1995) (unpublished paper, presented at
New York Stock Exchange Conference on Recent Developments in International Equity Mar-
kets, on file with author) (discussing why, despite economic theories to the contrary, domestic
investors invest the overwhelming part of their assets in domestic securities); Stay-At-Home
Shareholders, ECONoMIsT, Feb. 17,1996, at 75. But see CAROLYN K. BRANCATO, 1 THE BRAN-
CATO REPORT ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTENT. PATTERNS OF INSTUTITUIONAL INVESTMENT &
CONTROL IN THE USA, 58-67 (Sept. 1994) (describing increase in holdings of foreign equities by
U.S. institutional shareholders); James L. Cochrane, James E. Shapiro & Jean E. Tobin, Foreign
Equities and U.S. Investors: Breaking Down the Barriers Separating Supply and Demand, New
York Stock Exchange Working Paper 95-04, 3-6 (1995) (unpublished paper on file with author)
(pointing out that U.S. investors' holdings of foreign equity have doubled (from 3% to 5.5%) in
the last five years).
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readily available to U.S. investors outside SEC disclosure, there is no
problem for the SEC to address. If, as Judge Easterbrook and Profes-
sor Fischel have argued, the value of mandatory disclosure lies in its
"standardization" (i.e., it is the lowest cost solution to the production
of readily ascertainable facts about companies for investors), the
"open-ended" disclosure suggested by the proposal does not belong in
mandatory disclosure and is best (i.e., less costly for all) left to other
sources.24 9 In fact, given the ever-present possibility that the SEC
may maximize its own importance in promulgating regulations, it
would be inappropriate to recommend that the SEC focus upon
problems in foreign corporate governance disclosure, which, if other
sources of information exist, would generate needless social costs and
little benefit to investors.250 The absence of a problem may rather
suggest that the SEC take the final step of complete deference to
home country disclosure for foreign companies that make a public of-
fering or listing in the United States, as it did for Section 12(g) foreign
companies. To modify Edward Greene's terms, "hegemony" (now
written, on corporate governance matters at least, with a small "h")
would give way to "Deference" to foreign disclosure.25 1
U.S. investors have access to considerable information about and
explanations of foreign corporate governance. In recent years, organi-
zations, generally known as global proxy firms, have come into exist-
ence specifically to help large U.S. institutional investors manage their
overseas investments.252 These firms fill a market and legal need: in-
stitutional investors make foreign investments and recent legal
changes compel them to pay increasing attention to the corporate gov-
249 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 38, at 700-07.
250 See Macey, Admiministrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation, supra
note 19, at 921-27 (pointing out that the SEC seizes any chance to manufacture a crisis to con-
tinue to justify its existence).
251 See Greene, supra note 111, at 413 (title). See also id. at 434-44 (arguing for greater defer-
ence to home country disclosure in the listed or public offering cases, and an accompanying
restriction on the use of Rule 12g3-2(b)). Although this "quid pro quo" to the SEC (you allow
deference to foreign disclosure standards and we'll give up reliance upon Rule 12g3-2) has a
surface logic, it amounts to making the situation for listed companies identical to the "hands-off"
SEC approach for Rule 12g3-2(b) companies. In other words, if deference to home country
disclosure becomes the norm for listed companies, why would any foreign company have re-
course to the Rule?
252 The firms do not so much help institutional investors decide whether to make, or to hold
onto, an investment as they help investors understand the corporate governance environment in
foreign countries and the way for them to exercise their shareholder rights. The major firms
include the Investor Responsibility Resource Center, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. and
Global Proxy Services Corporation. See generally Fanto, supra note 4, at 26-28 (describing the
firms and the services they provide).
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ernance of their portfolio foreign companies. 25 3 Through personal
meetings with foreign companies and from foreign country sources,
these firms gather more information than any disclosure statement
based upon "bare bones" SEC corporate governance disclosure re-
quirements could present. 54 The firms also produce corporate gov-
ernance information in a readable form and from a critical
perspective, pointing to problems in companies and countries.25 5 This
presentation contrasts with the typical SEC disclosure statement,
which, as seen above, rarely provides a meaningful discussion of an
issuer's corporate governance practices.
Although only the largest of institutional investors use the global
proxy services, other investors indirectly benefit from them if, as is
often the case, they make investments through these financial in-
termediaries.25 6 All investors, moreover, have access to considerable
information about foreign companies and their governance from the
financial press, 5 7 which increasingly covers these subjects, and from
technological resources. An investor with a computer and modem can
access information on foreign companies throughout the world, and
253 See supra note 13.
254 For example, Institutional Investor Services uses as a French contact, Franklin Global Re-
search, an organization run by Sophie L'Hdlias, a bilingual lawyer and investment banker with
training both in France and the U.S. She is thus particularly well-suited to understand French
corporate governance and to explain it to U.S. investors. In an SEC public offering and private
placements, U.S. institutional investors do have the advantage of "road shows" and "one on
one" meetings with major officers of foreign companies and, from such meetings and presenta-
tions, can obtain a better knowledge of the company's corporate governance. See 1 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 337. Yet the global proxy firms ensure that these meetings, or their
equivalent, occur on an ongoing basis.
255 See, e.g., Howard D. Sherman, Corporate Governance Changes Make Inroads in Europe,
10 IssUE ALERT 1, 3-5, 12-14 (Sept. 1995) (discussing corporate governance developments in
various European countries); INsTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC., PROXY '95: THE
GLOBAL PARADIGM: THE ISS ANNUAL PROXY CONFERENCE (1995) (binder including materials
on U.S. and foreign corporate governance); INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC.,
PROXY IssUES '96: THE ANNUAL ISS PROXY CONFERENCE (1996) (binder including corporate
governance "snapshots" of numerous foreign countries); INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERV-
ICES, INC, ISS SPECIAL REPORT- GLOBAL PROXY REVIEW SECOND QUARTER 1995 (1995) (re-
view of corporate governance issues worldwide).
256 See Seligman, supra note 7, at 489 n.22, 490 n.33, and 491 n.34 (citing statistics given in
CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AN CAPITAL
MARKETS 8 (Sept. 1991); NYSE SHAREOwr-mRnsHm 10 (1990) pointing to the dominance of large
institutional investors as investment vehicles for retail and smaller institutional investors); THE
BRANCATO REPORT, supra note 248, at 10-11 (describing steady increase in institutional inves-
tors' share of U.S. equity market).
257 For example, the financial press has covered in some detail and sophistication corporate
governance developments in France. See, e.g., France's Boardroom Revolution, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 17, 1995, at A20; Andrew Jack, Monarchs, not Gurus, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at 9.
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this information will become only more available in the future.258
Any enterprising investor with a minimum of computer literacy would
be able greatly to supplement SEC disclosure documents when gath-
ering information about corporate governance in a particular foreign
company.
Although it may be useful for an individual investor to have di-
rect access to information about foreign companies and for institu-
tional investors to employ the global proxy services, these sources of
information may not be that significant for any investment decision in
a foreign security. If foreign securities markets are efficient in at least
a semi-strong sense, the market price of a given foreign company's
stock should reflect all relevant publicly available company informa-
tion, including information about its corporate governance. 259 An in-
vestor thus need only determine whether the company's shares are
trading in an efficient foreign market and the extent of the effi-
ciency.26° From the efficient market perspective, any increase in SEC
258 To take an example that is indicative of technological developments, there is considerable
relevant corporate governance information on foreign companies in an electronic service such as
LEXIS/NEXIS (eg., Company, World News files). There an investor can retrieve general infor-
mation about companies, analysts' reports on companies and individual industries, as well as
legal and news documents dealing with foreign corporate governance. See also MORNINGSTAR,
supra note 8, at 30-31 (discussion of service on ADRs); Seligman, supra note 7, at 495 ("To what
extent does computer technology on a twenty-four hour basis facilitate institutional and individ-
ual cross-border trading?"). See generally REPORT OF rm TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE SIMU-
FICATION, supra note 73, at 26-27 (describing investor access to foreign company information
through new technological resources); Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the
Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 747, 757-59 (1985); Macey & Miller, supra
note 4, at 98 (explaining that technological advances have brought information about capital
raisers and their assets to more investors and have thus eliminated a traditional source of bank-
ing strength as providers and evaluators of company information); Lewis D. Solomon & Louise
Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging Global Market and
the Implications for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299 (1991) (general discussion of influ-
ence of technology upon securities trading).
259 See sources cited supra note 38, para 2.
260 An analysis of the efficiency of a given foreign market as to corporate governance infor-
mation would require establishing a typology of the kinds of corporate governance information
that is available and of the market mechanisms (e.g., professional traders) processing this infor-
mation. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraaklnan, supra note 33, at 590 (presenting a chart listing mecha-
nisms and the kinds of distribution of information through them).
Available empirical evidence suggests that major foreign markets are efficient in at least
some sense of the term. See William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant Regulation of
Foreign Security Trading and U.S. Competitiveness, in MODERNIZING U.S. SEcurrmEs REGIULA-
TION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTrvES 39, 50 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis
eds., 1992); Franklin R. Edwards, SEC Requirements For Trading of Foreign Securities on U.S.
Exchanges, in MODERNIZING U.S. SEcuRITEs REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPEC-
TrvEs, supra at 57, 64-66. But see Carol Frost, Are Global Equity Markets Efficient? What are
the Implications for Securities Regulation? Outline of paper presented at New York Stock Ex-
change Conference on Recent Developments in International Equity Markets (Dec. 7-9, 1995)
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disclosure on foreign corporate governance could well be costly and
irrelevant.261
The above sources of information all increase a U.S. investor's
knowledge of foreign corporate governance, but they are not without
problems. Although the global proxy services provide detailed, often
culturally sensitive, information, they also reflect the U.S. orientation
towards corporate governance of their generally U.S. clients. This ori-
entation may well shape their view of a foreign situation and cause
them to miss some cultural subtleties of a given foreign corporate gov-
ernance situation. Moreover, rather than being neutral reporters of a
foreign context, these global proxy services and their clients are often
actors within this foreign context: in a given country, they are likely
(albeit with local supporters) to push for development of a U.S.-style
corporate governance over other alternatives.262 This is not to suggest
that their U.S. perspective so blinds members of these firms that they
fail to effect cross-cultural communication on corporate governance.
Any investor (and any corporate legal scholar) would profit from their
description of a specific foreign situation. In light of the role of the
global proxy services in the transformation of corporate governance
and their limited availability, however, they only supplement, but do
not replace, SEC mandatory disclosure for U.S. investors.
(on file with author) (pointing out the lack of data establishing foreign market and global market
efficiency). If, therefore, a particular foreign company, or even country, has corporate govern-
ance problems, the company or country should be appropriately penalized by its market price or
an overall market discount. Advocates of SEC deference to home country disclosure standards
for foreign companies have seized upon this data. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 111, at 437. The
U.S. investor may have to consider certain risks (e.g., exchange rate risk) that would not be
factored into the home country stock price, but there are techniques to limit these risks. See
generally BREALEY & MYERs, supra note 43, at 867-70.
261 See, e.g., Macey, Agency Obsolescence, supra note 19, at 928 (pointing to the lack of need
for any additional company disclosure). From a market-based approach, one should simply ac-
cept what, in various markets, market participants have determined to be an optimal disclosure
on corporate governance matters (Le., where they have concluded that increased disclosure does
not produce any corresponding benefit). See Fox, supra note 220, at 32-34 (contending that fully
diversified U.S. investors are unlikely to be adversely affected by purchasing securities in effi-
cient foreign markets because such diversification will eliminate unsystematic risks in the portfo-
lio associated with companies' corporate governance practices).
262 Both U.S. institutional investors and the global proxy services have tried to be sensitive to
the complexities of local foreign corporate governance in their "activism" abroad. See, eg.,
Howard Sherman, Commentary, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 79, 81 (1995). These investors and the
services, however, are increasingly willing to intervene directly in a foreign situation and to pro-
mote U.S. ideals of governance and disclosure. See; e-g., Institutional Shareholder Services Staff
Report, CALPERS Shifts Focus of Activism Efforts, 10 Issue ALERT 9 (Sept. 1995) (discussing
CALPERS increasing foreign activism); Michael R. Sesit, Calpers Voice May Be Heard Outside
U.S., WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1996, at Cl (discussing CALPERS' targeting of corporate govern-
ance reform in Japan, Britain, Germany and France).
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Nearly any investor can access seemingly unlimited information
about foreign companies and their governance, particularly through
new technological resources. Yet the gathering of this information re-
quires time and some computer expertise, and an investor with a lim-
ited investment will generally not find it worth his or her while to
make the effort. More importantly, the information is generally not in
the most meaningful form and is thus not readily understandable with-
out other research and explanations of the foreign situation and of its
critical differences with U.S. corporate governance. This state of af-
fairs may improve as finance journalists and other information provid-
ers perform more cultural translation for U.S. investors. For now,
however, information on the governance of a particular foreign com-
pany that these technological sources can supply is no substitute for
meaningful SEC disclosure, which has the additional virtue of coming
directly from a company that will be sanctioned by legal penalties for
misleading statements.
Finally, it may be at least open to question how efficient are for-
eign securities markets and how well stock prices in these markets
reflect corporate governance information. The U.S. has a distinct kind
of corporate governance of dispersed shareholders that is related to
and inseparable from its efficient capital markets and the role of dis-
closure in maintaining this efficiency.263 It appears contradictory to
assert that in other countries where corporate governance takes a dif-
ferent form than "strong managers, weak owners" (i.e., where it in-
volves the domination of companies by large financial institutions,
families or other kinds of concentrated shareholders and where capital
markets and capital market investors are thus significantly less impor-
tant in corporate finance), stock market prices reflect corporate gov-
ernance information as "efficiently" as they do in the United States.
If, more generally, corporate governance is a complex cultural prod-
uct, one should hesitate before assuming that stock market price can
readily reflect not only this subject, but also the peculiar variations
from the national "model" found in a company's governance and any
ongoing transformations in a company's and a country's governance
system.264
263 See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 14, at 54-57 (explaining that concentrated ownership is
generally incompatible with liquid capital markets).
264 This argument would suggest that, in many foreign situations, corporate governance in
general and differences in company's corporate governance practices would be imperfectly re-
flected in securities prices. Accordingly, portfolio diversification would have little effect in elimi-
nating for investors risks associated with these practices. But see Fox, supra note 220, at 32-33
(suggesting that markets are efficient as to this information and that diversification can eliminate
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These alternative sources of foreign corporate governance infor-
mation, particularly foreign market efficiency, do not therefore render
SEC mandatory disclosure on this subject (if reformed in line with the
proposal) superfluous any more than the great amount of information
generally available on companies would call for a complete replace-
ment of SEC mandatory disclosure. Like other phenomena con-
nected to the globalization and modernization of securities markets,
such as the possible world transformation of corporate governance
and the rise of the international institutional investor, however, these
alternative sources of foreign corporate governance information also
bear watching and need to be revisited. And they thus support an
SEC, not a Congressional, reform to foreign corporate governance
disclosure.
Finally and significantly, there is an objection based upon a prac-
tical concern that, as discussed earlier, has influenced SEC policies on
foreign company disclosure in general and foreign corporate govern-
ance in particular: an additional disclosure burden may prevent for-
eign companies, particularly world-class companies, from entering
organized U.S. capital markets. If foreign companies are remaining
aloof from U.S. markets because of SEC insistence upon U.S. ac-
counting standards, and if U.S. investors are increasing their holdings
of foreign company securities, the last thing needed is another pecu-
liar U.S. disclosure requirement. U.S. investors will take their foreign
company business overseas or to the less regulated U.S. over-the-
counter markets at the expense of U.S. stock exchanges and to the
detriment of the investors themselves who will lose the benefits con-
ferred by exchange trading.2 65 Related to this concern is the argument
that, even if the proposal did not further alienate foreign issuers, it
would induce foreign issuers to provide formulaic or opaque state-
ments so common in SEC disclosure documents, which, produced in
this context, would defeat the whole purpose of the reform.2 66
Foreign issuers, investment banks, and law firms (at the formers'
behest) are likely to oppose, for inertia reasons alone, any increase in
such risks). The proposed reform may in fact enhance market efficiency on foreign corporate
governance by providing professional traders with a meaningful and reliable source of informa-
tion on this subject. Cf Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 569-72.
265 For an eloquent statement of this position, see Cochrane et al., supra note 248. See also
James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate?, 17 FORD.
HAM INT'L L.J. S58 (1994). Given that the author and his colleagues are all executives of the
New York Stock Exchange, which stands to lose if U.S. investment in foreign securities goes
offshore or to less regulated markets, their position is understandable.
266 See generally Kitch, supra note 40, at 763.
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U.S. disclosure obligations. It is debatable, however, how strong their
resistance to the proposal would be and whether the reform would
injure foreign issuers' interest in using U.S. capital markets. The kind
of "cross-cultural" disclosure on corporate governance envisioned by
the proposal is familiar to foreign companies, even if they now pro-
duce it informally. Because of an increase in non-domestic sharehold-
ers, particularly U.S. investors, in foreign companies' equity capital,
executives of these companies find themselves explaining to certain
outside investors their corporate governance arrangements, and their
countries' corporate governance in general.267 Foreign companies
would, therefore, simply have to make formal and systematic what
they have undertaken to do informally and episodically. Unlike U.S.
accounting disclosure requirements, moreover, the "open-ended" cor-
porate governance disclosure requirement of the proposal would
neither impose upon foreign issuers a strict U.S. disclosure format nor
force foreign issuers to undertake a lengthy and costly restatement of
existing information in accordance with a U.S. model. As described
above, rather than placing foreign companies into a disclosure
straightjacket and, thereby, pushing them towards a U.S.-style corpo-
rate governance, the goal would be to induce foreign companies to
provide meaningful disclosure on cultural differences.
The extent of foreign issuer hostility, therefore, should not be a
foregone conclusion. Foreign issuers may not react to the proposal in
a uniform manner and, if they do not, neither would investment
banks. The traditional costs associated with disclosure (i.e., costs re-
lated to revealing confidential information to competitors) would be
low because this disclosure would not touch on the issuer's direct busi-
ness strategies. Some companies, and even countries, could perceive
that they would receive a competitive ad~antage in the U.S. capital
markets from a disclosure requirement enabling them to emphasize
their governance practices. U.S. investors might, for example, insist
upon purchasing at an additional discount securities of a French com-
pany that took its management from the State bureaucracy and did
not convincingly explain its reasons for this manner of management
selection (a discount that would not necessarily be reflected in the
market price in the home market). A French company that selected
267 See Fanto, supra note 4, at 70 (discussing meetings between institutional investors and
French company executives). This past October, the Global Proxy Services Corporation, a
global proxy firm based in Boston, and the Caisse des D6p6ts et des Consignations, a French
State-owned financial institution, sponsored meetings between U.S. institutional investors and
French company executives. Telephone Interview with Joseph C.F. Lufkin, Director of Global
Proxy Services, Inc. (Sept. 1995).
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its management in another manner (i.e., up through the company's
ranks or from an industry competitor) and that in its disclosure
thereof distinguished itself from the French national "norm" might re-
ceive a more favorable reception from U.S. investors (i.e., investors
would pay a higher price for the company's securities). This is not to
say that U.S. investors would reward only those companies that dupli-
cated U.S. governance practices. The example should only suggest
that competitive advantages and disadvantages could accrue to com-
panies depending upon their corporate governance disclosure.
Company competition over disclosure might also reduce the pos-
sibility that, if the proposal were adopted, foreign companies would
produce formulaic, terse and ultimately meaningless corporate gov-
ernance disclosure. In its informal, and often extensive, review of ini-
tial foreign issuer disclosure statements, the SEC could emphasize to
foreign issuers, their investment banks and securities counsel that they
should all make efforts to comply with this new disclosure require-
ment. To address the liability fears that tend to discourage disclosure,
moreover, the SEC might well consider initially granting foreign issu-
ers a safe harbor from Securities Act and Exchange Act liability for
any disclosure made pursuant to this new requirement, as has been
done for the provision of other soft information.268 There is no reason
why, through a combination of monitoring, encouragement and safe-
harbors, the SEC may not elicit from foreign issuers meaningful dis-
closure of their corporate governance practices.
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate governance has become a critical subject for corporate
law scholars and for the general business community throughout the
developed and even the developing world. In numerous countries, de-
bates have occurred and are occurring about a country's corporate
governance, its advantages and disadvantages with respect to other
systems, and about its possible transformation. The attention is not
surprising. As product market competition becomes increasingly in-
ternational and intense, corporations, which are vital to a country's
economic welfare, are subject to continuous scrutiny to see how well
their performance compares to that of firms in other countries. A
268 See supra note 73, para 2. Professor Kitch suggested to me that SEC staff, with the help of
securities lawyers as well as market authorities in home countries, might develop standard de-
scriptions of corporate governance in many countries. Companies could then compare their
governance to these standards. Interview with Professor Edmund W. Kitch (May 10, 1996).
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given corporate governance system may benefit companies and their
home country in the competition.
This Article has shown that corporate governance is a highly cul-
turally determined phenomenon. Although there are similarities be-
tween corporate governance systems, as there are between economies,
there are important differences that owe much to a country's stage of
economic development, its politics and its history. Given the complex
cultural origins of a specific corporate governance system, an out-
sider's understanding of the system also requires a special effort so
that he or she recognizes both the differences and the similarities with
one's own system.
Because the SEC mandatory disclosure system compels foreign
companies entering the U.S. public markets to provide corporate gov-
ernance information about themselves to U.S. investors, this Article
has asked how well this system elicits from such companies meaning-
ful information about cultural differences in corporate governance. It
has shown that, for complex historical reasons such as jurisdictional
concerns, policies designed to preserve U.S. securities markets, special
interest pressure and agency self-enhancement, SEC mandatory dis-
closure does not now encourage foreign issuers to explain adequately
and meaningfully their corporate governance practices to U.S. inves-
tors. The system in fact requires the production of little foreign corpo-
rate governance information.
The Article proposes a reform to address this situation: an
"open-ended" disclosure requirement that foreign issuers explain
their corporate governance practices against the background of their
country's corporate governance system. The success of the proposed
reform depends upon the efforts of lawyers, both those in the SEC
reviewing disclosure statements and advising foreign issuers about dis-
closure, and members of the practicing securities bar helping their cli-
ents prepare the statements. Because, in the globalization of
securities markets, other sources than mandatory disclosure produce
much information about foreign corporate governance, and because
these markets and corporate governance worldwide continue to
change, the reform, like many SEC rules, would be provisional.
The recognition of corporate governance and disclosure as com-
plex cultural products, which led to the identification of the problem
in current SEC mandatory disclosure on foreign corporate governance
in the first place, also supports the proposal. It could well be argued
that, in light of the SEC's own receptivity to special interest pressures
and its tendency to safeguard its own importance, any imaginative re-
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form to disclosure should minimize future SEC involvement. An ap-
preciation of SEC disclosure as itself complexly ingrained in U.S.
culture suggests, however, that it is unlikely to vanish tomorrow and
that it is worthwhile now to ameliorate it. Although special interests
and even SEC self-interest would affect and could even sidetrack any
reform, these pressures will never tell the whole story. Understanding
any situation as culturally complex means realizing that the decisions
of individuals (including regulators) cannot be explained solely on the
basis of their personal, group or institutional self-interest.269
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269 See generally Langevoort, SEC as a Bureaucracy, supra note 19, at 529 (explaining that an
agency's action reflects the influence of different groups, different bureaucratic interests and
power centers, strategic use of rhetoric and some efforts to address what its members perceive to
be the public interest).
